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*John Marquess of Blandford*

*From an Original Picture at Blenheim.  
Painted by Sir Godfrey Kneller.*

*Drawn by J. Wivins—Engraved by W.<sup>m</sup> Bond.*

MEMOIRS  
OF  
JOHN DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH,

WITH HIS  
ORIGINAL CORRESPONDENCE:

COLLECTED FROM  
*THE FAMILY RECORDS AT BLENHEIM,*  
AND  
*OTHER AUTHENTIC SOURCES.*

ILLUSTRATED WITH  
PORTRAITS, MAPS, AND MILITARY PLANS.

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By WILLIAM COXE, M.A. F.R.S. F.S.A.

ARCHDEACON OF WILTS.

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*IN SIX VOLUMES.*

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# MEMOIRS, &c.

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## CHAPTER 48.

1706.

*Sieges of Menin, Dendermond, and Ath. — Correspondence of Marlborough during these operations. — Prevented by the dutch from closing the campaign with the capture of Mons. — Visits Brussels. — Distributes the troops into winter quarters. — Repairs to the Hague.*

ON the reduction of Ostend, Marlborough prepared to carry into execution the design he had already announced, of turning his efforts against Menin, which would secure the line of the Lys, protect his conquests, and afford the means of pushing his attacks with effect the next campaign. To this object all his movements were directed, and he confidently anticipates success in a letter to lord Godolphin.

“ *Rousselaer, June 28th.* — The method the king of France has taken to make good his word to the elector of Bavaria, of putting him at the head of an army of 80,000 men, are the 18 battalions and 14 squadrons which came with the marshal de Marsin; the detachment that is now marching from

Alsace, of 30 battalions and 40 squadrons; and 14 battalions, which the comte de Gassy commanded in the lines, which were not at the battle. These, joined with the troops that were at the battle, would make above 100,000 men; but as of necessity they must put garrisons into several towns, I flatter myself that they will find it very difficult to form such an army as will be able to hinder me from making the siege of Menin, as soon as that of Ostend is over. Menin is one of their strongest towns, but there is a necessity of attacking that in the first place, for that will let us into their *pays conquis*. I do hope the descent will oblige them to make a detachment from this country, or force them to raise the siege of Turin."

He was, however, detained by the tardiness of the dutch in making the necessary preparations, and strongly expresses his disappointment.

"*Helchin, July 15.* \* \* \* \* \* M. de Gelder Massen came here last night from Ghent, and I find we must not expect all our cannon till the end of this month; but on the 22d I think to invest Menin, and employ the first six or seven days in covering some of the quarters; for we cannot spare above thirty-two battalions for the siege. There will remain with me seventy-two, which I hope will be a sufficient strength to oppose whatever they can bring, though the elector of Bavaria says he is promised an hundred and ten battalions. They have certainly more horse than we; but if they had greater numbers, I neither think it their interest nor their inclinations to venture a battle; for our men are in heart, and theirs are cowed. If the

duke of Vendome should be obliged to stay in Italy, we are told we are then to have the prince of Conti."

Before he quitted the camp at Rousselaer, where he had remained during the siege of Ostend, the prince of Holstein Beck, with eight battalions, took possession of Courtrai. On the 5th of July a detachment, which had encamped at Oudenard, marched to Harlebeck; and the prussian and hanoverian troops, who were also on their way to join the army, were directed to advance to Ninove, in order to cover the country between the Scheld and the Dender from any irruption on the side of Mons. The duke then moved with the main army from Rousselaer, and encamped between Courtrai and Harlebeck, having the Lys in his rear.

At this period, the three regiments destined to join the expedition in England, marched to Ostend, where they were to embark. On the following day the army again moved to Helchin, where bridges had been prepared for the passage of the Scheld, the army of Overkirk at the same time occupying the post of St. Eloi Vive, near Harlebeck. As the french had endeavoured to prevent the navigation of the Scheld, by means of sluices and drains, which lowered the water, general Salisch was dispatched with a proper force, to destroy all such works between Lille, Armentieres, Menin, and Courtrai.

Menin, the object of attack, was considered as one of the master-pieces of the celebrated Vauban. The defences were low, without being commanded, the approaches rendered difficult by inundations,



and the garrison sufficiently numerous, and well provided with means of resistance. The marquis of Bully was governor, but the military command was intrusted to the marquis of Caraman, who was versed in the defence of fortresses, and was assisted by able engineers. On the 23d the place was invested by general Salisch, who was charged to conduct the siege with 32 battalions, and 25 squadrons. He took post from Werwick to Wevelghem, and a competent number of pioneers were employed in forming lines of circumvallation.

The heavy artillery having arrived from Ghent, on the 30th of July, the attacks were opened on the night of the 4th of August against the bastion of Capucins and that of Ypres, on the west front; and pushed with a vigour which proved the determination of the allies to profit by the remains of the season for action. On the 18th, the works being advanced to a state proper for an attack on the covert way, Marlborough drew his army nearer to Menin, by taking post between Belleghem and Pont d'Espierre, and himself repaired to the trenches, to superintend the important operation. At seven the same evening the signal was given, by the explosion of two mines, which had been formed on the salient angles of the work called the Half Moon of Ypres. The assailants instantly advanced to the pallisades, threw grenades into the covert way, and entering amidst the confusion, swept every thing before them. For two hours they withstood a heavy fire from the ravelins, and other works commanding their position; but at length the establishment was effected, and stretched

to the pallisades of the four angles. The loss in this terrible combat amounted to no less than 1400 men.

The success of this operation, although not immediately effectual, was decisive; for on the following night, signals of distress were made by the besieged: their artillery was dismounted, and their whole strength scarcely sufficed to occupy the three half moons fronting the attacks. At this juncture, however, the duke of Vendome arrived at Valenciennes, to assume the command of the french army; and it was natural to expect, that as soon as he had collected his troops, he would make an effort for the deliverance of Menin. Marlborough, therefore, changed his position, by stretching his right to Lauwe, though his head quarters still continued at Helchin, from whence he wrote to Godolphin.

“ *Helchin, August 9.* — The duke of Vendome having strengthened the garrison of Menin, and ordered several troops to march that way, he is to be at Ypres this night, so that I have sent this day twelve battalions to strengthen those of the siege. Our cannon began to fire this morning. Three or four days we hope will dismount so many of their cannon, that we may with security carry on our trenches. M. de Vendome has given orders to all the troops to be in readiness to march at twenty-four hours warning, so that in three or four days he may draw them together. By his language we ought to expect another battle, but I cannot think the king of France will venture it;

if he should, I hope and pray that the blessing of God may continue with us."

During this interval, Cadogan, his confidential friend, was surprised and made prisoner, in protecting a foraging party. Before his fate was ascertained, Marlborough testified his keen regret for the loss of so faithful an adherent, in terms which do honour to his feelings.

*To the Duchess.*

"*Helchin, August 16.* — An officer is just come to me to give me an account of the forage we have made this day, and he tells me that poor Cadogan is taken prisoner or killed, which gives me a great deal of uneasiness, for he loved me, and I could rely on him. I am now sending a trumpet to the governor of Tournay, to know if he be alive; for the horse that beat him came from that garrison. I have ordered the trumpet to return this night, for I shall not be quiet till I know his fate."

He had soon the satisfaction to find his apprehensions unfounded, Cadogan being sent back on his parole, two days afterwards, by the French commander. This act of courtesy was immediately repaid by the liberation of the baron de Pallavicini, who had been made prisoner in the late battle.

We cannot refrain from adding another letter to lord Godolphin, written before the close of the campaign, which exhibits the affectionate character of the british general in a no less amiable light.

"*Cambren, Oct. 24. 1706.* — I find by your last letter, that applications are made by Mr. Mor-



daunt and others, for my brother's place in the Tower. I beg you will not be engaged, and that the queen will gratify me on this occasion. I would not have this place disposed of as yet; but when I shall think it a proper time, I would then beg the queen would be pleased to let brigadier Cadogan have it, since it will be provision for him in time of peace. As I would put my life in his hands, so I will be answerable for his faithfulness and duty to the queen. I have for the queen's service obliged him this war to expose his life very often, so that in justice I owe him this good office."

The breaching batteries being now opened against Menin, the duke again went to hasten the progress of the attack. Within a few hours he had the satisfaction to observe the last defences of the place in a state of ruin, and the garrison reduced to propose a capitulation. After some trifling discussion, the terms were arranged, and on the 25th of August the gates were opened to the allies; the garrison retiring with warlike honours to Douay. This success was immediately announced to the treasurer.

"*Helchin, August 23.* — Yesterday morning the enemy at Menin planted a white flag on their breach, and as I was there, I immediately ordered an exchange of hostages. We have this morning possession of one of their gates, and on Wednesday, being St. Louis's day, they are to march out, with the usual marks of honour. We must have eight or ten days for the levelling our lines, and putting the place in a posture of defence. In the mean time, I am taking measures for the siege of

Dendermond. If the weather continues dry, we shall take it; but if it should rain, we cannot continue before it. The duke of Vendome continues to talk more than I believe he intends to perform; however, he strengthens himself every day, with all the troops he can possibly get."

Among the cannon of the place were four english pieces taken at the battle of Landen, which being considered as a trophy of victory, were sent back to England. The injury which the works had suffered in the attack was speedily repaired. The loss which the allies incurred in the reduction of so strong and valuable a fortress, amounted to no less than 3000 killed and wounded; that of the garrison to 1500.

On the surrender of Menin, Vendome collected his troops, and occupied a strong position behind the Lys and the Dyle, to prevent any enterprise against Lille: but the views of Marlborough were directed to another quarter. Dendermond, though not a place of magnitude, was yet so strong by its marshy situation, and so advantageously situated for securing the winter quarters which he intended to occupy, that he resolved to wrest it from the possession of the enemy. The requisite arrangements were no sooner completed at Menin, than the blockade it had undergone was turned into a siege, and troops detached for the attack, the main army still occupying the camp of Helchin. The views of the british general will best appear from his correspondence.

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"August 26. — I have not had the happiness of



any of yours since my last, and am very impatient to hear of the descent, so that I beg you will constantly let me have all the particulars you receive of that matter. I saw the garrison of Menin march out yesterday, they were near 4500 men. The fear they had of being made prisoners of war, made them give up the place five or six days sooner than, in decency, they ought to have done.

“ My brother will be to-morrow before Dendermond, and I hope the cannon may fire by Monday ; and if we have no rain, five or six days may make us masters of that place, which has always been thought unattackable ; and in truth we should not have thought of it, but the extraordinary drought makes us venture. If we succeed at Dendermond, and can in time have more ammunition from Holland, we shall then make the siege of Ath, which will be a security to our winter quarters, notwithstanding the duke of Vendome’s army. If we could have been sure of having the necessaries for the siege of Ypres, I believe we should have undertaken it ; for that place is very difficult to be relieved when the posts are once taken ; but we can’t expect the stores that are sent for in less than three weeks, so that we should have consumed all the forage before we could have been able to have begun the attack. I give you the trouble of all this, that you may see that I should have preferred Ypres before Ath, but the dutch like Dendermond and Ath much the best ; so that I hope they will not let us want ammunition for them.”

“ *Helchin, August 30.* — The engineer sends me word that he finds much more water at Dendermond than he expected. I go there in three or four days, and then I shall be able to send you the certainty of what we may expect.”

“ *Sept. 1.* — I go there to-morrow, and hope by my next to let you know that they have overcome the difficulty; for that place would be very troublesome, it being in the midst of the winter quarters.”

The attack against Dendermond was confided to general Churchill. The attention of the garrison being diverted by a skilful feint, the trenches were opened on the left bank of the Scheld, without loss, and the approaches pushed with such unusual celerity, that the place was reduced to surrender unconditionally on the 5th of September.

To Godolphin the british commander thus writes, in the exultation of success.

“ *Sept. 9.* — In yours of the 23d, you were afraid that if there were any good news from this country, it would find the way over, whereas you had three packets due. When they come to you, you will find every thing you could expect from hence. That of Dendermond, making them prisoners of war, was more than was reasonable, but I saw them in a consternation. That place could never have been taken but by the hand of God, which gave us seven weeks without any rain. The rain began the next day after we had possession, and continued till this evening.

“ \* \* \* \* \* The express that carried the good news to the States of our being masters of

Dendermond, was dispatched in such haste, that I could not write to you. I believe the king of France will be a good deal surprised, when he shall hear that the garrison has been obliged to surrender themselves prisoners of war; for upon his being told that preparations were making for the siege of Dendermond, he said, ‘they must have an army of ducks to take it.’ The truth is, God has blessed us with a very extraordinary season.

“I do not give myself the honour of troubling the queen with a letter, so that you will give my duty to her, and to the prince, and acquaint them with this good success. What makes it the more remarkable is, that this place was never before taken, though once besieged by the french, and the king himself with the army. I hope in seven or eight days we shall have in this town all the cannon and ammunition that is necessary for the siege of Ath.

“I should think, if you have not already, you should now acquaint the dutch envoy, that her majesty has directed Mr. Stepney to come to the army, so that he may act with their deputies at Brussels, in what may be for the public good, she having commanded me to return to England as soon as the campaign shall be at an end. As Mr. Stepney is to be joined to me in that commission, so he will have orders to follow the directions I shall leave with him. You must also let him see that this was absolutely necessary in my absence; so that there might be no opportunity lost for the settling of the barrier with king Charles the third.



I am the more tedious on this subject, being very sure that the dutch will not like his coming."

Notwithstanding the advance of the season, Marlborough would not close this long and active campaign, without some new and signal enterprise. The various detachments being recalled, the army passed the Scheld; and Overkirk, with a competent force, on the 16th invested Ath, a small but important place on the Dender. Marlborough himself occupied the position of Leuze, and established his head quarters at Grametz. On the 22d the trenches were opened, the covert way was carried on the 29th, and the batteries played with decisive effect on the interior defences. The garrison in consternation forced the governor to beat a parley, on the 1st of October. The terms offered by the assailants being deemed too severe, the attack recommenced; but the renewal served only to convince the besieged of their hopeless situation. On the 4th they submitted to their fate, and 800 men, the only effective remains of a garrison of 2000, marched out as prisoners of war to Berghen-op-Zoom.

During this operation, Vendome had taken post on the Scheld, between Condé and Mortagne. With a discouraged and unequal force, he could not risk the chance of an engagement; and now, justly dreading an attempt on Mons, or Charleroy, he strengthened those garrisons. Indeed his fears were not without foundation; for Marlborough intended to close the campaign with the capture of Mons, had he not been restrained by the timid

counsels of the dutch. He thus expresses his regret to his correspondents in England.

*To Lord Godolphin.*

“ *Grametz, Sept. 27. 1706.* — We have nothing new in this country. The enemy continue in their camp, as you see I do in mine. I believe they have no thoughts of disturbing the siege of Ath, so that if I march before the siege is ended, it will be for the conveniency of forage. This last success at Turin has so disheartened their army in this country, that if the dutch can furnish ammunition enough for the siege of Mons, I shall endeavour to persuade them to undertake it ; for I am persuaded, if the weather continues fair, we shall have it much cheaper this year than the next, when they will have had time to recruit their army. But the backwardness I have found in some, even for this siege of Ath, makes me fear that they may create so many difficulties, that we shall be obliged to do nothing more after this siege is over ; so that I desire you will not speak of Mons, till you hear more from me. If we shall do nothing after the siege of Ath, but the putting of Courtrai in such a condition as that we may leave eight battalions in it this winter, you may then depend upon my being at the Hague by the end of the next month. Considering the humour those people are in, at this time, I believe there will be a necessity for the queen’s service, that I stay at least ten days, unless you shall order it otherwise.”

“ *Sept. 30.* — We have had at this time too much rain ; however, I continue of opinion we ought to make the siege of Mons, if we can have a sufficient

quantity of stores; for the taking of that town would be a very great advantage to us for the opening of next campaign, which we must make, if we will bring France to such a peace as will give us quiet hereafter."

After the reduction of Ath, Marlborough broke up from Grametz on the 12th of October, passed the Dender at Leuze, and being rejoined by Overkirk, pitched his camp between Chievre and Lens, establishing his head quarters in the abbey of Cambron. Vendome boasted, that during this movement he would attack the rear guard of the allies; but he disappointed the hopes of the british commander, who really felt all the eagerness, which his antagonist affected to feel for an engagement.

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"*Cambron, Oct. 14. 1706.* — After having had very bad weather, we have now the finest that is possible; I hope you have the same at Newmarket. I send you one sheet of the Paris Gazette, that you may see what they say of the affairs of Spain. I hope you will have better news from that country by the way of Portugal. M. de Vendome tells his officers that he has it in his power of strengthening his army to 140 battalions, and 180 squadrons; and that if my lord Marlborough gives him an opportunity, he will make him a visit before the campaign ends. I believe he has neither will nor power to do it, which we shall see very quickly; for we are now camped in so open a country, that if he marches to us, we cannot refuse fighting. What I most apprehend is, that he will have it in his power to give us trouble about Courtrai."



Alluding to the disputes which then reigned in the cabinet respecting the appointment of Sunderland, he continues: —

“ You will have seen by my last how uneasy I was at some news I have heard from England. I shall continue so till I have your thoughts on that matter; for my trouble proceeds from my friendship to you, and my duty to the queen. For the consequences of what may happen to the rest of Europe, mankind must and will struggle for their own safety; and for myself, I shall be much happier in a retired life, when I have the queen’s and your leave for it.”

The opinion which Marlborough expressed in the preceding letter, was verified by the event; for although Vendome advanced from Mons on the 18th and 20th, at the head of a strong reconnoitring party, and made demonstrations of an attack, he did not venture to carry his threat into execution, but retired as soon as his able antagonist took precautions to oppose him.

Having relinquished all farther operations, Marlborough broke up from Cambron on the 26th, and fell back to Ghieslingen, between Enghien and Grammont. Here he left the command to Overkirk, and departed for Brussels, to regulate the government of the conquered provinces. He made his public entry into the capital of Brabant in the most splendid manner, amidst the joyful acclamations of the inhabitants; was presented with the keys of the town; and received with all the honours usually paid to the ancient dukes of Burgundy. The magistrates offered, on this occasion, what was

called the wine of honour. It was contained in a tun, gilt and painted with the arms of his highness, on a carriage adorned with streamers, and drawn by six horses, preceded by trumpets and kettle drums. The procession was led by a cavalcade of students, richly habited, who presented to the hero of Ramillies, devices indicating the great events of this extraordinary campaign.

On the 31st he rejoined the army, and in the beginning of November distributed his troops into quarters, the english at Ghent, the danes at Bruges, and the troops of Prussia and Luneburgh along the Demer. Overkirk was left commandant in the Low Countries, Tilly was sent to Louvain, general Salisch to Mechlin, and general Churchill was intrusted with the government of Brussels. The duke himself quitting Antwerp on the 7th, repaired on the 9th to the Hague, to complete the arrangements which were rendered necessary, by the recent occurrences on the Rhine, in Italy, and in Spain; to concert the plan of operations for the ensuing campaign; and to take a share in the negotiations, which the dutch government had now opened with the court of France.



## CHAPTER 49.

1706—1707.

*Disastrous commencement of the campaign in Italy.— Danger of the duke of Savoy.— Siege of Turin.— Junction of Eugene with the duke of Savoy.— Defeat of the french, and relief of Turin.— Impolitic and selfish views of the imperial court.— Letters from lord Godolphin.— Recovery of the Milanese, and blockade of the french troops in Lombardy.— Inactivity of the campaign on the Upper Rhine.— Complaints and recriminations of the imperial ministers, and the margrave of Baden.— Events of the campaign in Spain.— March of the anglo-portuguese to Madrid.— Disputes between Charles and lord Peterborough.— The gallo-spaniards recover from their disaster, and straiten the allies.— Arrival of Charles in the allied camp at Guadalaxara.— Contentions among the generals.— Departure of lord Peterborough.— Retreat of the allies into Valencia.— Complaints against Peterborough.— Disappointment of Marlborough.— Correspondence.— Arrival of lord Rivers with reinforcements.— His intrigues against the other generals.— Expedition of Charles to Catalonia.*

**D**URING the siege of Ath, Marlborough had the satisfaction to learn that his indefatigable efforts in procuring succours of men and money, for the relief of the duke of Savoy, were crowned with the most gratifying success.

Anxious to compensate for the disasters in the Netherlands and Spain, the french king redoubled his efforts in Italy, where the strength of his army,

and the magnitude of his preparations, seemed likely to ensure a favourable issue. Since the surprise of the imperialists in their quarters, unusual exertions had been made to complete the ruin of the duke of Savoy, by the reduction of his capital, which was the last rampart of the allies in Italy. He was compelled to seek a retreat in the recesses of the Alps; and while a covering army, under Vendome, seemed to command every avenue by which relief could approach, La Feuillade, the son-in-law of Chamillard, minister of war, was intrusted with the direction of the besieging force, in the full confidence that speedy success would entitle him to the highest military honours.

Fortunately no common obstacles could baffle the enterprising spirit of so skilful and active a general as Eugene; for he no sooner received the promised reinforcements, than he resumed the offensive, at the moment when the cause of the allies appeared most desperate. Descending from the Alps, by passages scarcely deemed pervious, he suddenly appeared in the plains of the Veronese, baffled the combinations of his opponents, and traversing the rivers and canals, with which the country is intersected, compelled the enemy to fall back behind the river Parmegiana.

At this moment Vendome was recalled to recover the fortune of the french arms in the Netherlands, and the command was transferred to the duke of Orleans, under the direction of the count de Marsin. But the new generals were less able to withstand the progress of their enterprising antagonist, than their skilful predecessor. Driven be-

hind the Po, they had the mortification to witness the rapid advance of the imperial general, and his junction with the duke of Savoy; and they had no other means of prosecuting the siege of Turin, than by taking post behind the lines of circumvallation, which they considered as impregnable.

The momentous enterprise of Victor Amadeus, and Eugene, was conducted with consummate skill and promptitude. They met, for the first time, in a meadow near Carmagnola, and having settled their dispositions, effected the junction of their troops on the ensuing day. Ascending the heights of Superga, which command the plain surrounding the capital, they surveyed the dispositions and works of the enemy, and arranged the plan of attack. Inspired by a succour so unexpected, the confidence of the duke of Savoy equalled his former depression. To the master of his household, who inquired where he intended to dine on the following day, he replied, with impatience and enthusiasm, "at Turin! at Turin!"\* Nor did the event disappoint his sanguine hopes. The ensuing morning the hostile lines were attacked, between the Doria and the Stura, and the advantage of superior numbers being rendered unavailing, by the skilful combinations of the assailants, the enemy were forced, after a bloody resistance; and the victorious commanders carried relief to the capital, at the moment when breaches were opened in the rampart, and the garrison was reduced to the last charge of powder.† Marsin was mortally

\* Journal du baron de Montolieu St. Hippolit.

† History of the House of Austria, chap. 70.



wounded, and made prisoner, 9000 men were either killed or taken, and the army which had so long given law to Italy, was driven in confusion and disgrace towards the borders of Dauphiné. Eugene imparted the joyful intelligence to his friend and colleague, with his characteristic brevity.

“ Your highness will not, I am sure, be displeased to hear by the baron de Hondorff, of the signal advantage which the arms of his imperial majesty and his allies have gained over the enemy. You have had so great a share in it, by the succours you have procured, that you must permit me to thank you again. Marshal Marsin is taken prisoner, and mortally wounded. The troops have greatly signalised themselves. In a few days I will send you a correct account; and in the mean time refer you to that which you will hear from the bearer of this letter, who is well informed, has seen every thing, and is competent to give an accurate relation. Your highness will excuse the shortness of this letter, as I have not a moment of time.” \*

This victory inspired the british commander with no less joy than if it had been his own achievement, and he expressed his satisfaction in the warmest language.

*To the Duchess.*

“ Sept. 26.—I have now received the confirmation of the success in Italy, from the duke of Savoy, and prince Eugene; and it is impossible for me to express the joy it has given me; for I do

\* Eugene modestly omits to allege, in excuse for the abruptness of this letter, the pain of a dangerous wound in the head, which he received during the attack of the lines.

not only esteem, but I really love that prince. This glorious action must bring France so low, that if our friends can be persuaded to carry on the war one year longer with vigour, we could not fail, with the blessing of God, to have such a peace, as would give us quiet in our days ; but the dutch are at this time unaccountable."

It was natural to hope that this important victory would not only liberate Italy, but be followed by such decisive operations against France, as might realise the expectations of Marlborough, by bringing the war to a speedy conclusion.

The defeat of the french before Turin, however, produced the same effects in Italy, as their discomfiture in the Netherlands. The jealousies of the duke of Savoy and the emperor, which had with difficulty been suspended in adversity, were revived by success ; and the Maritime Powers, in their turn, had just reason to complain, that the emperor profited by this revolution of affairs to gratify his own interests, at the expence of the common cause. The most obvious plan of operations was, to leave the force which still remained in the Milanese to melt away, and by a vigorous attack on the retreating army, to draw the attention and strength of the enemy from other quarters. To this wise plan of operations the british cabinet looked with impatience and hope. Godolphin, in several letters to Marlborough, speaks both his own feelings and the expectations of his colleagues.

" *Sept. 17.*" After congratulating him on the victory at Turin, he adds, " I shall be impatient

to hear the next steps of the duke of Savoy, and prince Eugene. I am apprehensive the orders of the latter may direct him to the Milanese. But I hope the duke of Savoy will rather incline to push the french from Pignerol, where, as I am informed, they cannot protect themselves against a superior army. You will best judge what can be properly said to them upon this subject; from their allies on this side; and whatever is said by yourself, will have more weight with them, than from any body else."

"*Sept.* 18. \* \* \* \* \* Nor is it less necessary on the other hand, to press the duke of Savoy and prince Eugene to follow the remainder of the french army which retired to Pignerol, and from thence perhaps into Dauphiné; for if those troops should be at liberty to be employed elsewhere, we shall soon feel the weight of them upon us in Spain. I have spoken very earnestly to the comte de Briançon \* upon this subject, and perhaps a word from you to count Maffei, and a letter to prince Eugene, and also to the duke of Savoy himself, may be very useful. Or otherwise the consequence of this great victory, to which England has so much contributed, will not only serve to make the war of Spain so much more difficult and expensive to us; and considering how ready the queen has been to do every thing that could be desired for the support of the duke of Savoy, she may reasonably expect so much regard from him as this comes to. Besides this, I have gone so far as to let the

\* Minister of the duke of Savoy.



comte de Briançon hope, that whenever peace comes to be adjusted, we would use our best endeavours to keep France on this side of the Alps."

These just and pertinent remarks do honour to the penetration and judgment of Godolphin, and were perfectly in unison with the sentiments of the general, who urged this suggestion to the imperial cabinet and Eugene with his usual zeal. But their forebodings were too fully realised; for they had soon the mortification to learn that the enemy had been suffered to continue their retreat to Pignerol unmolested, while the views of the imperial court were carried into effect, by operations for the recovery of the austrian possessions in Lombardy. Within a few days after the battle, the combined army turned their attacks against a french corps left in the Milanese, under the command of Medavi, passed the Tesino, recovered the city of Milan, and finished the operations of the campaign, by penetrating into the Mantuan and Cremonese, and confining the french forces to the citadels of Milan, Mantua, and the other strong holds which they were unprepared to besiege.

The military operations on the Upper Rhine were far from exhibiting the splendid character which marked the campaign in the Netherlands, and in Italy. The successes of Marlborough had indeed checked the enterprising spirit of Villars, who, instead of restoring the honour of the french arms in Germany, as he had boasted at the commencement of the campaign, saw his forces diminished by continual draughts to the quarter, where the victorious army threatened to break

through the iron frontier of France. The margrave of Baden, however, was unable, even if inclined, to profit by the favourable turn of affairs; for his army was also fluctuating by the repeated draughts which the emperor made from his own forces, to feed the war in Hungary; and he was himself gradually sinking under a mortal disorder, which rendered him incapable of exertion, but irritable and impetuous, and impatient of advice or remonstrance.

Marlborough interfered to mediate an arrangement with the hungarian insurgents, which might prevent this perpetual drain, but without effect; for both the emperor and the insurgents were too elevated in their expectations, and too exorbitant in their demands, to enter into any serious accommodation.

During the whole course of the campaign, therefore, an active, though fruitless correspondence, took place; in which, appeals were made to Marlborough on every side. From the imperial ministers, against the inactivity of the margrave of Baden; from the margrave, against the imperial cabinet; and from the members of the british administration, who equally censured the want of zeal and concert manifested by both. The confidence which was placed in his integrity and conciliating manners, also drew on him a series of appeals and counter appeals on one side from the imperial cabinet, and on the other, from prince Ragotski, and the chiefs of the hungarian insurrection.

In Spain, the close of the campaign was as disastrous as the commencement was brilliant and suc-



cessful. Instead of prosecuting their advantages, and profiting by the confusion of a discomfited enemy, the allies displayed that want of concert which generally attends the operations of powers actuated by discordant interests, and directed by different heads.

On the western frontier, the united troops of Portugal, England, and Holland, were long held in suspense respecting the fate of Barcelona. Although they advanced without obstruction as far as the pass of Almarez, on the Tagus, lord Galway\* in vain urged Das Minas to proceed to Madrid, where no force remained to oppose them. Under pretence of securing the frontier, the portuguese general compelled his colleague to assist in reducing the fortresses of Alcantara, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Salamanca; and he could not be induced to direct his tardy march towards the spanish capital, until the intelligence from Catalonia removed all pretence for delay.

On the other hand, the feuds which agitated the petty court of Charles, produced a still more

\* *Lord Galway to Lord Godolphin.*

“ *Camp of Nuestra Senora de Oega, April 12-23. 1706.* \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* The king of Portugal has sent his positive orders to the M. das Minas to march directly towards Madrid, so we have now a fair game to play, except these people will openly betray their king, and the common cause. But, at the same time, M. das Minas has so set his mind on the siege of Badajos, that he does not show the satisfaction one might expect upon such great successes as we've had in a few days. He daily makes new difficulties and doubts, and expresses much unwillingness to go on. I give my lord ambassador notice of it, that he may get the king's positive orders repeated to him, which I hope we may receive at Placentia, to which place I reckon I may persuade him to march, tho' not without difficulty.”

fatal effect. A council of war was indeed held at Barcelona on the 18th of May, and it was decided that the young monarch should immediately take his departure for Madrid. In furtherance of this plan, Peterborough was dispatched into Valencia with 4000 men, to collect and organise an army, and open the way through the mountains which skirt the frontier of New Castile. Instead, however, of displaying the promptitude and decision which the case required, Charles lingered yet a month at Barcelona, importuning the british envoy and generals for pecuniary supplies, that he might appear in his capital with the splendour becoming a monarch.\* Finally, at the very moment when he was anxiously expected in Valencia, he suddenly changed his resolution. Availing himself of a revolution which took place at Saragosa, he directed his course through Aragon, under the pretence of receiving the homage of that kingdom, though in reality to obtain contributions from the States, as well as to escape from the controul of lord Peterborough.

Meanwhile Galway and Das Minas had commenced their march to Madrid, in the full confidence that Charles, with the army of lord Peterborough, would anticipate their arrival. Reaching the capital on the 26th of June, they observed no symptom of welcome or exultation on

\* While he was importuning for supplies of money, and excusing his delay by alleging his want of an equipage, Mr. Stanhope replied, "Sir, the prince of Orange entered London in a coach and four, with a cloak bag behind it, and was made king not many weeks after." — Memoirs of Lord Walpole, Chap. i.

the part of the people, and received no intelligence of the monarch, or the army on whose junction they had fondly calculated. Even Peterborough, whose aid would, at this moment, have been of the highest advantage, imitated the example of Charles, in delaying his march towards the scene of action. The disappointment was rendered more grievous, by reports which were artfully circulated, of the death of Charles, and which deterred many even of his zealous partisans, from manifesting their devotion to his cause. The confederate generals, however, proclaimed his accession, amidst the gloomy silence of an almost deserted capital, and pushed a corps to Toledo, where a commotion was excited in his favour, by the intrigues of the widowed queen, and cardinal Portocarrero. \*

By these delays and divisions, the Bourbon prince was enabled to recover from his disasters and perilous situation. Hastening back into Spain, by the road of Pampeluna, he appeared in the capital, at the very moment when his cause was considered as hopeless, and by this proof of firmness and attachment, gave an impulse to the loyalty of his people. At the same time, Berwick conducted the army, on which the fate of the monarchy depended, with a skill and circumspection, equal to the magnitude of the danger. Without exposing himself to an attack, he hung on the movements of the anglo-portuguese, and skirting the borders of Castile, protected the per-

\* *Memoirs of the Kings of Spain, &c.* ch. 14.



son of Philip ; while he superintended the removal of the queen, the court and tribunals, towards Burgos. No effort was omitted to collect reinforcements, and rouse the public enthusiasm. Philip not only joined the army of Berwick with full reliance on the devotion of his subjects, but had soon the satisfaction to see the two Castiles and Andalusia swarm with new levies ; while hordes of armed peasantry, and enterprising partisans, straitened the communications of the allies in every direction.

At this juncture the allied generals received intelligence that Charles was at length advancing, and Galway leaving Madrid under the protection of Das Minas, pushed forward to Alcala with a considerable force, to facilitate his junction. But it was now too late to remedy the mischiefs occasioned by their procrastination. Berwick still skilfully avoided an engagement ; and retreating as his antagonists advanced through Guadalaxara to Xadraca, was hourly joined by reinforcements, not only of new levies, but of the troops who had retreated from Barcelona.

Meanwhile Das Minas quitted Madrid on the 11th July, and the whole force of the allies was directed against the army of Berwick, which they expected to overwhelm ; but approaching his position on the 1st of August, they were confounded to find themselves in the presence of a superior force. Their whole attention was now directed to secure their junction with Charles, of whose movements they at length received certain intelligence. After lingering a month at Saragosa,



he took a circuitous route, with a small escort, through the borders of Valencia, and was joined by Peterborough, at Pastraña; but the confederate generals had no sooner directed their views to this quarter, than Berwick sent a detachment which recovered Madrid, and expelled their garrisons from Segovia and Toledo.

In this alarming predicament Charles reached the camp of Guadalaxara, on the 6th. of August, accompanied by Peterborough, count Noyelles, general Stanhope, and the prince of Lichtenstein; but brought with him, instead of an army, which was expected, not more than 700 horse, and 1500 foot. Within a few days he was followed by the rest of the force, which together did not exceed 5000 men.

Amidst the public rejoicings for the long expected arrival of a prince, whose presence was expected to ensure the conquest of Spain, the camp became a scene of altercation, and the person against whom all parties directed their enmity, was the earl of Peterborough. Finding himself censured for his delays in Valencia, and mortified by the unwelcome reception which he experienced from Charles, the eccentric peer anticipated his recall, by soliciting permission to fulfil the instructions which he had previously received from the queen, to raise money and succours for the relief of the duke of Savoy.

In a council of war, held in the palace at Guadalaxara, his proposal was warmly recommended, and he was still farther authorised, after he had relieved the duke, to return with the fleet for

the conquest of Minorca. That nothing might be wanting to facilitate his departure, the portuguese general and ambassador consigned to him bills of exchange to negotiate at Genoa, and the king gave him full power to mortgage any part of his dominions to the republic. Thus loaded with vain promises, and impracticable commissions, he took his departure the same evening, to the gratification of all parties, whose private piques and jealousies were absorbed in their common aversion to a general, to whose froward and overbearing temper they all ascribed the disasters with which they were menaced.

The combined generals, to whom the load of responsibility was now transferred, found themselves in a situation of imminent peril and perplexity. They were dissatisfied with the tardiness of the king, disgusted with the interference of his german ministers, without magazines and without money, in the midst of a hostile country, and opposed by an enemy superior in force. Behind, their communications were cut off by the loss of Madrid, Toledo, and Segovia, and around them swarmed innumerable enemies, while continual reinforcements swelled the army of Philip. They had therefore no alternative but to take the only road, which now remained open, to Valencia, and on the 11th commenced their retreat. Proceeding by hasty marches towards the mountains bordering New Castile, they suffered many hardships from the attacks of the enemy, the want of shelter, and the scantiness of provisions. They closed their long and harassing march at Requena, the last town in

New Castile, on the 29th of September, and distributed their exhausted troops into quarters of refreshment.

On the 27th, the king quitted his army during their retreat, and passing through Requena, repaired to Valencia, where his reception seemed for a moment to suspend the recollection of his recent reverse. He could not, however, reflect on this dishonourable retreat, without the deepest regret; and in the course of the march dispatched count Zinzerling, one of his confidential counsellors, to communicate his complaints to Marlborough, and to request that he might be relieved from similar mortifications in future. The letter which he sent by the same messenger, though written with the utmost caution, will show the poignancy of his feelings.

*“Camp of Peral, Sept. 22. — My lord prince, and duke of Marlborough; — You will have seen from my other letters which you received by the count of Lecheraine, how much I interest myself in every thing that can contribute to your glory and advantage, and the reward of your \* merits. Doubting not that you will continue in the inclination you express of advancing my interests, as well as those of the common cause; I am persuaded you will be sensibly affected by the misfortunes I have experienced this campaign, since I joined the army of my allies from Portugal. Of these you will be apprized by my counsellor, Zinzerling, the bearer, who will impart to you my*

\* Alluding to his confirmation of the grant, conferring on Marlborough the administration of the Netherlands.



most secret thoughts and projects. After what has happened, you will be aware that my honour, authority, and reputation, do not allow me any longer to expose myself to the same accidents and prejudices ; and that we cannot hope for a prompt and glorious conclusion of the present war in Spain, unless we adopt other measures ; and unless I am enabled to obtain the necessary succours, and act vigorously with my own troops on the points most sensible to France.”

He then solicits the advice and support of Marlborough, and having requested subsidies and other assistance from the queen and the States, he adds, “ they may be assured that I will neither spare my person, nor omit any exertion to perform what may be expected from me. You will believe, my dear lord, that I entertain no other views, than such as are most useful to the common cause, and most advantageous to the liberty of Europe, and the strict union with the crown of England. This I will always maintain, as a proof of the perfect gratitude I feel for benefits so essential as those I have just experienced from the queen, your mistress.

“ It is necessary also that I should make known to you the great satisfaction I feel in the prudent and zealous conduct of Mr. Stanhope, a gentleman who is endowed with every good quality, and possesses my entire confidence and satisfaction. As he has shown himself equally able in the cabinet and the field, you will give me great pleasure by confiding to him such powers as will enable me to profit by his assistance the ensuing year. On this subject, as well as on other important and secret



points, I have ordered my counsellor, Zinzerling, to communicate with you in the fullest confidence, and beg you to impart your sentiments with similar freedom.

“The services you have rendered to the public and to me, and those which I expect in future, will ever be so deeply impressed on my memory, that I shall neglect no opportunity of giving you convincing proofs of my gratitude and esteem for your merit.”\*

After the departure of the king, Galway and Das Minas remained with the army, to re-organise the troops, and settle the disposition of their quarters. Peterborough, who had not been permitted to share in the disgrace of the retreat, found on his arrival at Valencia, an order from the british government to dispatch a squadron to the West Indies. The intelligence which arrived at the same time from Turin, superseded his intended expedition to Piemont, so that after a short stay to press the siege of Alicante, he departed for Genoa, to exchange his military command for the equally difficult, though less honourable occupation of collecting pecuniary supplies.†

By this fatal reverse, Marlborough was not only mortified and disappointed, but placed in a predicament equally critical and unexpected. Admiring the chivalrous spirit, fascinating manners, and

\* Translation from the original, in french.

† Memoires de Berwick — Narrative of lord Galway — Conduct of the earl of Peterborough — MS. Letters from Peterborough to the duke and duchess of Marlborough, and to lord Sunderland — Journal des Operations en Espagne, in a letter dated Lisbon, Oct. 23; by an officer in the service of the allies.

courtly address of Peterborough, he had recommended him to the command, and bestowed unqualified praise on his splendid achievements. He was therefore deeply chagrined to find that success had rendered him impatient of controul, ambitious of pre-eminence, and no less vain and visionary in his designs, than petulant in his manners, and unaccommodating in his disposition. Peterborough had also not only treated with contempt and levity the young monarch under whom he was commissioned to act, and whom he was interested to conciliate; but from pique and revenge he was suspected of having so far swerved from his duty, as to make private overtures, proposing to assist in raising the duke of Savoy to the spanish throne.\*

In addition to the uneasiness arising from these causes, the intemperate effusions and acrimonious complaints of Peterborough, evinced an envious and vindictive spirit, which it was dangerous to provoke, and impossible to gratify. It appeared that he had already prepared documents to perplex and embroil the administration at home, and had even begun to manifest the hostility to which he afterwards gave full scope, by distributing them through his agents in England, among the chiefs of the disaffected, and the leaders of opposition.

The correspondence of Marlborough is therefore filled with complaints against the misconduct and perverseness of all who were intrusted with the direction of the war in Spain, more especially of Peterborough, to whose froward and arrogant spirit

\* Letter from Godolphin to Marlborough.

he and Godolphin principally ascribed the unfortunate result. A few extracts will suffice to display their sentiments and opinions on a subject in which they took so deep an interest.

*From Lord Godolphin.*

“June 11--22. — I have had other notices agreeing with count Wratislaw’s letter, which you sent me concerning lord Peterborough; but I reckon they come all from the complaints of the prince of Lichtenstein. And though I can easily believe occasion enough may have been given for them, yet I certainly know, by several letters from Mr. Crowe and others, that the conduct of him who complains has been worthless and contemptible to the last degree. Count Noyelles’s letter is very modest, and does not pretend to decide between the two noblemen.”

*To Lord Godolphin.*

“June 18. — The duke of Savoy has desired that lord Peterborough may go with the succours. That part is left to the king of Spain, who, I suppose, will not be sorry to part with him, and his lordship will be naturally willing enough to go, if he does not suspect that it will make the king of Spain easy.”

*From Lord Godolphin.*

“Windsor, July 18. — Mr. Montague, a nephew of my lord Halifax, and one of my lord Galway’s aides-de-camp, arrived here with eight letters from his lordship, dated from the camp of Madrid, of the 16--27 of June; but this gentleman did not leave him till the 29th. I will not trouble you with particulars, because I send you the letters



which he brought, desiring they may be sent to me again at your own conveniency.

“ The same packet brought me a letter from my lord Peterborough, of a very old date, from Barcelona. It is full of extraordinary flights, and artificial turns. But one may see by it, that there is room for every thing that has been thought or said of his conduct there ; and, at the same time, by that and other letters of more credit, nothing ever was so weak, so shameful, and so unaccountable, in every point, as the conduct of the prince de Lichtenstein, and the rest of the king of Spain’s german followers. If Mr. Crowe calls upon you in his return, as I hope he will, I shall not need to trouble you with any more of it now. But it looks as if the king of Spain would never have come to Madrid, if my lord Galway had not sent to him from thence, though there was no enemy in the field to hinder him.

“ In short, as we have had good luck in what has passed, we shall want it no less in what is to come, except the king of Spain keeps my lord Galway near him, at least for some time, as I have most humbly desired him to do, in a letter to himself, purely for that purpose.”

“ *Windsor, July 19-30.* — Since my letter of yesterday, from this place, I have the favour of yours of the 22d, with the inclosed from count Noyelles, whose complaints I believe truly are as just as the matter of them is unjustifiable ; but vanity and passion are capable of carrying people, who have no principle, to do strange things.



“ Upon the joining of our portugal and catalonian troops with the king of Spain at Madrid, it has been thought proper, for preventing disputes, to settle in whom the superior command of all the queen’s troops should be lodged. The lords here have been unanimously of opinion, that it ought to be in my lord Galway, as having the elder commission from the queen, and that the king of Spain’s commission to my lord Peterborough ought not to interfere in this case. I think this is right for the service, but how it may make him fly out, I cannot answer.”

*To Lord Godolphin.*

“ *Helchin, August 5.* — I had yesterday yours of the 13th. I send you back lord Galway’s letter. You will have seen by my former letter, the fears I have that the duke of Anjou, being joined by M. Legale, may be in a condition to oblige lord Galway and the portuguese to retire from Madrid, which will make it very difficult for king Charles or lord Peterborough to join them. I do with all my heart wish lord Galway with king Charles; for it is certain, since the relief of Barcelona, he has done every thing as the french ought to have wished. For had he made use of the time, and marched to Madrid, every thing must have gone well in that country. The cabinet council are certainly in the right in advising the queen to give the command to lord Galway, but I am afraid the character of our ambassador is what will be very uneasy to king Charles.”

“ *Helchin, August 16.* — I agree with you that the germans that are with king Charles are good

for nothing ; but I believe the anger and aversion he has for lord Peterborough is the greatest cause of taking the resolution of going to Saragosa, which I am afraid will prove fatal ; for Mr. Crowe told me, that he once said to him, that he would never have any thing to do with lord Peterborough, that he would not accept of health from him : I suppose this expression is better in spanish than english. The king of Spain was not to be at Saragosa till the 15th of last month ; and by our letters from France, lord Peterborough had not joined lord Galway the 1st of this month, nor have we any account where he is ; but I am afraid the troops are so divided in that country, that the duke of Anjou may be encouraged to attempt the portuguese. Mr. Richards and Mr. Crowe will give you so full an account of what passes in that country, that I have already troubled you too much. However, I must repeat to you what I have already said to Mr. Richards, that I thought the end of June a very wrong time to send on so long a message, the man that has the sole care of the train of artillery ; for lord Peterborough could not expect him back till the month of October.”

*From Lord Godolphin.*

“ *St. James's, August 13-24.*—Lord Peterborough has written a volume to Mr. secretary Hedges. It is a sort of remonstrance against the king of Spain and his ministers, in the first place ; and secondly, a complaint against all the orders and directions sent from hence, and as if he had not authority enough given him, either at sea or land. In a word, he is both useless and grievous there,

and is preparing to be as troublesome here, whenever he is called home."

" *Windsor, Aug. 15-26.* — Mr. secretary Hedges tells me he is causing lord Peterborough's long letter to be copied, that he might send it to you. It is a sort of two-edged sword ; first, a remonstrance against king Charles, in terms as unmannerly as unjust ; and secondly, it is prepared to fall on any body here that shall be in his displeasure."

*To the Duchess.*

" *Sept. 13-24.* — In the letter from lord Rivers, which I sent to the lord treasurer, he proposes to send Mr. Richards immediately to the king of Spain, to concert every thing for their operations. I hope he will also advise with lord Galway ; but I must confess, if my opinion were to be taken, lord Peterborough should not be consulted. I do not think much ceremony ought to be used in removing him from a place where he has hazarded the loss of the whole country."

*From Lord Godolphin.*

" *Windsor, Sept. 2-13.* — I trouble you with a long letter from the king of Spain. In my answer to it, I have not been able to forbear complaining of his inexcusable delays, in not advancing sooner towards Madrid ; though I can agree with you that lord Peterborough's humour may have given a handle to his ministers to prevail with him against his own interest, from a hope they had of squeezing the people of Aragon, as they had before done those of Catalonia. But they have missed their aim in it, as I find by colonel Stanhope's letter,



which I send you; and in a word, lord Peterborough's extravagancies could not have hurt us, if those germans had not outdone him, both in folly and every thing that is worse."

"*Newmarket, Sept. 30—Oct. 11.*—You will receive from me by this post, a letter dated from St. Alban's, and I should not have troubled you from hence, but to tell you that colonel Hamilton has brought me a letter from lord Peterborough, of the 4th Sept., old style, in which, the only matter of fact he tells is, that he had left the army and court, upon a council of war, held at Guadalaxara, pretending he had orders from the queen to go to Italy. The whole council agreed to it, by which we may conclude they were as well content to be rid of him, as he was to go.

"Colonel Hamilton tells me they had the news at Alicant before he left it, of the victory at Turin. I don't find he can give any other account of my lord's journey to the duke of Savoy, than to get some dismounted german troopers, and to carry them back to Spain and mount them. This seems so slight an occasion for a general, that I cannot help thinking it might be worth your pains to engage count Maffei to let you know what he says to the duke of Savoy; for my opinion is, it fully deserves your curiosity."

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"*Cambren, Oct. 18.*—I am obliged to Sir Charles Hedges for sending me copies of all that is come from Portugal and lord Peterborough; but the bulk is so great, that I shall not have time to read them, till I am on my way to the Hague. I have,



however, given them to Mr. Cardonnel, that he may see if there be any thing required of me, so that the queen's service might not suffer by my not reading them."

*From Lord Godolphin.*

"Nov. 1-12.—I take it for granted Mr. secretary Hedges sends you extracts of the letters we had yesterday from Spain. I will not trouble you with repeating them, but I find by colonel Stanhope's letter to me, that the comte de Noyelles is very well with the king of Spain, and of a temper to make them all very uneasy there. His aim seems to be, that the king should act by himself, with a separate body, and the portuguese by themselves. At the same time they allow, that all their troops joined are not sufficient to oppose the enemy at present.

"My poor lord Galway continues so very pressing to retire, and come home, that I really think it would be too great a barbarity to refuse it him; but what amazes me is, that he recommends lord Peterborough as the properest person to succeed him in the care of the whole.

"They press very much for recruits, but seem to think themselves, there is no having them in time, unless whole regiments be sent them from hence, or from Ireland. I should hope the force gone with lord Rivers might be a reinforcement sufficient for them; but how the command shall be settled when my lord Galway comes away, is a matter which I hope you will turn your thoughts to, against your coming over."

Meanwhile lord Peterborough continued to im-

portune the ministers with letters and memorials, vindicating his own conduct, and bitterly reflecting on king Charles and his ministers, as well as on the generals commanding in Spain. He hoped also to secure an interest with the duchess of Marlborough, on whose mind his fascinating conversation and adulatory letters had already produced a considerable effect. One of these will be sufficient to show his design, and display his character and address.

“ *On board the Resolution, in Alicante Road, Sept. 4. 1706.* Madam;—The favour of your grace’s letter, and the honour of those brought from my lord duke of Marlborough, by the count of Lecheraine, I received at the same time. I wish I could have answered both from Madrid, and then my next wish would have been the satisfaction of seeing your grace at the Lodge.

“ You were pleased, madam, to allow me to be fortunate; till I had nothing to wish. Remember, my lady duchess, one of my first wishes is, that I may never lose your good opinion and favour, and yet I am content to suffer the punishment, whenever I deserve it, by failing in my duty to my queen or country, or my private respects due to my lord duke or yourself, for your public merits, and particular favours to me and my family.

“ The most disagreeable country in the world is Spain; the most pleasing, England; our german ministry and spanish statesmen much alike; their officers the greatest robbers, and their soldiers the greatest cowards; the only tolerable thing, your sex, and that attended with the greatest dangers.

Judge then, madam, of my joy and disappointment, when I soon expected the honour of seeing your grace, after a war ended in a year, and a treaty finished in two months.

“ These pleasing thoughts I had, but I submit to the faults and misfortunes of others, not my own. Hitherto I have been only acquainted with success, but attended with inconceivable fatigues. Perhaps I may now have a reprieve, or at least the satisfaction of submitting to whatever the queen shall desire or command.

“ I have troubled the ministers with the tedious particulars, but hope my lord Marlborough’s success and conduct have made our follies less fatal and recoverable.”

Marlborough saw the danger to be apprehended from a confidential intercourse with a nobleman of so captious and imperious a temper, in the actual state of affairs ; and therefore, he not only deferred answering the letters with which he was himself assailed, but cautioned the duchess to discontinue a correspondence, which would eventually implicate her in endless squabbles and cabals. He observes, “ What you say concerning lord Peterborough and his fair lady, is certainly very just, for there is nothing that may not be expected from them. I have observed, since I have been in the world, that the next misfortune to that of having friendship with such people is, that of having any dispute with them, and that care should be taken to have as little to do with them as possible.”

From this statement we may judge of the embarrassments created by the affairs in Spain, and in



particular we may anticipate the mischiefs which were afterwards raised by so restless a nobleman as Peterborough, when irritated by pique and disappointed ambition, and foiled in all his schemes of aggrandisement and distinction.

The perplexity of Marlborough did not, however, arise from the eccentric and perverse conduct of Peterborough alone; for the situation of the army, as well as the rivalry and disputes which reigned among the generals, and in the court of Charles, daily furnished new causes of disquietude. In consequence of the losses sustained during the retreat, the army was scarcely sufficiently strong to defend even the eastern provinces. Hence both Charles and lord Galway sent repeated expresses to England for immediate reinforcements. The only succours, however, which could be furnished with sufficient promptitude, were the troops intended for the descent on the french coast, which were now become useless for their original destination. This expedition had been so long detained by contrary winds and other obstacles, that the fleet did not reach Plymouth till the 13th of August. At the moment of its intended departure, the marquis de Guiscard, the projector of the expedition, was examined, and his information being found vague and exaggerated, the design was abandoned, much to the disappointment of Marlborough. Orders were accordingly dispatched for the fleet to proceed to Lisbon, with the view of conveying relief to the peninsula. After farther delays, occasioned by the opposition of the elements, the fleet at length sailed, and reached Lisbon towards the



latter end of October, the land forces being commanded by earl Rivers, an officer who owed his situation to the interest of the whigs.

Soon after his arrival, the king of Portugal died, and was succeeded by his son John, aged seventeen, a young prince of great spirit and promise, but deficient in experience. The change of government creating considerable confusion, the fleet was again detained, and did not reach Alicante till the 28th of January. About this period lord Peterborough arriving from Genoa, there were no less than three commanders at the head of the british army in Spain. This division of power created great confusion and jealousy, and the embarrassment was increased by the change which had taken place in the disposition of the spanish court; for Galway was, in his turn, become the object of odium, and Peterborough had partially succeeded in reconciling himself to the young monarch and his courtiers. At the same time the count de Noyelles was endeavouring to form a separate party, and by his engaging address had conciliated the good will of Charles; but the person highest in the confidence of the young monarch, was lord Rivers, who laboured to throw equal discredit on his two predecessors, Galway and Peterborough. In the midst of these clashing interests, the three british generals affected a desire to concede to each other the principal command, and all applied for an immediate recall. As it was impossible for all to remain in their actual situation, Peterborough was remanded to Italy; and lord Rivers, unwilling to incur the responsibility of so dangerous a

pre-eminence as the command in Spain, announced his determination to return to England, without waiting for orders. Previous to their separation, a council of war was held at Valencia, to decide on their future operations. The succour brought by lord Rivers, which amounted to above 10,000 men, inspired the generals with a desire to retrieve their recent disasters, and it was decided to clear the frontier of Valencia, and after destroying the magazines of the enemy, to take the route through Catalonia to Madrid. This opinion was sanctioned by all except Peterborough, who, as usual, proposed a different plan of his own.

In the midst of the preparations for carrying the design into execution, when the junction of the whole army was necessary, and the presence of Charles required to stimulate the zeal of the austrian partisans, he declared his intention to proceed to Catalonia, for the purpose of repelling an expected invasion on the side of Roussillon. His minister, prince Lichtenstein, indeed, apologised for this sudden change of conduct, by declaring that his majesty would be ready to join the army in person, whenever he saw it in a condition to undertake the proposed operations. The real cause was, however, a desire to escape from the controul of the british generals.

Charles himself was fully conscious that his sudden departure at so critical a time, might justly expose him to censure. He therefore sent to Marlborough, a long and laboured vindication of his conduct, which conveys a striking proof of his impatience to liberate himself from restraint, and

shews the impracticability of the system hitherto pursued, in giving only the nominal authority to a young and high-spirited prince, and confiding the real power to british officers.

After repeating his former protestations against the disrespect and indifference with which he was treated, and complaining that his presence was made only an excuse to cover the faults of others, he continues: "I give you this little detail, because you are interested in whatever concerns me; and, consequently, in my reputation. I leave you to judge whether I can again expose myself to similar mortifications, and whether I am not justified in declaring, that I will not make another campaign in the same manner. I may add also, that these generals, who think only of advancing, do not condescend to reflect on the necessity of securing what we have already gained, particularly so important a province as Catalonia, when we know that the force of the enemy is augmented in Roussillon. From these considerations, from the conviction that other measures are necessary in the army, and from the fear that the portuguese, as heretofore, have no inclination to act, I have firmly resolved to pass some time in Catalonia, till I can receive your advice and opinion. My reasons are, first, that the generals may act more gloriously, since I have observed that my presence alone incommoded them, that they paid no attention to me, and that if they do nothing, my reputation at least may be saved. Secondly, that I may place Catalonia in a state of defence, and shew to all my allies, and to the world, that I wish to act for the good of the



common cause, where I am able to do something. I can relinquish my interests, but for no consideration in the world will I sacrifice my reputation. Lastly, the loss of my kingdom is a fatality which my allies and the maternal bounty of the queen cannot absolutely prevent; but I should deserve it, were I capable of sacrificing my honour; for even if I should lose my crown, my sword will always find fortune as long as I preserve my character. I hope that no one will censure these, my true sentiments, and that you, as my friend, will render justice to my determination, and explain and support my motives with the queen. I am far from refusing to act in any quarter whatever, and will even rejoin the army, when I see that I can be useful, without risking my reputation. You, as well as the queen, will hear much against this expedition; but you will, I trust, see that I cannot do otherwise, and I place my character in your hands.

“ From the particular confidence I repose in you, I have explained myself thus freely, and I leave it to your discretion, either to conceal or to impart to the queen, the reasons which have compelled me to pass into Catalonia.” \*

Charles had no sooner adopted this resolution than he summoned lord Rivers to Valencia, for the purpose of obtaining his sanction. He indeed not only succeeded in his object; but even seems to have conceived hopes, that if he could procure the transfer of the command to a nobleman who ap-

\* Abridged from the french original.



peared anxious to conciliate his good will, he should be relieved from the controul under which he had been held by the other generals. The effect of this interview was, therefore, a letter from lord Rivers, vindicating the intended journey to Catalonia; and conveying by implication, a bitter censure on the conduct of his colleagues; and another from Charles himself, praising the demeanour and judgment of lord Rivers, and warmly soliciting his return to the command. At the same time the appearance of this new candidate for favour produced a total change in the language and conduct of Peterborough. After having censured the proposed expedition of Charles, as the act of a madman, and suggested a series of plans for the conduct of the war in Spain, which were no less absurd than impracticable, he suddenly assumed a different tone and strain of argument, and in imitation of his colleague, justified the departure of Charles, as the only expedient which he could adopt, to deliver himself from the degrading tutelage in which he was held by lord Galway.\*

Amidst these petty intrigues, Marlborough and Godolphin laboured to bring Charles to a sense of his own interest, as well by their remonstrances, as by private applications to the court of Vienna. They even employed the intervention of the queen, who wrote to the young prince, dissuading him from his ill-timed journey, and recommending him to restore lord Galway to his confidence. But no

\* Letters from lord Peterborough to the duke, Casale, Nov. 10. 1706; Valencia, Feb. 23. 1707; and from king Charles, Valencia, March 7. 1707.

representation could obliterate the deep sense which Charles entertained of his dependence, or counteract the insidious advice of those who were caballing for his favour. A letter from lord Galway to the treasurer will shew the inefficiency of these remonstrances, and the froward temper of the young monarch.

“ *Valencia, Feb. 22.*” After expressing his gratitude for the gracious orders of the queen to continue in her service, and the new commission by which he was appointed commander-in-chief of all the british forces in Spain, he adds: “ When I was so pressing for leave to retire, it was not so much on account of my own infirmities, and the disquiets of the service, as of so many difficulties that made it impossible for me to serve the queen as I ought; but seeing her majesty, the ministry, and my friends, believe I can still be serviceable, I submit to their better judgment. But they must answer to the public for any faults I may commit, tho’ I’ll do my utmost to save them from any reproach, if fidelity, application, and vigilance, can do it; but I cannot answer for my capacity in affairs so very difficult to manage. \* \* \* \*

“ I am extremely sensible of the encouragements her majesty is pleased to give me. I wish her letter to the king, so much to my advantage, may produce a good effect. He has taken no notice yet of it to me. It would not be easy to represent to you that prince’s character. He cannot but have so much respect for the queen, that he will always outwardly shew me a great regard. He always outwardly agrees with me, when I represent

any thing to him; but never does what I advise him to. He has now lately made a german chamberlain of his household, which is one of the greatest offices in Spain, and has shewn very little countenance to the spaniards he is most obliged to. I have already had the honour to tell your lordship how necessary it would be, that prince Eugene came hither to prevent the disorders of the court, as well as those of the field. The king sends Don Pedro Moraes to him. I enclose the copy of the letter I sent him, believing his presence here of an absolute necessity."

Notwithstanding the opposition of the british cabinet, Charles departed for Catalonia. He was accompanied by count Noyelles, and took with him two regiments of foot, and five squadrons of horse, a force which could ill be spared in the actual condition of the army, particularly in the weak and defective state of the cavalry.

## CHAPTER 50.

1706.

*Anxiety of Marlborough and Godolphin to obtain the guaranty of the protestant succession from foreign powers. — Negotiations on the subject with the dutch. — Difficulties relative to the barrier. — Correspondence. — Effects of the exorbitant demands advanced by the States. — Dissatisfaction of the house of Austria. — Private overtures made by France to the republic — Rejected. — New proposal for a negotiation, through the elector of Bavaria. — Conduct of Marlborough. — Decision of England and Holland to decline the proffered negotiation. — Reply to the elector. — Public communication to the ministers of the allies. — Attempts of Marlborough to allay the disputes between the emperor and the dutch.*

IN the course of his negotiations abroad, Marlborough experienced the commencement of those interminable disputes, relative to the belgic provinces, which deeply affected the vital interests of the grand alliance, and for a century proved a germ of contention to Europe.

From the accession of Anne, when the reins of government were transferred to the hands of Godolphin and Marlborough, they had been incessantly accused of a latent inclination towards the family of their former sovereign, and a culpable lukewarmness towards the protestant succession. They were anxious, therefore, as well to exonerate



themselves from this odious imputation, as to complete the system on which they had invariably acted. The liberties of Europe had been in a great degree secured by the recent victories, and the juncture now seemed favourable for establishing on a stable basis the liberties of England, which depended on the security of the protestant succession. The natural and obvious means were, the union with Scotland, which appeared likely to avert internal dangers, and the guaranty of the succession by foreign powers, which was equally calculated to prevent such as might arise from abroad.

The arrangements for the union with Scotland were wholly consigned to Godolphin, as domestic minister ; while those for the guaranty of foreign powers were intrusted to Marlborough, in virtue of his great interest abroad, and the diplomatic authority with which he was invested. As the foundation of this system of guaranty, a treaty with Holland was formed with the concurrence of the whigs. It comprised an offensive and defensive alliance, in the usual terms, for the security of the protestant succession ; and to remedy the imperfect stipulations in the peace of Ryswic, a clause was introduced, binding the contracting powers to extort from France, as a preliminary to any future negotiation, the recognition of the protestant establishment.

It was expected that the example of the dutch would influence other powers, and to secure their acquiescence in the proposed guaranty of the protestant succession, lord Halifax, on his return

from Hanover, passed some time at the Hague. His instances, however, proving fruitless, the States declined giving a distinct or positive answer, and he took his departure for England.

The negotiation being thus wholly assigned to Marlborough, he submitted the question to the States in July, the day before he repaired to the army; and to obtain their consent, he offered, on the part of the queen, to secure to the republic such a barrier as justice and safety should require.\*

To bring the question of the barrier into discussion, was to touch a chord which vibrated in every nerve of the republic. Perceiving the anxiety of the british cabinet to obtain their guaranty, the dutch hoped to procure a considerable accession both of trade and territory, under the plea of strengthening their frontier. Instead of the right to garrison a chain of fortresses, which had hitherto limited their demands, they now claimed a portion of the adjoining provinces, and their views extended according to the success of the confederate arms. New difficulties therefore continually arose, and every negotiation was entangled with the question of the barrier. Marlborough himself, though so warm a partisan of the alliance with Holland, was offended by their insatiable cupidity; and in his correspondence we find numerous complaints, that instead of confining their views to a rational system of security, they were labouring for the acquisition of a considerable kingdom.

These jarring interests not only excited irritation

\* Lamberti, t. iv. p. 77, 78.

between the two Maritime Powers, but even affected the more distant members of the alliance. In particular the austrian princes were indignant at this attempt to rob them of the richest prize which they expected to derive from this dangerous and expensive war. The opportunity also was too favourable to be neglected by the enemy. The king of France saw with pleasure, an inexhaustible source of contention between the principal members of the grand alliance, and renewed his offers of negotiation, with the hope of luring the cupidity of the dutch, by the promise of a more extensive barrier than they could expect from the gratitude or policy of their allies. Accordingly, before the return of Marlborough to England, he witnessed a new and insidious attempt to sow divisions among the confederates, and arrest his career of conquest.

Soon after the battle of Ramilies, an overture was made to the british commander, by the elector of Bavaria, declaring his indignation at the neglect with which he had been treated by France, and announcing his readiness to join the grand alliance. As a proof of his sincerity, he even offered to surrender the fortresses of Mons, Charleroy, and Namur, which were intrusted to his custody as governor of the Netherlands. The opportunity appeared advantageous, and a long correspondence ensued. As on a former occasion, the earnest professions, and pressing instances of the elector, weighed with the unsuspicious mind of Marlborough. He obtained full powers from the queen to complete the arrangement, and conceived hopes of a satisfactory result. Continual



difficulties were, however, started, and the negotiation began to languish. After a short interval, it was renewed with additional warmth, through the agency of the king of Prussia, but with as little effect as before; for the elector rose in his demands, and his offers became more vague and unsatisfactory, in proportion as the allies appeared anxious to purchase his defection.\* At length, Marlborough discovered the insidiousness of the proposal, and broke off a correspondence which could only tend to create umbrage among the allies.

Meanwhile Louis employed the agency of count Bergueick, intendant of the Netherlands, to convey private overtures to the dutch government. The communication was made through Vanderdussen, then chief magistrate of Tergow, and by him imparted to Pensionary Heinsius. The offer comprised the relinquishment of Spain and the Indies, a barrier for the republic, the recognition of the queen's title, and considerable commercial advantages to both the Maritime Powers, on the condition that the Two Sicilies and Milan should be ceded to Philip. Such a proposal made a deep sensation in Holland, where the national jealousy against the House of Bourbon had so much declined, that Marlborough had reason to observe, "It is publicly said at the Hague, that France is reduced to what it ought to be, and that if the war should be carried farther, it would serve only to make England greater than it ought to be. In

\* Correspondence of Marlborough and Godolphin, and letters from the prussian ministers, Wartensleben and Grünkow, to the duke.



short, I am afraid our best allies are very fond of a peace, and that they would engage England to quarrel with the emperor, to have a pretext to come at a peace.”\*

The overture did not escape the notice of the british commander, and he succeeded in convincing the pensionary and the partisans of the Grand Alliance, that it was merely intended to lure the republic into a separate negotiation. It was, therefore, declined, though it long occupied the attention of the two governments, and influenced the discussion pending with the dutch, relative to the barrier. The progress and effects of this transaction are well detailed in the correspondence.

*To Lord Godolphin.*

“*July 14.*—Now that the siege of Ostend is over, I was in hopes we might have lost no time in attacking Menin; but M. Gilder-Massen sends me word, that they have not the necessary preparations ready. But as soon as they come to Ghent, he will let me know it. I am afraid we shall find at last, that some of our friends are of opinion that we have *already done too much*; for notwithstanding what I said when I was at Ostend, that two regiments would be enough to leave in that place, they have left six. But I have writ to the Hague, and if they do not give orders that some of them be sent to the army, they do not intend to have much more done this year. This will appear strange to you, but we have so many of these refined politics, that it is high time we had a good

\* To Godolphin, Helchin, August 30. 1706.

peace. At the same time that I say this to you, the greatest part of the people are very honest, and wish well to the common cause; but those that are of the contrary faction are more active and diligent. Every thing goes so well in Spain, that if we have success with the descent, France must submit to a reasonable peace. The wind has continued so long westerly, that I am afraid several of my letters are at the Brill, which makes me desire Sir Stafford Fairburn to send this. The dutch have ordered their transports to Ostend, so that you will have their troops and the english together."

" *July 15-26.*—I hope the treaty at the Hague about the succession, as it is now settled by lord Halifax, cannot fail to succeed, since the queen will make no difficulty of warranting the barrier for the States, if they will not be unreasonable."

" *July 19-30.*—I am sorry to find by yours, that the siege of Menin is like to go on so slowly; but I see it is unavoidable. I hope your impatience to make an end of the war in this year will not prevail with you to make any unreasonable attempt, nor to push any thing too fast; for I cannot find that taking that place, and perhaps one or two more, which is the most to be expected, would put an end to the war this year. Success in Italy perhaps would do it, or making a lucky use of the powers sent you from Mr. secretary Harley, might possibly have the same effect.

" I don't think the dutch are very reasonable, to be so much in pain about their barrier, as things stand; but it is a plain argument to me, they think of joining their interest to that of France,

whenever a peace comes ; and for that very reason the longer we can keep it off, the better.”

“ *Helchin, Aug. 23.*—I send you inclosed a letter from the pensionary, and my answer. I do not doubt Mr. secretary Harley or yourself will hear from M. Buys, as the french are making applications, I believe, at Vienna, as well as at the Hague. You must be careful what answer you make, for be assured they will not continue the war much longer ; and I am afraid, in a very little time, we shall find that the court of Vienna, and the dutch, are more desirous of quarrelling with each other than with France.”

*From the Duke to the Pensionary.*

“ *Helchin, Aug. 21.*—I have had the favour of yours of the 13th, and shall obey your commands as far as I dare ; for, as a good englishman, I must be of the opinion of my country, *that both by treaty and interest we are obliged to preserve the monarchy of Spain entire.* At the same time, as a friend, I must acknowledge, that I believe France can hardly be brought to a peace, unless something be given to the duke of Anjou, so that he may preserve the title of king. I think that of Milan is unreasonable, since it would make France master of the duke of Savoy, and all Italy. As to what they pretend on the Rhine, I can’t think they would insist on that. The explication of the queen’s title is certainly very impertinent ; for the last peace, in which they take no notice of the successor, was contrary to custom, and the laws of the land. You see that in few words I let you know my thoughts. But I durst not advise what answer you should give ; but I



should think it were very natural for M. Buys to give an account of this proposal to Mr. secretary Harley, and lord treasurer, who will acquaint her majesty; by which means you will have the opinion of the queen."

*From Lord Godolphin.*

"Windsor, Sept. 2-13. 1706.—I now send you a copy of the answer to M. Buys from Mr. secretary Harley and myself. I hope it will have your approbation, and I am pretty sure it is what the generality that one can speak with here, will think very reasonable for us to insist upon. If the very first point be agreed to, that before any formal step be made towards peace, both England and Holland shall engage to warrant whatsoever shall be concluded upon that occasion, I shall not doubt but the rest will follow to our satisfaction.

"I beg leave only to add, that I don't see how this first point can be refused with any tolerable honesty or sincerity, or indeed unless the dutch be absolutely resolved to throw off the mask, declare themselves open friends to France, and not under any obligations to keep farther measures with the queen. This I take to be no easy task, and therefore I am humbly of opinion, that to speak plain to them now, is the best way to divert them from attempting it; for the more complaisance is shown them, and the more we give way to them, it is both their nature and their practice to be the more assuming."

*Reply of the Duke of Marlborough.*

"Grametz, Sept. 20.—At my return this day from the camp before Ath, I had the favour of



yours of the 2d from Windsor, and that of the 3d from London. Your answer to Buys' letter is certainly very right; and if they had no view but their true interest, they would think so; but I am afraid you will find they will make reply to it; for the success with which it has pleased God to bless the arms of the allies this campaign has made them very jealous of the great power, as they term it, that England has in the greatest part of the courts in Christendom. It is certain that the dutch carry every thing with so high a hand, that they are not beloved any where. I am very much of your opinion that before any step be made towards peace, we ought to have a treaty with Holland for the guaranty of any treaty of peace we may hereafter make with France; and that there be room left for the allies to come into it, that if I have her majesty's commands I hope it might meet with no opposition at my coming to the Hague."

*From Lord Godolphin.*

"Windsor, Sept. 18-29.—I had time but just to thank you by yesterday's post, for six letters I received at once from you. The news they brought at last was good enough to make amends for our long expectation.

"I hope before this comes to your hands you will have taken Ath, and turned your thoughts, not to any new expedition, but to end the campaign as soon as the french will give you leave to do it. I don't think their misfortune at Turin will prevail with them to make any detachments from M. de Vendome's army as long as you are in the field; but rather I am not out of pain, lest they may

yet venture something to redeem the blow at Turin on this side, when they think the season so far advanced as that you could not be able to prosecute any advantage you might have upon them. And this seems the more reasonable, because it would be a great help to their negotiation with the dutch this winter, upon which I believe *they place their greatest hope*.

“ Upon this head I cannot help saying, that though some of the leading men of Holland may be blind, or worse ; yet surely the generality cannot be imposed upon so far as to be blown up with a jealousy of the queen’s power, when all that power, be it great or little, has been, and is still exerted, for their safety, without the least view or desire of any extent of conquest or dominion for England ; and when it is plain that in two or three years time France, with the comfort and assistance of peace, will be just where she was before, if the nicest care be not taken to put it out of her power, now there is an opportunity in our hands.

“ But whereas you say in one of your letters we may now be sure of a solid and lasting peace, if *the dutch do not play the fool*: that position is certainly right, if we can agree to carry on the war *with vigour*, as you call it, another year. But the difficulty is in that *agreement*, for I very much doubt whether Holland will make so much as a show of doing it. \* \* \*

“ *The 19th.* — Since I had written the former part of this letter, I have the favour of” yours of the 23d, by which, as also by the letters from Paris to the venetian ambassador here, I perceive

Holland is running very fast towards peace, and therefore I think nothing must be left unattempted of any kind to let them see that the queen will not be compelled in that matter. On the other side, I am of opinion it would be right to humour them the more in all reasonable things, and particularly in the affair of Munster. I cannot help repeating, that now the election is over by a fair majority, I think the emperor pushes that matter too far; and since he has not done, nor can do any thing considerable but as he is helped by England and Holland, it seems to be an unreasonable assuming; and I doubt you will not do yourself a good office with Holland, by leaving too much to the imperial court in this matter.

“ My Paris Intelligencer says M. Rouillé, and the elector of Bavaria, carry on the affairs of Spain with great vigour and success.”

*To Lord Godolphin.*

“ *Grametz, Sept. 23.* — I have forborne writing till this evening, in hopes of having the english letters, or an express from Italy, but neither is come. The germans have at length passed the Rhine, but it is so late in the year, that we must not expect much from them. The 27th of the last month was the post by which you sent me the copy of M. Buys’ letter. We hear that packet boat was carried into Calais. I hope they had time to fling the packet overboard, for I should be sorry to have his letter go to Versailles, though I am afraid they are there too well informed of the inclinations of the dutch; for what has passed in Italy, I am afraid will make them neglect what is fit to be



done for the support of the war, being not only fond, but as they think, sure of enjoying peace before the next summer, which thought can only end in hurting themselves and friends. For as our affairs are in Spain, how is it possible that the king of France can resolve to send for the duke of Anjou back? so that there is an absolute necessity of supporting the war some time longer, which is what you will find them very averse to. They are so angry with the emperor about the election at Munster, that they very freely say that if France were in a worse condition, they might expect from the emperor to be used by him, as he does his own subjects. This, joined with the jealousy they begin to have of England, may give such advantage to the king of France, that he may in a few years recover so much strength as to be able to punish them for their folly."

"*Grametz, Sept. 26. N. S., 1706.* — The baron Hondorff, who gives you this, is sent by his master, the duke of Savoy, and prince Eugène, to give her majesty a relation of the glorious action at Turin. Thinking this opportunity safer than my letters that go through Holland, you shall have my thoughts concerning the dutch: they are positively resolved to have peace, being very angry with the emperor and jealous of England. They cannot agree among themselves concerning their barrier; but the most reasonable are extravagant, so that if that matter be not settled before we come to a formal treaty of peace, the french will certainly make a great advantage of it. They are very positive that the duke of Anjou must have some-



thing given him. In short, they think that by supporting that, they make their court to France, at the expence of England. I am afraid the management of the war in Spain will afford them some reasons; so that the only cure I can see is, if it be possible, to persuade them to support the war one year longer.

“ You know I have great indulgence for what the States General may wish, but they are so very unreasonable in this dispute of Munster, that I hope the queen will not be persuaded by M. Vryberg to enter into that quarrel.”

*From Lord Godolphin.*

“ *Windsor, Sept. 24—Oct. 4.*—I have received the favour of yours of the 23d, with the inclosed from the pensionary to you, about peace, in which he is pleased to lay weight upon two arguments, which seem to me to have so little, that I cannot help saying something upon them to you, because my answer to M. Buys’ second letter, of which I send you a copy, is not so strong upon those particulars as it might have been.

“ His two arguments are :

“ First, that I take no notice in my letter of the low condition of their finances.

“ Secondly, that France may not be so well disposed to treat at another time as now.

“ I took no notice in my letter of the state of their finances, because I thought it unnecessary, the answer to it being so very obvious, for all arguments of that kind must be taken comparatively. And though the land and trade both of England and Holland have excessive burthens upon them,

yet the credit continues good both with us and with them; and we can either of us borrow money at 4 or 5 per cent.; whereas the finances of France are so much more exhausted, that they are forced to give 20 and 25 per cent. for every penny of money they send out of the kingdom, unless they send it in specie, by which means they have neither money nor credit. The result of this first argument is only, that it absolutely destroys the second; since it is plain the condition of France is in all respects so low, that the greatest support they have at present, comes from the *greediness*, if I may use that word, of Holland, to encourage and entertain all projects of peace; whereas, if the allies would agree not to receive or hearken to any proposals of peace, till the state of war for the next year was settled, I durst venture my little fortune upon it, that France would agree to every point mentioned in my former letter to M. Buys.

“As to the project brought over by my lord Halifax, he will send you his thoughts by this post, as he did by the last to M. Heinsius. Mine you will see in the copy of my answer to M. Buys, which goes herewith.”

This letter was accompanied with a reply to Buys, of which the draught has been preserved.

“I am very glad that you approve of the proposition of making a preliminary treaty among the allies, for maintaining the peace that shall be made. I hope my lord Marlborough will agree that with you, when he comes to the Hague. But this cannot properly be done in the treaty for the guaranty of our succession and your barrier; for it would not be convenient to ask some of our allies to

guaranty the succession in the house of Hanover, who are too considerable to be left out of the treaty for the guaranty of the peace.

“ I have seen that project of a treaty which my lord Halifax brought over, and I believe there must be great alterations made in that before it can be agreed to. I think that part which relates to your barrier is so worded, that it may be interpreted to extend farther than you yourselves mean it should.

“ I am also glad that you agree, that if all the essential points are not settled before we enter upon a public negotiation, we give the enemy too great an advantage. I am so much of that opinion, that I shall despair of obtaining any condition of consequence, after the treaty is begun, that is not agreed to before. The time of beginning these private transactions is much less material than the manner of managing them. If the design of them be clearly to let France know upon what terms we think it safe and honourable to make peace, and this be expressed with great firmness and resolution, and with a general view to the interest of the allies, the sooner they know our minds, and we theirs, the better. But if some of our demands are faintly made, only to save appearances with our friends, and France can suspect that we have not equal concern for all the parts of them, and the like resolution to insist upon them, we ought to be very cautious how we begin a transaction, that may create distrust and jealousy among the allies, and give France an opportunity of dividing them.

“ It is very reasonable that Holland and Eng-



land, who have borne the burthen of the war, should be the arbiters of such disputes as may arise upon the interpretation of our treaties. But would you make use of this authority to lessen any advantage that the allies might have from the success of their arms? Would it be a sufficient excuse for giving the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily to the french, to say they were not expressly secured to the house of Austria in the grand alliance? And, perhaps, the apprehension the neapolitans may have of our being too easy in delivering them up to France, may hinder their attempts to free themselves, which the french will not fail to let them know.

“ For my own part, I think the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily would make the french such entire masters of the Mediterranean, would give them such an authority over all the princes of Italy, and lay open Milan and Piemont so much to the attempts that may be made against them on both sides, that the duke of Savoy, after all he has done and suffered, would be exposed to their revenge and ambition. The qualifications and restrictions which you would put upon this article, are the same that were mentioned in the treaty of partition, and were there thought elusive, and of no effect. This was the article most censured in that treaty, and after all our success, I hope we shall not come back to it again.

“ I don't see how the queen can, with honour or decency, enter upon a treaty with France, while they receive and treat another as king of England; and the case now is very different from what it was in the last war. The monarchy of Spain is now the matter in dispute, as the king's title was



in that; and though the king of France should send the prince of Wales to Rome, he would thereby yield nothing of his pretensions to the crown of Spain, and only remove the offence he has given to the queen and the nation, in setting up another pretender after he had owned the king's right to the crown. To put this off till the public treaty, is to leave it to have the same effect. And as you see the queen would never consent to a cartel, as was done in the former war, neither will she be willing to have her right and dignity lessened in any treaty.

“ You say I have taken no notice of the state of your finances in my letter. I cannot apprehend there can be any argument drawn from thence to induce you to accept a disadvantageous peace, and a good one we all desire. The debts of England are very great, and the burthens on our land and trade excessive. But we see your credit is good, and we hear they are not at their ease in France, and that their finances are exhausted; and it would be no more relief to your circumstances to make such a peace, as might draw on another war, than it would be a strength to your government to take such conditions as your allies may complain of, and your own people dislike.

“ Now the duke of Savoy has recovered his dominions, there is not the same occasion to have such regard for the elector of Bavaria; and, perhaps, if he were made sensible that you are not so easy in that matter, he might do something to reconcile himself to you, and not stick so firmly to France.”

This reply, though at once judicious, firm, and conciliating, does not appear to have restrained the inclination of the dutch government for peace.

*To Lord Godolphin.*

“ *Grametz, Oct. 4.* — Every post gives me an account of the great desire some in Holland have to end the war before the next campaign. The knowledge France has of this, is, no doubt, the reason of their having made no new offers since their misfortune in Italy. If Holland can be persuaded to go on with the war the next year, we have reason to expect an honourable, safe, and lasting peace; so that I beg of you that the pensionary and M. Buys, against my coming to the Hague, may be prepared, by letters from yourself and Mr. secretary Harley, to take with me the necessary measures for carrying on the war the next campaign.

“ I shall not care to stay longer at the Hague than is absolutely necessary for the service, being sure they will be very troublesome concerning the peace. Their notions of that matter, in my opinion, are very wrong; so that, with the queen's leave, I must speak plainly to them; for they argue as if they alone were the only people concerned in this war, and consequently in the peace.”

“ *Grametz, Oct. 9.* — I am very far from being of your opinion that the french will venture anything on this side, for they knew of their loss at Turin before we began the siege of Ath; so that if they could have had any temptation to venture a battle, it ought to have been when we of necessity must have been divided. But I believe they

have set up their rest in the hopes they have that their negotiations with the dutch may succeed, so that there will be a necessity of the queen's giving me leave to oppose it in her name, unless they should offer much better conditions than I have yet heard of. I have writ concerning the preliminary treaty you mentioned ; but I think it would forward it very much, if Mr. secretary Harley would let me have the heads of such a one as you desire.

“ The business of Munster is like to be very troublesome. The queen can certainly meddle with it no otherwise than by doing good offices.

“ I had a letter last night from the pensioner : he complains that the treaty for the guaranty for the succession stands still, for his want of hearing from lord Halifax. If you have any difficulty in England concerning that treaty, I should know it ; if not, it should be pressed, so that I might sign it before I leave that country.”

“ *Grametz, Oct. 11.* — Since my last we have no letters from England, nor any news from France. I expect the comte de Zinzendorff about a fortnight hence, and then I shall be able to let you know what the emperor's intentions are for the operations of the next campaign on the Rhine ; for if they can be brought to act offensively, that will very much help the allies in all other parts.

“ It has always been and is still my opinion, that M. Slingelandt is the best inclined for carrying on the war of any at the Hague. This opinion makes me send you the inclosed letter, that you may see how the humour runs in that place. This



letter should be seen by none besides the queen and prince, but such as you would advise with, to know how I ought to carry myself when I come to the Hague. The comte de Maffei has shewn me a letter he has from Paris, in which he is assured that the french are resolved to make no new offers till I am gone for England; and then they will offer whatever they think will be agreeable to the dutch. When I have been at Brussels some few days with Mr. Stepney, I think it will be for her majesty's service that I take Mr. Stepney with me to the Hague, to try, if possible, to cure their jealousies, and then send him back to Brussels.

“ Having written thus far, I have received yours of the 23d of the last month, and a copy from Mr. secretary Harley of yours to M. Buys, which is so reasonable and just that it will be impossible for him to give an answer, so that the effect of your letter will be, that they will be angry. For by all that I can learn they are resolved to have a peace; but in my opinion, when they shall endeavour to put it in practice, they will find it very difficult, for I do not think their people will be pleased with any propositions that are not liked by the queen.”

“ *Cambron, Oct. 14.* — By my letter from the Hague, I see they are preparing a great deal of business for me, as to their disputes with the emperor, their barrier, and the peace. But I hope the queen will allow me to speak my mind freely, and then come to England; for in my opinion, they will be so extravagant in their barrier, that it will hinder the treaty for the succession.”



*From Lord Godolphin, in reply.*

“ *Newmarket, Oct. 10–21.* — Since my last, I have received your letter of the 14th. To that of the 11th, I made some answer by the last post, and sent you at the same time the last letter I had from M. Buys, as also the substance of my answer, which was very short.

“ I believe, as you seem to do, that notwithstanding the violent passion for peace which appears in Holland, they will have a good deal of difficulty to compass their inclinations against the opinion of England, especially if they will force us to make public upon what terms the queen is willing to approve of peace ; since I cannot but think those will not appear unreasonable either to the rest of the allies, or to their own people.

“ The chief point in my opinion is, that Holland should, upon your arrival at the Hague, proceed to settle their state of war for the next year ; and though France should then make new offers after you were come for England, they could not fail of communicating them here, before any resolutions were taken upon the whole matter. Therefore, it seems best, on all accounts, that you should come over as soon as you can, since you are wanted here as much as there ; and what you are wanted for here cannot be supplied by another, as the business on that side may, for aught I know, upon any extraordinary occasion, which shall happen to occur when you are here.

“ I am apprehensive count Zinzendorff's coming to the Hague, will rather increase, than ap-

pease the differences between the emperor and the States."

*From Lord Godolphin.*

"*St. James's, Oct. 13-24.*—The necessity of the parliament meeting so late here, may, I fear, furnish a handle to the States to put off fixing their state of war for next year, which, if they do, it will be the greatest encouragement imaginable to the partisans of France. They have no ground to take any pretext of delay from thence; since it is necessity, and not choice, which retards the sitting of our parliament.

"As to the letter you sent me yesterday from the Hague, concerning peace, I can easily believe that and more. The inclinations of the dutch are so violent and plain, that I am of opinion nothing will be able to prevent their taking effect, but our being as plain with them upon the same subject, and threatening them to publish and expose to the whole world the terms for which they solicit, and the terms to which we are willing to consent, if they think fit to insist upon them, in conjunction with those allies, without whose assistance they could not have been able to support themselves. I hope their own people would think this reasonable; I am very sure the generality of people in England would not be satisfied with less.

"Lord Somers has shewn me a long letter which he has had from the pensionary, very intent upon settling the *barrier*. He says he sent you a copy of it. I have desired him also to send you a copy of his answer, and I hope he will do it by this post, since I think it may be of use to you, when

you come to discourse with them upon this affair at the Hague. I am of opinion they will think it reasonable to specify the particular towns which they propose to have for their barrier, and are pretty well cured of the folly of affecting the sovereignty to themselves, which, however, they had to a great degree swallowed, from the offers made to them by France last winter, before you had conquered the country.

“ I am afraid we shall have another difficulty, though of the same nature, with the court of Vienna, about the duchy of Milan. Italy will be all up in arms, if the emperor thinks to keep possession of it in his own right; but that is not all. None of the allies will like it any better than the princes of Italy. For this reason, the queen being about to dispatch Mr. Crowe to the king of Spain, will cause him to be particularly instructed to desire that his catholic majesty would be pleased to appoint a governor there in his own right, and let him see that the emperor's pretensions, in that particular, will not be borne by the rest of the allies.

“ Directions will be sent for putting all the queen's forces in Spain and Portugal under the orders of my lord Galway.”

*To Lord Godolphin.*

“ *Cambren, Oct. 18.* — The inclosed french letter is what I received last post from the duke of Loraine's minister at the Hague. He is a very honest man. I send it that you may see what he writes concerning the peace. He must not be known to have writ such a letter. You may ob-



serve that the french are trying in all courts but that of England, to have a negotiation for peace, by which they hope to slacken the preparations for the next campaign, whilst they are making their utmost efforts."

"*Cambron, Oct. 21.* — I forgot to send by the last post the inclosed letter from the pensioner; you will see by it the necessity there is of sending me such instructions as I may communicate to him and M. Buys, who penned the blank for the barrier; so that you must be the more careful in the objections you make to the wording of that clause. By all I hear from the Hague, we must not expect one step to be made to the succession, but as the barrier goes with it. They are so flattered from France, that whatever is easy to themselves, they think both just and reasonable; but when I come to the Hague I shall use my endeavours to let the honest men see that the project of France is to make them fall out with their best friends, which is the only method they have left for disturbing of the confederacy."

While Marlborough was combating the inclination manifested by the dutch to accept the secret overtures of France, he was assailed by a diplomatic artifice of another kind. Louis the fourteenth being foiled in the attempt to open a separate negotiation with Holland, disclaimed the view imputed to him of dividing the Maritime Powers by a private negotiation: and as a proof of his sincerity, offered to hold public conferences in any place between the two armies, during the continuance of the campaign, and afterwards in some



town between Mons and Brussels. The proposal was made at the same time to the deputies of the States, and to the duke himself, in a letter from the elector of Bavaria. Although the quarter from which this double proposal emanated, and the vague terms of the overture itself, sufficiently proved it to be delusive; yet, as it bore a plausible appearance, and was likely to find a grateful reception in Holland, he could not venture to give a specific opinion, much less to reject it. He therefore referred it to the decision of the cabinet.

*To Lord Godolphin.*

“*Cambren, Oct. 24.*—I send by this express copies of the elector’s letter to me and the deputies of the army. I am of opinion that this matter has been settled by some in Holland, so that the queen must be the more careful of the directions she shall think fit to give; for should you shew a backwardness to a good peace, they would make an ill use of it; and I believe one of the designs that France has in this proposal is, that it may make the dutch less zealous in their preparations for the next campaign, whilst they are doing their utmost. Another is, to let the world see that they have been managing a treaty these last 12 months. If it were possible to have their proposals without entering into a treaty, I should think that were best; for I am very sure they would not be liked by the confederates; and if they have not an opportunity given them to make a proposal, they will endeavour to induce every country to believe that they should have offered what would have been most agreeable to them.

“ I beg I may not be employed in this first step: Mr. Stepney will be very proper. The deputies were very desirous of having my opinion, that they might have sent it to the Hague; but I desired to be excused, by telling them that my opinion in this matter must be governed by her majesty's commands, and that I was sure the States would give no answer, till they had consulted with her. I shall go to Brussels on Wednesday next, being the 27th, and begin my journey to the Hague on the 2d of the next month. By the inclosed letter from the pensionary you will see what he desires of me. Whatever the queen would have me do at the Hague, I beg I may have her commands by the next post; for I shall be very uneasy till I come to England; for I have never been so uneasy as I am at this time, since her majesty's coming to the crown. I thought to have sent this last night, but was disappointed, so that you will have no other by this night's post. Being to march to-morrow, I have chose this day for seeing the army under their arms, which is a sort of taking leave, tho' I do not intend to quit them till the second of the next month, at which time I design to send them to their several garrisons.”

“ *Brussels, October 29.* — I have been in such a hurry since I came to this town, that I have but just time to tell you I have had the favour of two of yours, and I beg you will make my excuse to lord Halifax, for my not having time by this post to acknowledge the favour of his, and thank him for the copy of his letter to the pensioner, which will be of use to me when I come to the Hague.

This will be about the end of the next week, for I shall leave this place on Sunday, and separate the army on the 3d of the next month, and the same day begin my journey to the Hague, where my inclinations will lead me to make as little stay as possible, tho' the pensionary tells me I must stay to finish the treaty of succession and their barrier, which, should I stay the whole winter, I am very confident would not be brought to perfection. For they are of so many minds, and all so very extravagant concerning their barrier, that I despair of doing any good till they are more reasonable, which they will not be till they see that they have it not in their power to dispose of the Low Countries at their will and pleasure, in which the french flatter them. Mr. Stepney has his powers for Holland, but not for this country ; but I hope he will meet them at the Hague, where I think it is for the queen's service he should be, till I come for England ; so that I may be the better able to inform him of all that shall pass."

A matter of such importance was taken into immediate consideration, and the decision of the queen was imparted to the duke by secretary Hedges, and inclosed in a letter from lord Godolphin, dated October 21st, O. S.

" I can never thank you enough for all your kind letters which I have received, particularly those by this messenger, who goes back to you with her majesty's opinion and orders upon the letters you sent by him, from the elector of Bavaria. I shall add nothing to the particulars which you will receive by Mr. secretary Hedges,



but that they have been considered by all our friends here, as the shortness of the time would allow, and upon the whole we think them so reasonable and so fair, as that you will do yourself but right in insisting upon them there. And I think you may depend upon being supported in it here. Besides what is mentioned in Mr. Secretary's letter, the conferences proposed, if they should be admitted, could not fail of giving an immediate ease and support to all France, which lies almost gasping at this time, under an excessive want both of money and credit. I shall long, therefore, very impatiently, for the return of this messenger, and to hear that this blow has been avoided.

“ There needs not, I think, any other answer to the letters you have sent me from the pensioner, than what you will find in my lord Halifax's letters to him and to yourself, concerning our remarks upon the treaty for the barrier and the succession, which is, in one word, that it is too general ; and when they please to particularise the plans they propose for their barrier, and the troops necessary to maintain them, we shall agree.

“ As to the preliminary treaty for the guaranty of the future peace, which the pensioner mentions in his letter to you, I think that must, for the present, be only in general terms, except this treaty for the barrier and succession should be first concluded, in which case it might be particularly warranted in the preliminary treaty.”

*From Sir Charles Hedges.*

“ *Whitehall, Oct. 21.—Nov. 1.*—Having laid before the queen copies of the letters sent by your grace



from the elector of Bavaria, to yourself and the deputies of the States, relating to a peace, her majesty has judged it for her service that your grace should, upon this occasion, explain very particularly to the States General her majesty's thoughts concerning that matter.

“ The queen did find herself obliged last winter to express her sense of a peace in general, in a very public and solemn manner. Her majesty is now pleased farther to declare, that she entered at first into this war, in conjunction with her allies, and for their support, and has ever since continued it at an extraordinary expence to her subjects, with no other view or design, than to procure for herself and her allies an honourable and durable peace.

“ Her majesty hopes it must be evident to all the world, that the great successes with which it has pleased God to bless the arms of the allies, have given them a fair and reasonable prospect of obtaining such a peace. In order, therefore, to adjust the particular terms of it, so as that the same good friendship and correspondence in which her majesty has lived with the States General, ever since her accession to the crown, and which she desires to cultivate and improve with the greatest care, may continue as firm and immovable after the peace as it has been during the war; her majesty is of opinion, that the first proper step would be, for herself and the States General to concert and agree, betwixt themselves, upon such a scheme of a peace, as may be honourable and safe both for themselves and for the rest of the allies. And her majesty cannot but look upon this method as more honour-

able for the allies, and more effectual for the end desired, than the conferences proposed by the elector of Bavaria in the name of France, for the foundation of a treaty, without so much as knowing what particulars are to be considered in that treaty. Of which conferences, therefore, her majesty cannot see any other use than to distract the allies with jealousy, and to divert them from making in time their necessary preparations for continuing the war. These are her majesty's thoughts and apprehensions of this matter ; and in case they meet with the approbation of the States, as her majesty hopes they will, she thinks it proper to add, that she is willing to enter upon the adjustment of particulars betwixt herself and the States, in such manner, and at such time, as they shall think fit. In which case also, her majesty thinks it proper that your answer to the elector of Bavaria should be concerted with the States, and agree with the answer from their deputies, that so England and Holland may appear to France to be uniform and of one mind in the transaction of this great affair, by which means it cannot fail of having a happy conclusion."\*

The decisive opinion manifested by the british government, and the judicious reasons on which it was founded, weighed with the more patriotic members of the States, and silenced the clamours of the rest. To prevent the repetition of a similar artifice, a resolution was taken to form a series of preliminaries, which were not merely to be offered to France as the common claims of the confe-

\* Draught in the Marlborough Papers.

derates, but were to be understood as a mutual pledge among themselves, to support the terms on which the future peace was to be founded. This important document was drawn up by Marlborough, in conjunction with the members of the States; and being transmitted to England for consideration, was returned with the sanction of the queen, accompanied by some remarks of the treasurer.

*From Lord Godolphin.*

“ Oct. 22.—Nov. 2.—The messenger arrived this morning, and brought me the favour of yours of the 12th and 14th, with the papers inclosed. I have also seen your letter to Mr. secretary Hedges, with the paper of preliminaries, of which he sends you, by this post, the queen’s approbation, provided we keep strictly to every one of them.

“ I observe the form of these preliminary articles, which you have sent over, is a little different from what was proposed by the queen. Her majesty’s proposal was, that we should concert and agree to the preliminary articles of a peace to be offered to France, whereas the title of this paper runs thus: ‘ Preliminaries for a treaty of peace, in  
‘ case France can be induced to make the offers in  
‘ the name both of the king of France, and the  
‘ duke of Anjou.’ I don’t know that there is any thing essential in this observation; but I had a mind to take notice of it to you, that you might judge whether this difference in the form were only casual, or whether it were affected.

“ I find my letter of the 25th of October has been thrown into the sea. You have escaped a good deal of trouble by it, for it was very long,



and full of complaints of the emperor's taking possession of the duchy of Milan in his own name, though obtained by our money ; but if these preliminaries take place, that complaint will be pretty well cured. Now if Holland will hold firm to them, I am of opinion, that first or last they will take place ; for, besides all the successes of France, they will have a ruin increasing every day upon them in the point of their money, which they are not sensible of themselves, nor cannot be able to have a right notion of it, from any thing that has happened of that kind within the memory of man in that kingdom. I agree with you that France will not at first receive these proposals ; but I incline to think they will not absolutely reject them, but endeavour to moderate some articles, and graft something upon others ; so as to keep on foot a negotiation upon them, and by that means hope to slacken the preparations of the allies, and gain time to hearten and encourage their friends in Holland.

“ It may, therefore, deserve your consideration, whether there should not be a time prefixed and limited to them, within which they should be obliged to declare their final resolution of accepting or refusing them.

“ I don't trouble you with one word about the barrier ; because, having communicated the whole to lord Somers and lord Sunderland, I send you a letter unsealed from my lord Halifax, with whose thoughts upon that subject I entirely concur ; and if they can agree to their own demands, I don't see why any scruples on our part should take up two hours' time.

“The powers are sent as you desired for Mr. Stepney, so I hope you will have nothing to hinder you from leaving the Hague soon after you have received these letters.”

The intended answer to the elector of Bavaria was then taken into consideration, in an assembly of the States, which was held on the 10th of November, and a reply, conformable to the opinion of the british government, received a public sanction. An answer was accordingly transmitted to the elector by Marlborough, in the name of the queen, and by the deputies in behalf of the States. This letter will display the motives which actuated the allies.

“Sir;—Having communicated to the queen, my mistress, what your electoral highness did me the honour to write to me in your letter of the 21st of last month, of the intentions of the most christian king to endeavour to re-establish the tranquillity of Europe, by conferences to be held for that purpose, between deputies on both sides, her majesty has commanded me to answer your electoral highness, that as she has received with pleasure this notice of the king's inclination to agree to making a solid and lasting peace with all the allies, being the sole end that obliged her majesty to continue this war till now, so she will be very glad to conclude it, in concert with all her allies, on such conditions as may secure them from all apprehensions of being forced to take up arms again after a short interval, as has so lately happened. Her majesty is also willing I should declare, that she is ready to enter, jointly with all the high allies, into just and neces-

sary measures for attaining such a peace, her majesty being resolved not to enter upon any negotiation without the participation of her said allies. But the way of conferences that is proposed, without more particular declarations on the part of his most christian majesty, does not seem to her to be proper for obtaining a truly solid and lasting peace. The States General are of the same opinion. Wherefore your electoral highness will rightly judge, that other more solid means must be thought of to obtain so great an end, to which her majesty will contribute, with all the sincerity that can be wished, having nothing so much at heart as the relief of her subjects, and the tranquillity of Europe.”\*

To give publicity to these proceedings, and to obviate all jealousy on the part of the confederates, an extraordinary congress was held at the desire of the States, to which the foreign ministers were invited. The deputies for foreign affairs then detailed the different overtures, both private and public, which had been made by France, to open a negotiation for peace, communicating the proposals from the elector of Bavaria, and the answers of the Maritime Powers. They concluded by professing the determination of the republic to abide by their engagements with their allies, and to accept no overtures for peace without their concurrence and approbation. This declaration seemed to give great satisfaction to the foreign ministers, and was approved with apparent cordiality.

\* Hague, Nov. 20. — Printed in Lediard, vol. ii. p. 123.



Marlborough was no less gratified with this resolution than with the spirit which it seemed to infuse; and in his final letter to lord Godolphin, from the Hague, he expresses his hope that the allies would continue to prosecute their success, till France was reduced to more reasonable terms.

“ *Hague, Nov. 16.* — This country, like others, is vexed with different opinions, of which the french must take advantage. I shall not now trouble you with particulars, but I hope all will agree that the war must be carried on till the french be more reasonable; for as yet nothing has been proposed but a partition treaty, which is not only dishonourable to the allies, but in length of time destruction, as I have fully declared to be her majesty’s opinion.”

During his continuance at the Hague, he also employed his mediation in allaying the disputes which had arisen between the emperor and the States, relative to the bishopric of Munster, and the delicate negotiation for the barrier. An arrangement was, indeed, considerably facilitated by the condescension of the emperor, who ordered his minister, count Zinzendorff, to conform himself to the directions of Marlborough; but the views of the respective parties were yet too much at variance to permit a perfect accommodation.

The question of the barrier also partook of the same difficulties as before; and, therefore, though with unfeigned reluctance, Marlborough referred it to a future negotiation.

## CHAPTER 51.

1706.

*Struggle for the appointment of Sunderland to the secretaryship of state, in the room of Sir Charles Hedges. — Opposition of the queen. — Correspondence on the subject between the queen, Godolphin, and Marlborough. — Resolution of Godolphin to resign, in consequence of the hostile threats of the whigs — Deprecated by Marlborough. — His remonstrances with the duchess against the suspicions of the whigs. — Continuation of the correspondence. — Firmness of the queen in her opposition to the transfer of the secretaryship.*

**D**URING the greater part of 1705, the whole nation had been kept in suspense by the struggle in the cabinet, and by the contention between the two parties relative to the office of lord keeper. The present year did not less teem with similar feuds, and Marlborough was exposed to superior disquietude, in consequence of the struggle which arose from the determination of the whigs to persist in their purpose of transferring the seals of the secretaryship of state, from Sir Charles Hedges to the earl of Sunderland.

On returning from the embassy to Vienna, which he had filled with great prudence and ability, Sunderland expected to be rewarded by an immediate admission into the ministry; and his hopes were encouraged by the other whig leaders, who had promoted his appointment to the embassy, as an in-

troductory step to an office of trust and dignity at home.

We have already mentioned the opposition of Marlborough to the appointment of Sunderland, and his unwillingness to wound the feelings of the queen, by pressing his admission into the cabinet. This opinion he strongly manifested to the duchess, who displayed even more than usual zeal, for the advancement of her son-in-law.

“ *Helchin, August 9.* \* \* \* \* \* You know that I have often disputes with you concerning the queen ; and by what I have always observed, when she thinks herself in the right, she needs no advice to help her to be very firm and positive. But I doubt but a very little time will set this of lord Sunderland very right, for you may see by the letter that she has a good opinion of him. I have writ as my friends would have me, for I had much rather be governed than govern. But otherwise I have really so much esteem and kindness for him, and have so much knowledge of the place you would have for him, that I have my apprehensions he will be very uneasy in it ; and that, when it is too late, you will be of my opinion, that it would have been much happier if he had been employed in any other place of profit and honour. I have formerly said so much to you on this subject, and to so little purpose, that I ought not now to have troubled you with all this, knowing very well that you rely on other people’s judgment in this matter. I do not doubt but they wish him very well ; but in this they have other considerations than his good, and I have none but that of a kind friend, that



would neither have him, nor my daughter uneasy. Writing this by candle light, I am so blind that I cannot read it, so that if there be any thing in it that should not be seen, burn it, and think kindly of one who loves you with all his heart."

Notwithstanding the reluctance which he here manifests, he suffered himself to be overcome by the importunities of the treasurer, and wrote to the queen, urging the appointment with all the arguments which the circumstances of the case suggested. Supported by this recommendation, Godolphin renewed his instances with additional zeal, proposing to remunerate Sir Charles Hedges for the loss of his office, by a place of a more permanent and profitable nature. But the queen still continued inflexible, and dreading a personal altercation, expressed by letter the poignancy of her feelings and her aversion to the meditated change.

"*August 30-Sept. 10.* — I think one should always speak one's mind freely to one's friends on every occasion, but sometimes one is apt to hope things may not come to that extremity, as to make it necessary to trouble them, and therefore it is very natural to defer doing so as long as one possibly can. The difficulties I labour under at this time are so great, and so uneasy to me, that they will not suffer me any longer to keep my thoughts to myself; and I choose this way of explaining them to you, rather than endeavour to begin to speak, and not be able to go on. I have been considering the business we have so often spoke about, ever since I saw you, and cannot but continue of the same mind, that it is a great hardship to persuade

any body to part with a place they are in possession of; in hopes of another that is not yet vacant. Besides, I must own freely to you, I am of the opinion, that making a party man secretary of state, when there are so many of their friends in employment of all kinds already, is throwing myself into the hands of a party, which is a thing I have been desirous to avoid. May be some may think I would be willing to be in the hands of the tories; but whatever people may say of me, I do assure you I am not inclined, nor never will be, to employ any of those violent persons, that have behaved themselves so ill towards me. All I desire is, my liberty in encouraging and employing all those that concur faithfully in my service, whether they are called whigs or tories, not to be tied to one, nor the other; for if I should be so unfortunate as to fall into the hands of either, I shall not imagine myself, though I have the name of queen, to be in reality but their slave, which as it will be my personal ruin, so it will be the destroying all government; for instead of putting an end to faction, it will lay a lasting foundation for it. You press the bringing lord Sunderland into business, that there may be one of that party in a place of trust, to help carry on the business this winter; and you think if this is not complied with, they will not be hearty in pursuing my service in the parliament. But is it not very hard that men of sense and honour, will not promote the good of their country, because every thing in the world is not done that they desire! when they may be assured lord Sunderland shall come into employment as soon as it is possible. Why,

for God's sake, must I, who have no interest, no end, no thought, but for the good of my country, be made so miserable, as to be brought into the power of one set of men? and why may not I be trusted, since I mean nothing but what is equally for the good of all my subjects? There is another apprehension I have of lord Sunderland being secretary, which I think is a natural one, which proceeds from what I have heard of his temper. I am afraid he and I should not agree long together, finding by experience my humour and those that are of a warmer, will often have misunderstandings between one another. I could say a great deal more on this subject, but fear I have been too tedious already. Therefore I shall conclude, begging you to consider how to bring me out of my difficulties, and never leave my service, for Jesus Christ's sake; for besides the reasons I give you in another letter, this is a blow I cannot bear."\*

Convinced from this declaration that farther arguments would be fruitless, Godolphin recurred to his resolution of withdrawing from a post, which he could no longer maintain with honour to himself, or advantage to his sovereign. He declared his purpose in a letter, which exhibits an interesting picture of his feelings.

"*Saturday Morning, at nine.* — I come this moment from opening and reading the letter which your majesty gave yourself the trouble to write to me last night. It gives me all the grief and despair imaginable, to find that your majesty shews inclination to have me continue in your service, and

\* From a copy by the duchess.



yet will make it impossible for me to do so. I shall not therefore trouble your majesty with fruitless repetitions of reasons and arguments. I cannot struggle against the difficulties of your majesty's business, and yourself at the same time; but I can keep my word to your majesty.

“ I have no house in the world to go to, but my house at Newmarket, which I must own is not at this time like to be a place of much retirement; but I have no other. I have worn out my health, and almost my life, in the service of the crown. I have served your majesty faithfully to the best of my understanding, without any advantage to myself, except the honour of doing so, or without expecting any other favour than to end the small remainder of my days in liberty and quiet.” \*

Unwilling to lose a tried and zealous servant, the queen endeavoured to compromise the dispute, and save her own feelings, by offering to nominate Sunderland a privy counsellor, with a pension, and to confer on him an office superior in emolument to the secretaryship of state, but which would not entitle him to constant access to her person. This proposal being however regarded by the whigs as a mere expedient to exclude them from power, they persisted the more firmly in their purpose, and began to foster new suspicions of the sincerity of the treasurer. Accordingly Sunderland rejected the offer as injurious to his honour, and Somers and Halifax announced the resolution of their party to enter the lists of opposition, if their demand was not granted without farther delay.

\* Draft in the hand of lord Godolphin.

Their decision was communicated in a letter from Sunderland to the duchess.

“ *London, Sept. 17-28.* — Lord Halifax and I reckoned to have set out to-morrow for Woodstock, and it is with a great deal of regret that we are obliged to put off our journey thither; but when you know the reason of it, I dare say you won’t think us in the wrong.

“ When I writ to you last, I gave you some account of a conversation lord Halifax and the lord treasurer had together; but since that, lord Halifax has told lord Somers and me several particulars of that conversation, and among other things, of the great offers of any place, or any other advantage whatever that the lord treasurer was pleased to make to me, in lieu of the thing in question. I can’t but think, and we are all of the same mind, that for me to hearken to any such offer, would be in effect to be both fool and knave. Lord Somers, lord Halifax, and I have talked very fully over all this matter, and we are come to our last resolution in it, that this and what other things have been promised must be done, or we and the lord treasurer must have nothing more to do together about business; and that we must let all our friends know just how the matter stands between us and the lord treasurer, whatever is the consequence of it. If the lord treasurer comes to town either to-night or to-morrow, both lord Somers and lord Halifax will let him know this resolution in the plainest words, and in the fullest manner they can. If he does not come, lord Halifax will go to Windsor to him, and let him know it in lord Somers’s name,

as well as his own, so that a few days will determine whether it is to be a breach or not. But whether it is or not, you must be assured that every honest englishman will acknowledge, that whatever good has been done is entirely owing to you ; and that whatever is not done is for want of your power to do it.

“ There is another reason which makes lord Halifax not think it so proper for us to go to Woodstock whilst this matter is in suspense, and lord Somers is of the same mind ; that is, that since it is plain that you are very ill with the queen, purely for acting and speaking honestly and sincerely your mind, nobody knows how far some people might make the queen believe, that we were gone only to influence and engage you to be more and more uneasy to her.

“ I beg you would let us know whether we are right in this thought or no ; for nothing can be a greater mortification than to be prevented of the pleasure of waiting upon you.”

The letter of Sunderland was instantly communicated to Marlborough, and the resolution of the whigs not only aggravated his embarrassments, but increased his dissatisfaction with the party. His feelings were still more deeply wounded, by the reproaches and taunts of the duchess, who inveighed against the tenderness which he manifested towards the queen, as well as against his lukewarmness towards the whigs. Hence his letters are filled with complaints of their unreasonable demands and unjust suspicions ; and he solemnly declares his resolution to support the treasurer to



the utmost, and to consider as his own enemies, those who should shew themselves the enemies of his colleague.

*To the Duchess.*

“What you write me concerning the queen and the lord treasurer gives me a great deal of trouble; for should the consequence be what you say, that there is no relying upon the tories, and that the whigs will be out of humour, it must end in confusion, which will have the consequence of the dutch making peace with France. I am afraid this is what will gratify many of the tory party; but I can see no advantage that can come to the whigs by the ruin of the lord treasurer; so that I hope they are too wise a people to expose themselves and the liberties of Europe, because some things are not done with a good grace. I would not have you mistake me; for as far as it is in my power, for the sake of my country and the queen, for whom, had I a thousand lives, I would venture them all, I would have every thing that is reasonable done to satisfy the whigs, of which I think the lord treasurer is the best judge. \* ”

“If it were not for my duty to the queen, and friendship to lord treasurer, I should beg that somebody else might execute my office. Not that I take any thing ill, but that the weight is too great for me, and I find a decay in my memory. Whatever may be told to you of my looks, the greatest part of my hair is grey, but I think I am not quite so lean as I was.”

\* This part of the letter is taken from a copy written by the duchess, the remainder from a copy in another hand.

Marlborough, as we have just seen, sympathised in the embarrassments of Godolphin, and was not less alarmed than the queen, at the design which he had announced of retiring. Without delay he deprecated his resolution, as no less injurious to his friends and country, than to Europe in general.

“*Vilaine, Sept. 9.*— In yours of the 20th, you say it would be an ease to you to retire from business, the weight of which you cannot bear, if you are not allowed some assistance. I hope the queen will do every thing for your ease, but that of parting with you, in which, should you have a serious thought, you could not justify yourself to God or man; for without flattery, as England is divided, there is nobody that can execute your place but yourself.”

“*Grametz, Sept. 16.*— I have had the favour of yours of the 30th, from St. Alban’s, and am very much concerned that those of the 27th are lost, since you tell me you had in that, given me an account of a conversation with Mrs. Morley. Lady Marlborough’s letter of the 28th, which mentions that conversation, has very much alarmed me; for, without flattery, I am positively of the opinion, that should you quit the service of the queen, you would not only disturb the affairs of England, but also the liberties of Europe; so that I conjure you not to have a thought of quitting till we have obtained a good peace; and then I hope the queen’s interest may be so well settled, that she may allow of our living quietly. But as the affairs of Europe, and those of the queen in particular, are at this time, I think both you and I are in conscience and

honour bound to undergo all the dangers and trouble that is possible, to bring this war to a happy end, which I think must be after the next campaign, if we can agree to carry it on with vigour.

“ We have not as yet any particulars of what has passed at Turin, but we may be assured by the french silence that they are not pleased.

“ I shall be very uneasy till I hear from you that every thing is easy between Mrs. Morley and yourself; for without that I shall have no heart to act in any thing, being sure that all things must go to destruction.”

After alluding to some embarrassment in his military operations, he adds, in another letter, dated Grametz, Oct. 12. —

“ This has given me some trouble, but nothing of what I now feel by a letter I have received this morning from the duchess, concerning the temper and resolutions of the whigs, by which I see all things like to go to confusion. Yours of the same date mentions nothing of it, which makes me fear you have taken your resolution, which if it be to retire, I must lay the consequence before you, which is, that certainly the dutch will make their peace, which will be of fatal consequence, especially considering the advantages we now have; for in all probability one year's war more would give ease to all Christendom for many years.”

Godolphin was as anxious to communicate, as Marlborough to learn his sentiments and situation. He could not however convey more satisfactory information than in the preceding letters; but with a disinterested zeal which does him honour, he



laboured to soothe the dissatisfaction fostered by his friend against the whigs.

“ *Windsor, Sept. 10-21.*—There being now four posts wanting from Holland, you will not expect one should trouble you very long from this place, from whence one can tell you nothing that is agreeable. The uneasiness betwixt the queen and myself continues as it was; nor do I see how it can ever be mended, unless you were here to do it, either by your credit with the queen, or by your authority and influence with lord Sunderland and lord Somers, and their friends. Not that I think them so much to blame, because they do really not see the difficulties as they are, and one cannot go about to shew them those difficulties, without too much exposing the queen. Now though I really think you might be able to ease all this, yet negotiation not being my talent, I doubt it may be past cure before you come, and there is no reason to hope for the least assistance from Mrs. Freeman in this matter. \* \* \* \* \*

“ The same blustering winds which keep your letters from us, continue to keep the fleet still in Torbay, which is no small mortification.”

In another letter, dated Windsor, Sept. 18-29. after alluding to the eagerness manifested in Holland for peace, and the difficulty of persuading the dutch to *carry on the war with vigour*, he adds, “ As for England, though the generality is entirely for doing it, yet the plain unwillingness in the queen to do any thing for those who have shewn themselves most forward and zealous in promoting all the present advantages, is a discouragement not

to be overcome by me alone. And there is not one besides in any ministerial office of the government, that must not be spoken to ten times over before any thing can be executed, even after it is ordered, as I said before, with all the slowness and difficulty imaginable. When I have given you the trouble of telling you this, assure yourself that if you saw me, I would tell you it is very short of the disagreeableness I find upon the subject."

To relieve the perplexity of his friend, Marlborough wrote another pressing letter to the queen, employing every argument which appeared likely to weigh with her prejudices, or to influence her decision. The letter itself is missing, but an extract is preserved in his correspondence with Godolphin.

"Oct. 7. 1706.—As I am persuaded that the safety of your government, and the quiet of your life, depend very much upon the resolution you shall take at this time, I think myself bound in gratitude, duty, and conscience, to let you know my mind freely; and that you may not suspect me of being partial, I take leave to assure you, in the presence of God, that I am not for your putting yourself into the hands of either party. But the behaviour of lord Rochester, and all the hot heads of that party, is so extravagant, that there is no doubt to be made of their exposing you and the liberties of England to the rage of France, rather than not be revenged, as they call it. This being the case, there is a necessity, as well as justice in your following your inclinations in supporting lord treasurer, or all must go to confusion. As the humour

is at present, he can't be supported but by the whigs, for the others seek his destruction, which in effect is yours. Now pray consider, if he can, by placing some few about you, gain such a confidence as shall make your business and himself safe, will not this be the sure way of making him so strong that he may hinder your being forced into a party? I beg you will believe I have no other motive to say what I do, but my zeal for your person, and friendship for a man whom I know to be honest, and zealously faithful to you."\*

But it was to the duchess that he most fully expressed the poignancy of his feelings, and his chagrin at the unjust suspicions which she and the whigs entertained of his sincerity, at the very moment when he had advocated their cause with so much zeal and frankness. After stating his conviction that the queen could place no reliance on the tories, but must give her confidence to those who would carry on the war, and support the lord treasurer, he adds, "I will frankly own to you, that the jealousy some of your friends have that I and the lord treasurer do not act sincerely, makes me so weary, that were it not for my gratitude to the queen, and concern for him, I would now retire, and never serve more. For I have had the good luck to deserve better from all englishmen, than to be suspected of not being in the true interest of my country, which I am in, and ever will be, without being of a faction; and this principle shall

\* In this extract, Marlborough has, for the sake of brevity, omitted the title of majesty, and the forms of ceremony, which he never failed to use in his correspondence with the queen herself.



govern me for the little remainder of my life. I must not think of being popular, but I shall have the satisfaction of going to my grave, with the opinion of having acted as became an honest man; and if I have your esteem and love, I shall think myself entirely happy.

“ Having writ thus far, I have received your two letters of the 20th and 21st, which confirm me in my opinion before. And since the resolution is taken to vex and ruin the lord treasurer, because the queen has not complied with what was desired for lord Sunderland, I shall from henceforth despise all mankind, and think there is no such thing as virtue; for I know with what zeal the lord treasurer has pressed the queen in that matter. I do pity him, and shall love him as long as I live, and never will be a friend to any that can be his enemy.

“ I have writ my mind very freely to the queen on this occasion, so that whatever misfortune may happen, I shall have a quiet mind, having done what I thought my duty. And as for the resolution of making me uneasy, I believe they will not have much pleasure in that, for as I have not set my heart on having justice done me, I shall not be disappointed, nor will I be ill used by any man.”\*

“ *Grametz, October 7.*—I am to return you my thanks for five of yours, all from Woodstock. I could wish with all my heart every thing were more to your mind; for I find when you wrote most of them, you had very much the spleen, and in one I had my share, for I see I lie under the same

\* This letter is printed in the *Conduct of the duchess*, but was deemed too important a document to be omitted here.

misfortune I have ever done, of not behaving myself as I ought to the queen.

“ I hope Mr. Hacksmore will be able to mend those faults you find in the house, but the great fault I find is, that I shall never live to see it finished ; for I had flattered myself, that if the war should happily have ended this next year, I might the next after have lived in it ; for I am resolved to be neither minister nor courtier, not doubting the queen will allow of it. But these are idle dreams, for whilst the war lasts, I must serve, and will do it with all my heart ; and if at last I am rewarded with your love and esteem, I shall end my days happily, and without it nothing can make me easy.

“ I am taking measures to leave the army about three weeks hence, so that I shall have the happiness of being above one month sooner with you, than I have been for these last three years.”

In a letter to Godolphin himself, he expresses in stronger terms the same friendship and attachment which he had repeatedly announced.

“ I have writ my mind with freedom to the queen, so that having done my duty, let what will happen, I shall be more easy in my mind. Allow me to give you this assurance, that as I know you to be a sincere, honest man, may God bless me as I shall be careful *that whatever man is your enemy shall never be my friend.* As soon as you receive this, I conjure you to let me have your thoughts freely, for till then I shall be very uneasy.”

In the mean time, reflection seemed to strengthen the determination of the queen, and she regarded

the threat of the whigs as a proof of their design to monopolize all the offices of state, and reduce her to dependence. Instead, therefore, of exposing herself to new expostulations from Godolphin, she wrote a second letter, again pressing the expedient, which she had proposed for Sunderland, and recurring to every argument which her anxiety suggested, to dissuade the treasurer from his purpose of retiring.

“ *Sept. 21. 1706.* — I have read your letter over and over, and considered it very well before I have answered it ; but I cannot but remain of the same mind I was when I wrote last concerning Sir Charles Hedges, thinking that he did once desire the place you have now a mind to get for him ; yet it is a hard thing for me to remove him, and I can never look upon it otherways. As to my other difficulties concerning lord Sunderland, I do fear, for the reasons I have told you, we shall never agree long together ; and the making him secretary, I can’t help thinking, is throwing myself into the hands of a party. They desire this thing to be done, because else they say they can’t answer that all their friends will go along with them this winter. If this be complied with, you will then, in a little time, find they must be gratified in something else, or they will not go on heartily in my business. You say yourself, they will need my authority to assist them, which I take to be the bringing more of their friends into employment, and shall I not then be in their hands ? If this is not being in the hands of a party, what is ? I am as sensible as any body can be of the services lord



Sunderland and all his friends have done me, and am very willing to shew I am so, by doing any thing they desire that is reasonable. Let me therefore beg of you once more to consider of the expedient I proposed, of bringing lord Sunderland into the cabinet council, with a pension, till some vacancy happens. When I mentioned this before, I remember your objection against it was, that so young a man taken into the cabinet council, without having any post, might look more like an imposition upon me, than a desire of my own. May be some people may find this fault; but I confess I can but think if he was made secretary, others would say *that* were also an imposition upon me. One of these things would make me very easy, the other quite contrary; and why, for God's sake, may I not be gratified as well as other people? I cannot but think my lord Sunderland, who has so much zeal and concern for my interest, and believes I have nothing so much at my heart, as the good and happiness of my own subjects, and the quiet of all Europe, will act heartily upon this principle, whatever station he is in, and have patience till it is in my power to put him in some post. And if all his friends have this opinion of me that you say he has, they can't, sure, for their own and their country's sake, but concur in my service, especially when they see, as they will, by my taking lord Sunderland into the cabinet council, that I am willing to employ them in any thing I can. By this he will be brought into business, and be able both to assist you and have it in his

power to do good offices to his friends. If they are not satisfied with so reasonable a thing as this, it is very plain, in my poor opinion, nothing will satisfy them, but having one entirely in their power. This is a thing I have so much at my heart, and upon which the quiet of my life depends, that I must beg you, for Christ Jesus' sake, to endeavour to bring it about. I know very well that you do not serve for advantage or ambition, but with entire duty and affection, which makes me that I cannot bear the thoughts of parting with you; and I hope, after what the duke of Marlborough has said to you, you will not think of it again, for to use his words, 'you cannot answer it neither to God nor man, but are obliged both in conscience and honour not to do it.' Let his words plead for her, who will be lost and undone, if you pursue this cruel intention, and begs that you would neither think of it, nor mention it any more to one, that is so affectionately and sincerely your humble servant."\*

Godolphin received this appeal at the moment when he was preparing to depart for Woodstock, to consult with the duchess on the best mode of vanquishing the repugnance of the queen. His reply we shall give without a comment.

"*Woodstock, Sept. 25.* — There was so little time before I came from Windsor, after I had the honour of your majesty's letter, that it was not possible for me to answer it, though I thought it was very necessary for your majesty's service, not

\* From a copy in the hand of the duchess.

to lose time in doing it. Your majesty seems to continue desirous I should stay in your service, and not retain a thought of quitting it. I never had such a thought, nor never can have, for my own sake or ease, if I saw a possibility of supporting your service, to which, as I have often said to your majesty, I must be a weight, and not a help, unless you would please to let me have the assistance of those who are able and willing to serve me.

“ Your majesty is pleased in your letter to make use of some expressions in the duke of Marlborough’s letter to me, which I had the honour to read to you, that I could not answer it to God or man, that I was obliged both in honour and conscience not to quit your service. But you are not pleased to take any notice of those other expressions, which he uses in the same letter, as that there is no doubt but the queen will do any thing you can desire to make your service easy, and the like. But I desire nothing to make my service easy; I propose nothing but what is necessary for carrying on your majesty’s business, especially in this next winter, which is like to be the most critical of your whole reign, and when many things of very great consequence will come to bear all at once. I doubt whether all we can do will be able to keep off the peace this winter. The peace will necessarily bring on the consideration of what fleet, and what army must be continued for your majesty’s safety; and the safety of the government; besides all this, when the kingdom has been exhausted by a long war, your majesty’s enemies, and mine particularly,



which are not a few, will be grumbling at the greatness of your revenue. All these must be defended and supported. These are not slight things.

“ These things make me much concerned to trouble your majesty with repeating so often, that the future quiet and happiness of your whole life depends upon what is done in this winter, and you have an opportunity of making your government strong, which you will never have again.

“ Your majesty will have me think you are desirous of my advice, and of the continuance of my service, and yet you are not pleased to have any regard to it, in a time, and upon an occasion of the greatest consequence that can ever happen to you. By what your majesty says of some particulars in my letter, I find I have not expressed myself so as that your majesty seems to have rightly apprehended my meaning in them. I must therefore endeavour to explain myself better as soon as I can; but since to go about it now would make this letter too tedious, I hope you will allow me to do it in words, when I have the honour to wait upon you.”

The coldness and brevity of the queen's reply, will shew the slight impression which this remonstrance produced.

“ *Kensington, Sept. 28.*—Tho' I hope to see you on Wednesday, I cannot help writing a few words, to thank you for your letter, and I beg you would believe I am as sensible as any body can be, that the particular things you mention are of the greatest consequence imaginable, and that this is a

very critical time; upon which subject I think there is a great deal could be said, but I shall defer telling you my poor opinion till we meet, and only now assure you, that I am, with all sincerity, yours."\*

\* Copy in the hand-writing of the duchess.

## CHAPTER 52.

1706.

*Interposition of the duchess of Marlborough in favour of Sunderland. — Contention between her and the queen. — Marlborough again intreats the queen to gratify the whigs. — Suspicions entertained of the fidelity of Harley. — Attempt of the whigs to supplant him. — He is supported by Godolphin and Marlborough. — Arrival of Marlborough in England. — Obtains the appointment of Sunderland.*

THE projected change inflamed the political variance between the queen and the duchess, to which we have already referred. The duchess, who on no occasion was temperate, was warmed with additional zeal, when it was in agitation to raise to one of the highest offices of state, a nobleman who was not only an ardent whig, but her own son-in-law. It is now, therefore, that we perceive the splenetic effusions of both parties changed into the strongest expressions of resentment, contempt, and indignation, and observe the foundation laid of an enmity as violent and inveterate, as their friendship had been ardent and excessive. To detail their incessant disputes does not fall within the compass of this work; but we shall interweave a few extracts, which will serve to shew the character of their epistolary intercourse.



*The Duchess to the Queen.*

“ I conclude your majesty will believe my arguments upon this subject proceed chiefly from the partiality which I may have for my lord Sunderland, tho’ I solemnly protest that I never had any for any person, to the prejudice of what I believed your interest. And I had rather he had any other place, or none at all, if the party that most assist you would be satisfied without it ; for, besides the very great trouble of that office, executed as it should be, he is not of a humour to get any thing by such an employment ; and I wish from my soul that any other man had been proposed to you, that you could not have suspected I had any concern for. But ’tis certain that your government can’t be carried on with a part of the tories, and the whigs disobliged, who, when that happens, will join with any people to torment you, and those that are your true servants. I am sure it is my interest, as well as inclination, to have you succeed by any sort of men in what is just, and that will prevent what has been done from being thrown away. Your security and the nation’s is my chief wish, and I beg of God Almighty, as sincerely as I shall do for his pardon at my last hour, that Mr. and Mrs. Morley may see their errors as to this notion before it is too late ; but considering how little impression any thing makes that comes from your faithful Freeman, I have troubled you too much, and I beg your pardon for it.”

The queen was naturally irritated as much by this opposition to her will, as by the intemperance of such language. Mistaking, or affecting to

mistake, the word *notion* for *nation*, she treated the observation as a studied affront, refused to reply, and assailed lord Godolphin with complaints against such disrespectful behaviour. Hence the duchess was induced to write an explanatory and expostulatory letter, although she could not desist from employing the same improper and indecorous style.

“ *August 30.* — Your majesty’s great indifference and contempt in taking no notice of my last letter, did not so much surprise me, as to hear my lord treasurer say you had complained much of it, which makes me presume to give you this trouble to repeat what I can be very positive was the whole aim of the letter, and I believe very near the words. It was in the first place, to shew the reason why I had not waited upon your majesty, believing you were uneasy, and fearing you might think I had some private concern for lord Sunderland. I therefore thought it necessary to assure your majesty that I had none so great as for your service, and to see my lord treasurer so mortified at the necessity of quitting it, or being the ruin of that and himself together. Then I took the liberty to shew, as well as I could, that it was really no hardship nor unkindness to Sir Charles Hedges ; and I think I might have added, tho’ I believe I did not, that your majesty, to carry on your government, must have men that neither herd with your enemies, nor that are in themselves insignificant. At last, I concluded, if I am not more mistaken than ever I was in my life, with these following words, that I did pray to God Almighty, with as much earnestness as I should at my last day for the saving of

my soul, that Mrs. and Mr. Morley might see their errors. This is the whole sense of the letter ; and having had the honour to know your majesty when you had other thoughts of me than you are pleased to have now, and when you did think fit to take advice and information, I could not reasonably imagine that you should be offended at my earnest endeavours to serve you, and pray that you nor the prince might not be deceived. But finding that no proofs nor demonstrations of my faithfulness to your interest, can make any thing agreeable to your majesty that comes from me, I will not enlarge upon this subject. I will only beg one piece of justice, and that I fancy you would not refuse to any body, if you believed it one, that you will shew my lord treasurer the letter of which your majesty has complained ; and I wish from the bottom of my heart, that he, or any body that is faithful to you and the prince, could see every word that ever I writ to your majesty in my life."

Godolphin, who was charged with the unpleasant office of delivering this curious epistle, thus communicates the result of his audience.

" *Windsor, Sunday.* — According to your commands, I gave your letter to Mrs. Morley. As she was going to put it in her pocket, I told her that you had made me promise to beg of her to read it before I went out of the room. She did so, and then said she believed she had mistaken some words at the latter end of the former letter, which she seemed to think had a different sense from that which I had given her from you ; but because you desired I might see it, she would look for it,



and give it me, which she did, and desired me to return it to her to-day. I come now from giving it back into her hands, and I think I have convinced her that her complaint was grounded upon her having misapprehended the sense of your letter, by not reading it right, that is to say by reading the word *notion* for *nation*.

“To explain this the more clearly to you, I send you a copy of the conclusion of your first letter to her, taken as far back as I thought was enough to shew the plain sense and meaning of your letter. At the same time I must own that in your original letter, that word *notion* was not so distinctly written, but that one might naturally read it *nation*, if the sense of two or three lines together before did not fully explain your meaning.

“As to the main point, she has only told me that she had written a letter to me, as she said she would, to explain her difficulty, but she must write it out before she could give it me.”

The interposition of Godolphin, aided by more deliberate reflection, contributed to sooth the resentment of the queen; but, contrary to her usual custom, she suffered a week to elapse before she replied.

“*Friday morning.* — Since my dear Mrs. Freeman could imagine my not taking notice of her letter that was writ before she went to St. Alban’s, proceeded from indifference or contempt, what will she think of my not answering her other in another week’s time? But I do assure you it was neither of the reasons you mention that hindered me from writing, *nor no other*, but the concern I

have been in since the change of the secretary was proposed to me. I have obeyed your commands in shewing your letter to my lord treasurer, and find my complaint was not without some ground, a mistake any body might make upon the first reading; for you had made an *a* instead of an *o*, which quite altered the word. I am very sensible all you say proceeds from the concern you have for my service, and it is impossible to be more mortified than I am, to see my lord treasurer in such uneasiness; and his leaving my service is a thought I cannot bear, and I hope in God he will put all such out of his own mind. Now that you are come hither again, I hope you will not go to Woodstock without giving me one look, for whatever hard thoughts you may have of me, I am sure I do not deserve them, and I will not be uneasy if you come to me; for though you are never so unkind, I will ever preserve a most sincere and tender passion for my dear Mrs. Freeman."

Several other letters passed, which it would be needless to insert, as they all bear the same tone and character. The queen indeed became disgusted with this epistolary controversy, and gradually delayed her replies, till the correspondence on the unpleasant subject was discontinued.

The lord treasurer was now sensible that the interference of the duchess was become as fruitless as his own, and that their different appeals had served only to render the queen more pertinacious. He had, therefore, no other alternative than to renew his instances to Marlborough, with the conviction that nothing but his just and temperate

arguments, supported by the merit of his great services, could produce the expected effect.

Before, however, his application could reach the camp, we find a letter from the duke to the duchess, written in a style which shews his perplexity and concern.

“*Cambren, Oct. 18.* \* \* \* \* I hope you will order it so, that after I have been some days at London, we may go to the lodge and be quiet, for I am quite weary of the world; and since I am afraid there is a necessity of my serving in this country as long as this war lasts, let me have a little more quiet in England than I have been used to have, and then I shall be the better able to go through what I must endure in this country; for upon the success we have had this year, our friends grow less governable than when they were afraid of the french. \* \* \* \*

“As I have no farther prospect of doing any more service to the public this campaign, but that of putting Courtray in a condition, every day is very tedious; and for the two or three days I shall be at Brussels I shall be torn to pieces, there being twenty pretenders to every place that must be given; for I have not been able to prevail with the deputies to declare them before my arrival, which would have given me ease.

“Having writ thus far, I have had the happiness of your kind letters of the 23d, 26th, and 29th, of the last month, from Woodstock. The express you mention which the lord treasurer writ me word from St. Alban's he would send, yet I hear nothing of it, though I have received another letter



of his from Newmarket. I have already more than once writ my mind very freely, so that my conscience is at ease, though my mind is very far from it; for I did flatter myself that my zeal and sincerity for the queen were so well known to her, that my representations would have had more weight than I find they have. But nothing can ever hinder me from being ready to lay down my life when she can think it for her service; for I serve with an entire affection, as well as the utmost duty; for you and I, and all ours, would be the most ungrateful people that ever lived, if we did not venture all for her good. By this, do not mistake me; for I am very sensible that if my lord treasurer be obliged to retire, I cannot serve in the ministry. But when these projectors have put all in confusion, I shall then readily not only venture my life, but all that I have, to shew my gratitude. When the express comes, by which I shall see all that has passed, I shall once more write, as becomes me, and will yet hope it may have its effect; if not, God's will be done."

On the arrival of the expected messenger, Marlborough did not hesitate to fulfil his promise, though hopeless of success. He again wrote to the queen a letter, at once firm and respectful, displaying in detail the mischiefs which she must expect to encounter, if she persisted in consulting rather her own personal prejudices, than the public interest. At the same time he inclosed a letter from the treasurer, which he supposed would give additional weight to his instances.

"*Cambron, Oct. 24.*—I have had the honour of

your majesty's of the 27th and 1st of this month. The last has mortified and troubled me very much, since by it, I see the little effect my letters have had with your majesty, so that I was resolved to have been silent, till I should have had the honour of being near your person. But finding by the lord treasurer's letters, as well as by others, that the measures you must take before the meeting of the parliament will have the consequence of making every thing go easy, or ruining your business, I could not avoid troubling you on this subject. The lord treasurer assures me that any other measures but those he has proposed, must ruin your business, and oblige him to quit his staff, which would be a great trouble to him, and I am afraid will have the fatal consequence of putting you into the hands of a party, which God only knows how you would then be able to get out of it. It is true that your reign has been so manifestly blessed by God, that one might reasonably think you might govern without making use of the heads of either party, but as it might be easy to yourself. This might be practicable if both parties sought your favour, as in reason and duty they ought. But, madam, the truth is, that the heads of one party have declared against you and your government, as far as it is possible, without going into open rebellion. Now, should your majesty disoblige the others, how is it possible to obtain near five millions for carrying on the war with vigour, without which all is undone. Your majesty has had so much knowledge and experience yourself of the capacity and integrity of the lord treasurer, that you cannot but know you

may safely rely upon his advice, and if there be any opinions different from his, your majesty will allow me to say, they neither know so much of these matters, nor can they judge so well of them.

“ I take the liberty of sending a copy of a letter the lord treasurer writ to me on the 13th of the last month. I shall repeat nothing in it, but earnestly desire you will once more read it. And as I would in return for your many favours, die to make you and your government easy, makes me take the liberty, with all submission on my knees, to beg for your own sake, the good of your country, and all the liberties of Europe, that you would not lose one day in giving the lord treasurer that necessary assistance he thinks proper, for carrying on of your business in parliament, by which you will not only enable him to make your business go well, but also that of governing the only party that can be made use of. I am very confident the lord treasurer thinks he shall be able to govern them to your satisfaction, or he would not say so much as he does; and as for myself, I beg your majesty's justice in believing that I shall take all the care I can to make them sensible of the obligations they have to you, so that you may never have reason to repent the measures, I hope in God, you will now take. I can have no ease nor quiet till I have the honour of hearing from your majesty, being with the utmost duty and respect, &c.

“ I do most humbly beg you will be pleased to keep the inclosed letter till I have the honour of waiting upon you.”

The purport of this letter was of course commu-



nicated to Godolphin; and to him Marlborough observes:—

“ *October 25.*—You will see by the inclosed copy what I writ to the queen, and I hope you will not disapprove of my sending a copy of yours to the queen, writ on the 13th of the last month. If the queen has complied with your desires, you will be the best judge of what may be proper to be done with my letter, either to deliver it or to burn it.”

A subsequent letter indicates still more strongly his despair of success.

“ *Brussels, Oct. 29.*—If the letter I sent you by the express has no effect with the queen, I shall conclude that God intends that way to punish us for our faults; for I think what you write in yours of the 13th of September, is not to be answered; for in England no minister can, or ought to govern without help. God preserve her, and send you to serve her long.”

These letters, as well as similar appeals at a future period, did not produce the expected effect. We find, from a letter of Godolphin to the duchess, not only that the queen continued indisposed towards her, but that she still manifested the same repugnance against the admission of Sunderland.

“ Mrs. Morley sent for me this morning, and complained much of Mrs. Freeman’s letter, and particularly of the last two or three lines upon that part which related to 110.\* She appealed to me, upon which I said I could not but remember she had some difficulties, and I believe she liked this man better than she expected to do; and from

\* Probably the lord keeper, Cowper.

thence I went on to tell her that I knew very well all Mrs. Freeman's complaints proceeded from having lost Mrs. Morley's kindness unjustly, and her telling her truths which other people would not ; to which she said, as she has done forty times, how could she shew her any more kindness than she did, when she would never come near her. I said, she had tried that several times, and complained it was always the same thing. Upon that she said, Mrs. Freeman would grow warm sometimes, and then she herself could not help being warmer than she ought to be, but that she was always ready to be easy with Mrs. Freeman. I said, I hoped then she would be so, for that I would die, with all my soul, to have them two as they used to be. Then she said she would send me a letter for you, and so she did last night, intending I should have sent it by the post, but I thought it was better to keep it for this messenger. But when all this is done, you may see by her letter to lord Marlborough, which he sent me, that she leans still towards expedients, though I have told her, that to satisfy her, I had tried how far that would go, and the thing was not capable of any expedient, and that I was convinced by what had been said to me by lord Somers and lord Halifax, that it was infinitely more for her advantage not to think of any such thing as an expedient. But she told me the other day, she believed I thought it strange that she said nothing upon my shewing her lord Marlborough's letter ; but it was, that though she was very uneasy to see what he writ, she could not, for her life, be convinced but her expedient was better ; and when he

comes over she will certainly talk so to him ; but if he holds firm to what he has written and said, as I do not doubt he will, I dare say she will do the thing."

The concluding observation of Godolphin was verified ; for although the parliament was on the point of assembling, the queen still continued to protract her final decision.

The repugnance which the queen manifested to these changes, notwithstanding the instances of two ministers, turned the suspicions of the whigs into a new course. Justly ascribing to Harley the opposition made to their views, they were anxious to involve him in the disgrace of Sir Charles Hedges, and thus to exclude still more the remnant of the opposite party from the ostensible offices of state. With this intention the agency of the duchess was employed, to inspire the duke and Godolphin with similar jealousies of a minister who abused their confidence, and was exerting his favour with the queen to their detriment. Their representations, though founded on fact, did not make the desired impression on the two friends. Marlborough in particular was fascinated by the zealous professions and apparent candour of Harley, and treated the imputation as the usual fruit of party spirit. With Godolphin also the accusation seems to have had little weight, for we find him at this very moment appealing to Harley for information concerning the relative strength of the contending parties.

Harley indeed was not without hope of gaining the two ministers, and turning their influence



against the whigs; and his replies prove his anxiety to revive the tory propensities of the treasurer. After adverting to their original principle of uniting the moderate and able of both parties, he endeavours to prove that no concession would gratify the whigs, till they had usurped the whole power of the state, he hinted that their preponderance was more apparent than real, and contended that in a new parliament, if supported by the favour of the crown and the influence of the ministers, the tories would certainly regain the ascendancy. One of these letters to lord Godolphin has been already printed \*; the other is here given as a striking specimen of the adroit, supple, and insinuating character of the writer.

“ My lord,

*November 16.*

“ I received the honour of your lordship’s letter, and shall be very ready, whenever your lordship thinks it a proper time, to receive your commands about Vienna, or any thing else; for I do assure your lordship I have no thoughts but for the queen’s service and your lordship’s, neither would I ever mention any thing disagreeable to your lordship, if I was not persuaded that the public interest were concerned in it. I have no obligation to any party; I have no inclination to any one more than another; I have no animosity to any. But I think I should not do the duty of a public servant to your lordship, if I did not tell you what your lordship may hear if you please, from people of undoubted credit, from whigs themselves, that all that has been done has not obliged the party;

\* See Somerville’s *Queen Anne*, p. 622. — From the Hardwicke Collection.

whether it has their pretended leaders, will be shewn hereafter. I have no concern ; but only that what has been done, I wish the best of the whigs had been the better for it. As for the violence of the other side, I hope I have shewed myself as zealous against them as any one whatever. I think the distinction of the tackers was what they justly deserved. But, my lord, this is now carrying farther. Not only the 134\* are to be persecuted, but all the rest ; not only those who upheld them, but those without whose assistance these gentlemen could not have been an equality, much less a majority. They have endeavoured their ruin ; nay, they have proceeded so far as to proscribe (to use the words of a zealous whig and no whimsical†) many of their own party. In short, the lay and ecclesiastical policy is, by misrepresentation, to make those they do not like desperate ; they are doing their best to turn the pyramid on its point. But I hope your lordship will rescue us from the violence of either party ; and I cannot forbear saying, I know no difference between a mad whig and a mad tory, and as for the inveteracy of either party

*Iliacos intra muros peccatur et extra.*

“ There is no need of going back two years, nor scarce four months, to hear the most inveterate, malicious things said by their leaders against the queen, my lord duke, and your lordship, that tongue could utter, besides what the last parliament could produce from their undertakings ; and this is so notorious, that it is very common to

\* The number of those who voted for the tack.

† This epithet was applied to the violent of all parties.

match one malicious story from a tory with another from a whig. I will trouble your lordship no more ; but there is a disposition to do every thing that is reasonable, without any previous engagement ; there is no need of faith, where works only are to be the proof.

“ It will be very hard ever to bring the nation to submit to any other government but the queen’s. In her they will all center, and another election will shew that the party, as a party, are very far from being a majority, though clothed with all manner of authority that can be given it.

“ I must now beg your lordship’s pardon for this tedious letter, which is dictated by a heart unfeignedly devoted to your service.”

Not content with these insinuations to the treasurer, Harley wrote to the general, censuring the whigs, and making a more direct and explicit offer of the services which the tories were prepared to render.

“ My lord,

*Sept. 6.*

“ The last of the scots lords are gone down this week ; I hope they will be in earnest to carry the union thro’. It is so just and beneficial to both nations, that none can be against it, but those who do not understand it, or are ill-intentioned to the common good. It is plain the duke of Hamilton has it more his interest than any one man in that nation, that the union should succeed, yet I believe he is gone out of Lancashire into Scotland resolved to oppose it. I do not understand that country, and therefore cannot tell what will be the success ; but I think, in my poor opinion, it is very easy to



have the next session pass very well in all respects; yet it is plain some persons are endeavouring to make every thing difficult, by pursuing their old maxim, to make as many people as they can desperate. This being now obvious, I hope those who can hinder it will do it. I can only add, that I will obey your grace's commands without reserve."

" My lord, *Whitehall, Nov. 12-23.*

" I was detained in the country till Saturday last, by excessive floods.

" I had the honour to receive your grace's letter, with one enclosed to my lord keeper on Sunday last, which I immediately sent to his lordship. This morning I am honoured with your grace's letter from the Hague, of the 20th. I heartily wish your grace a prosperous voyage, and a speedy arrival here, where I am sure you will find such a disposition to do every thing that is reasonable, as I never did remember formerly; and they ask nothing, but only not to be exposed, and that their service may be accepted. I doubt not but your grace's true sense and superior genius will dispel all those clouds that hang about us, and shew the true path to a lasting well-founded settlement, clear of the narrow principles and practice of the heads of both factions.

" I doubt not but your grace has had all the requisite powers sent to you during my absence, and I am sure your grace will manage and improve every thing for the glory of the queen, and the common benefit of the nation."

A similar appeal, conceived almost in the

same terms, had been previously made by St. John, in whom Marlborough reposed peculiar confidence.

“ I do not hear of any besides my lord Guilford and Mr. Bertie, but what intend to act in the lieutenancy of Oxfordshire, and am confident your grace will make that county reasonable, and your own. The same methods that your grace takes there, would produce the same effects all over England. There are some restless spirits who are foolishly imagined to be heads of a party, who make much noise and have no real strength, that expect the queen, crowned with success abroad, and governing without blemish at home, should court them at the expense of her own authority, and support her administration by the same shifts that a vile and profligate one can only be kept up with. Nothing but unnecessary compliance can give these people strength; and their having that, is the great terror of those who are trusty servants to the queen, and who are entirely attached to your grace and to my lord treasurer. We have had some instances of late, how they would use power; and your grace cannot but know that in the distribution of employments, they have insisted on the scum of their own party.

“ If this was only my private sense, I should not presume to trouble your grace with it; but it is the sense, and the discourse too, of every man in England, that wishes the queen's glory and prosperity, and that loves and honours my lord treasurer and your grace. I am too well acquainted with your grace's goodness to suspect you will not

pardon me for saying so much, since I have no interest or view of my own that shall come in competition with the queen's service, and my gratitude and duty to you, who have tied me to be, ever, my lord, your grace's most devoted, faithful, humble servant."

These letters will supersede the necessity of whole pages of comment, and perfectly display the temper and state of the administration. Harley, and the few moderate tories yet in power, were striving to undermine their political antagonists, and to draw the two ministers to their party. The whigs, on the contrary, were not satisfied, but jealous of Marlborough and Godolphin. Each successive point which they gained, was considered only as a prelude to another; and they were eager for an opportunity of forcing the ministers, whose confidence they were well aware they did not possess, to rely on their single efforts for support. Both were equally averse to resign themselves to either party. They were inclined to the tories, though disapproving their violence; but compelled by necessity to identify themselves with the whigs, without whose assistance they could not carry on the government. The queen was disappointed that Marlborough had not rescued her from the bondage of the whigs, and beginning to withdraw from him and the treasurer that confidence and gratitude which she had hitherto entertained for their persons and services. Her alienation was increased by the acrimonious reproaches of the duchess, who, in her zeal for the advancement of the whig interest, over-stepped the bounds,



not only of respect, but of prudence, and aggravated the embarrassment of her husband and the treasurer.

In the anxiety of Harley to profit by these feuds, and form an independent interest, he at length forgot his usual caution, and awakened the suspicion of Godolphin, whose reliance on his attachment neither the suggestions of the whigs, nor the insinuations of the duchess, had hitherto been able to shake. He communicated his sentiments to his friend, though with a mixture of doubt and hesitation.

“ *Oct. 18–29.* — Lady Marlborough told me this morning, and promised to write to you, that Mr. Harley, Mr. St. John, and one or two more of your particular friends, were underhand endeavouring to bring all the difficulties they could think of upon the public business in the next sessions, and spoke of it to me as taking it for granted, it was what I could not have heard of before. I am apt to think they may have made some steps toward this, which are not justifiable, out of an apprehension that others would have all the merit; but whatever be their motive, the thing is destructive and pernicious. I have had a long letter this very day, full of professions of being guided in these measures, as in all others, by you and me; but at the same time, I doubt so much smoke could not come without some fire.”

From implicit confidence in the discernment of his friend, Marlborough seems at length to have become sensible of the petty intrigues and aspiring views of Harley; but still he regarded his cabals

with indulgence, and was only anxious to render this discovery the means of repressing the encroachments of the whigs, and maintaining the balance between the two parties.

“ *Hague, Nov. 9.* — I have had the favour of yours of the 15th, 18th, and 21st, by the express. In one of them I find you have received a letter from Mr. Harley, full of expressions. I beg you will lay hold of the occasion, and when he is with you, that you would acquaint him with the business of Sir Charles Hedges and lord Sunderland, and give him your reasons for the change ; for he must not be suffered to go on in the project that lady Marlborough acquainted you with ; and by gaining him you will govern the others without taking any pains with them. I have not heard from lady Marlborough, but I believe the thing is true. However, if you take this method, I am very confident when I shall be with you, you will be able to make Mr. secretary Harley very useful to yourself, and the queen’s business ; and by it you will enable me to make the others sensible of their error.”

The secret cabals of Harley were not, however, to be restrained by the fear of displeasing his two patrons, for he still continued to oppose with success the transfer of the secretaryship. As late as October 18. Godolphin thus wrote to the duchess : —

“ *Friday night, at eleven.* — I can’t help making haste to thank you to-night, for the favour of your letters, both of Wednesday and Thursday in one packet ; tho’ this day has been a day of so much

hurry of all kinds, that 'tis but just now I have been able to sit down to write to you. I have written a long letter to lord Marlborough, and enclosed yours in it, tho' it was as thick as it was long, which, with my handiness at making up a packet, gave mine a particularly graceful figure. The uneasiness which Mr. Montgomery complained of lately to you, is too long a story to be written, and must be kept till I have the happiness to see you, which I still hope is not far off. The lodge is a very pretty place, and lord Marlborough, I see in his letter, desires to find or carry you thither very soon. I return you his letter, with my opinion, that it should be sent to Mrs. Morley; for tho' it be no news to her, it may be of use to see he continues of the same mind, and will be so when he comes hither; for which reason, as well as others, I confess I am extremely impatient to have him here. I am glad you did not send him word of lord Sunderland's apprehensions, since there is not the least ground for them, and they would only have made him uneasy with him. I am sorry he and his friends continue so uneasy, since we have no other bottom to stand upon. Nothing shall be omitted by me to make them easier, tho' the queen is very far yet from being sensible of her circumstances in that particular.

“ Our letters to-day from Scotland are full of hopes to carry the union. Lord Sunderland is much pleased with this news, and lord Somers much more, which shews me the other would be so too, if he had not uneasiness upon the other account. All Mr. Johnston's friends have behaved



themselves well, so I am now as fond of him as you are of his letter.”

In this state of suspense, the presence of Marlborough produced an instantaneous effect. Departing from the Hague, he landed at Margate on the 16th of November, and reached London on the 18th. The recollection of his services, and the burst of popularity which his appearance awakened, gave weight to his personal representations. In his first private audience, the queen again recurred to the compromise which she had before proposed to Godolphin, but without effect. At length dreading, lest farther hesitation should provoke the whigs, not only to turn their attacks against Harley, but to oppose the measures of government, she reluctantly acquiesced in the removal of Sir Charles Hedges, and the promotion of Sunderland. His appointment was announced only on the 3d of December, the very day fixed for the meeting of parliament.

This important step being taken, less difficulty remained on inferior points. Several promotions were made in the peerage, in favour of the whigs, among which we particularly notice Mr. Cowper and Sir Thomas Pelham, who were created barons, and lord Wharton and lord Cholmondely, who were raised to earldoms. The same rank was also conferred on Godolphin himself.

Soon afterwards farther changes were made. Sir James Montagu, brother of lord Halifax, was appointed solicitor-general; and lord Stamford, with lord Herbert of Cherbury, and Mr. Pulteney, were constituted commissioners of trade, in the

room of viscount Weymouth, Mr. Monkton, and Mr. Prior. In consenting to this arrangement, Marlborough proved that neither political expedience, nor party interest, outweighed his respect for merit. He not only continued to manifest the same friendship toward the disgraced poet, but procured him a pension, as some compensation for the loss of his post, and laboured to sooth his chagrin by marks of personal regard. Indeed Prior, for a considerable period, looked up to his noble patron for advancement, and by his interest endeavoured to obtain first an increase of his pension, and afterwards the post of envoy at the Hague or Brussels.\* But on the decline of Marlborough's favour, and the restoration of his former friends to office, Prior was among the earliest who abandoned the fallen commander, and vied with Harley and St. John in repaying his past kindness with ingratitude.

The queen also removed from the privy council, the chiefs of the tory party, among whom we particularly notice the duke of Buckingham, the earls of Nottingham, Rochester, and Jersey; lord Gower, and Sir George Rooke. The administration now therefore assumed a new character, and may be considered as established on a whig basis; Harley and St. John being the only tories of any note, who were suffered to retain a place of distinction and responsibility.

\* Letters from Prior to the duke of Marlborough, in 1707 and 1708. — Marlborough Papers.

## CHAPTER 53.

1706—1707.

*Proceedings in parliament. — Thanks to the duke of Marlborough from both houses. — Removal of the colours, taken at the battle of Ramilies, to Westminster Hall. — Extension of the ducal title to the female line, and collateral entail of Blenheim, together with the pension of £ 5000. — Letter from the duchess to the queen. — Public business. — Settlement of the union with Scotland. — Conduct of Marlborough in this transaction. — Military preparations. — Address for the appointment of prince Eugene to the command in Spain.*

THIS triumph over the prejudices of the queen, and the combined efforts of the violent tories, as well as over the secret, but powerful opposition of Harley, stimulated the whigs to exert all their influence in favour of the government, and to continue, with unabating zeal, their support of the war and the political system of Marlborough. They also vied with Godolphin in bestowing due reward on his eminent services. As their party predominated in the house of lords, and was considerable in the commons, the session passed with unusual unanimity, and scarcely any opposition occurred, except on the union with Scotland, which was too much a national and party question to be carried without a vigorous struggle. The session



opened on the 3d of December, and the speech from the throne was perfectly in unison with the sentiments of the two ministers and the whigs. "I hope," the queen observed, "we are met together at this time, with hearts truly thankful to Almighty God, for the glorious successes with which he has blessed our arms and those of our allies, and with steady and serious resolutions to prosecute the advantages we have gained, till we reap the desired fruits of them in an honourable and durable peace."

After a few remarks on the necessity of establishing a balance of power in Europe, she appealed to the commons to grant such effectual supplies as might enable her to profit by the advantages of this successful campaign. Adverting to the arrangements for the union with Scotland, she recommended dispatch in public affairs, that both friends and enemies might be convinced of their firmness and vigour.

In reply to the speech from the throne, the peers warmly congratulated the queen on the great successes of her arms during this "wonderful year;" particularly on the ever memorable victory gained at Ramilies, under the command of her wise and valiant general, the duke of Marlborough.

Then delicately alluding to the conduct of the emperor, they testified the satisfaction which the country in general derived from the public declaration of the queen and the States, that no negotiation for peace should be undertaken without the concurrence of all the members of the Grand Alliance. They expressed their hope that such

an example would inspire them with a noble emulation; and if any had been wanting in time past, that her majesty would find means to apprise them that the only amends which they could make to public liberty was, by redoubling their efforts at so important a juncture. "This," they added, "will be the true way to obtain such a peace as all good men desire, which may secure to your majesty's subjects the protestant succession, and all the advantages of trade and commerce; may restore the whole monarchy of Spain to king Charles the third; may fix such a barrier for the States General (in whose security we must always think the interest of England is engaged), as may be to their just satisfaction, and may procure such terms and conditions for all the allies as may be just, safe, and honourable. Such a peace as may be durable and lasting, by reducing effectually the exorbitant power of a prince, whose restless ambition nothing could satisfy, and who has always despised the obligations of the most sacred leagues and treaties."

The address of the commons was brief, but, if possible, still more honourable to the duke of Marlborough.

After acknowledging their gratitude for the queen's most gracious speech, they added, "And with all thankfulness to Almighty God, we congratulate your majesty upon the signal victory obtained by your arms and those of your allies, under the command of the duke of Marlborough, at Ramilies; a victory so glorious and great in its consequences, and attended with such continued

successes, through the whole course of this year, that no age can equal."

Having testified their resolution of suffering no pretence to divert them from their steady resolution of enabling her majesty to improve, in all cases, the advantages of the campaign, they continued, "their experience of the great care and management shewn in the application of the public aids, encouraged them to assure her, that they would cheerfully give such speedy and effectual supplies as, by the continuance of God's blessing upon her arms, might establish the balance of power in Europe, by a safe, honourable, and lasting peace."

Both houses proved their sincerity, by hastening to redeem the pledge given in their respective addresses. Having examined the estimates, the commons, in less than a week, voted six millions for the ensuing year; and no discordance occurred, except a feeble but fruitless attempt, to oppose the sanction of the extraordinaries advanced on the faith of parliament. These were declared to have been expended for the preservation of the duke of Savoy, the interest of king Charles the third in Spain, and the safety and honour of the nation. Alluding to the dispatch which had marked the proceedings of both houses, the speaker, in presenting the money bills to the queen, pertinently observed, "as the glorious victory, obtained by the duke of Marlborough, at Ramilies, was fought before the enemy was apprised that the confederates had taken the field, so your faithful commons have granted subsidies, before the



enemy were apprised that the parliament had assembled."

During these proceedings the duke of Marlborough was greeted with those marks of national gratitude and honour which his services so well deserved. On taking his seat he was welcomed by the lord keeper, in a speech expressing the thanks of the house, not in the formal style of parliamentary proceedings, but in the language of the heart.

" My lord duke of Marlborough ;

" I am commanded by this house to give your grace their acknowledgment and thanks for the eminent services you have done since the last session of parliament, to her majesty and your country, together with their confederates in this just and necessary war. Though some former successes against the power of France, while it remained unbroken, gave most reasonable expectation that you would not fail to improve them ; yet what your grace has performed this last campaign, has far exceeded all hopes, even of such as were most affectionate and partial to their country's interest and your glory. The advantages you have gained against the enemy, are of such a nature, so conspicuous in themselves, so undoubtedly owing to your courage and conduct, so sensibly and universally beneficial in their consequences to the whole confederacy, that to attempt to adorn them with the colouring of words, would be vain and inexcusable ; and therefore I decline it, the rather because I should certainly offend that great modesty which alone can, and does add lustre

to your actions, and which, in your grace's example, has successfully withstood as great trials as that virtue has met with in any instance whatsoever. And I beg leave to say, that if any thing could move your grace to reflect with much satisfaction on your own merit, it would be this, that so august an assembly does, with one voice, praise and thank you: an honour, which a judgment so sure as that of your grace's, to think rightly of every thing, cannot but prefer to the ostentation of a public triumph."

The reply of the duke was brief and modest.

"I esteem this a very particular honour, which your lordships are pleased to do me. Nobody in the world can be more sensible of it than I am, nor more desirous to deserve the countenance of your favour and good opinion."

On the 4th a committee of the commons also waited on the duke to convey the thanks and congratulations of the lower house for his eminent services and late glorious victory. His reply was given in similar terms to that which he had delivered in the house of peers.

The gratulation of both houses was the prelude to another public recompense, — a regulation to render permanent in his descendants, the title as well as the pension and territorial property annexed to the ducal honour.

Having lost his only son, and being without hopes of farther issue, the duke was naturally anxious that the rewards which had been granted for his meritorious services, should be extended to his daughters and their posterity. This extension

was made in a manner no less gratifying than honourable. On the 17th of December, the house of lords presented an address to the queen, requesting her majesty to perpetuate the memory of the great actions of the duke of Marlborough, by continuing his titles and honours in his posterity, by act of parliament, and soliciting that the queen would please, in virtue of her prerogative, to indicate in what manner they should be so limited.

The queen, in reply, having expressed her resolution to extend the titles and honours of the duke to his daughters and their heirs male, in succession, so as to comprise all his posterity, recommended that the honour and manor of Woodstock, with the house of Blenheim, should always descend with the title. In the course of the deliberation, the duke of Marlborough addressed the house, in terms indicative of his gratitude and satisfaction.

“ My lords ; — I cannot find words sufficient to express the sense I have of the great and distinguishing honour, which the house has been pleased to do me, in their resolution and their application to her majesty. The thoughts of it will be a continual satisfaction to me, and the highest encouragement ; and the thankful memory of it must last as long as any posterity of mine.

“ I beg leave to say a word to the house in relation to that part of her majesty’s most gracious answer, which concerns the estate of Woodstock and the house of Blenheim. I did make my humble request to the queen, that those might go along with the titles, and I make the like request to your lordships, that after the duchess of Marlborough’s



death, upon whom they are settled in jointure, that estate and house may be limited to go always along with the honour.”

This request was speedily gratified. The requisite bills being prepared and approved by the peers, were transmitted to the commons on the 19th. On the ensuing day they were thrice read, for the sake of form, and being passed unanimously, received the royal sanction without delay. The settlement consisted of two acts: the first rendered the honours and dignities of John duke of Marlborough permanent in his posterity, and annexed the manor of Woodstock, with the house of Blenheim, to the ducal title, after the death of the duchess. The second was to entail in perpetuity the annual sum of £5000 from the post-office, first upon the duchess, and afterwards on his eldest daughter, lady Harriet Godolphin, and her heirs male; and in failure of such issue, successively to the three other daughters and their heirs male: namely, Anne, countess of Sunderland; Elizabeth, countess of Bridgwater; and Mary, marchioness of Mounthermer.\*

\* Journals of both houses. — The two acts of parliament are printed in the Statutes at large, for 1706. Their titles are:

“An act for the settling of the honours and dignities of John duke of Marlborough upon his posterity, and annexing the honour and manor of Woodstock, and house of Blenheim, to go along with the said honours.”

“An act for settling upon John duke of Marlborough, and his posterity, a pension of five thousand pounds per annum, for the more honourable support of their dignities, in like manner as his honours and dignities, and the honour and manor of Woodstock, and house of Blenheim, are already limited and settled.”

The duke appears, in this instance, to have lost the anxiety which he had formerly manifested for the perpetuation of his name ; for, instead of the clause, which he had inserted in the draught of his will, in 1703, binding his representatives in succession to assume the name and arms of Churchill, this act contains no such stipulation. Another singularity is, the confirmation of the settlement made by jointure on the duchess, and the extension of the grant of £5000 annually to her during her life.

This provision was suggested by the affection of the duke, who, as he himself observed, had made it his particular request to the queen, and urged his son-in-law to propose and support it in the house of lords.\* Among the papers of the duchess, we find her thanks to the queen, written in a cold and formal style, which shews, that either the irritation of their recent dispute was not calmed by this act of munificence, or that the duchess did not deem herself so much indebted to the friendship of the sovereign, as to the intercession of her husband.

“ Whether I have or have not the honour to see your majesty, I find there must always be something which obliges me to return you my humble thanks. The concern I have in the settlement made to lord Marlborough’s family, by the act of parliament, makes a necessity of my giving you the trouble of them upon this occasion; and though it is not natural to me to make you so many fine speeches

\* Letter from the duchess to Mr. Hutchinson in 1713.

and compliments as some others can do, yet nobody has a heart fuller of the sincerest wishes for your constant happiness and prosperity than your poor forsaken Freeman.” \*

During the discussion relative to these grants, the duke experienced from the city of London, the same testimonial of national gratitude as after the battle of Blenheim.

At the request of the city, the standards and colours taken at the battle of Ramilies, were transferred with military pomp from Whitehall, where they had been first deposited, to Guildhall. The procession commenced with a body of horse grenadiers and guards, in the center of whom were twenty-six gentlemen, each bearing a standard. It was closed by the foot guards, who escorted a party of one hundred and twenty-six pikemen, bearing the same number of colours taken from the infantry. As the cavalcade traversed the Park and Mews of St. James's, the queen appeared at one of the windows of the palace, at once to witness the procession, and give it additional honour. Passing through the Strand, and the principal avenues leading to the place of destination, the cavalcade was hailed by innumerable crowds, who beset the streets, and filled the windows and balconies, rending the air with their shouts and acclamations.

[ Indorsed by the Duchess. ]

\* “ This letter to the queen shews that I did not omit taking any reasonable occasion to please her, even when I saw she was changed to me ; for it is certain that she never took any care of me in the settlement ; and if I am ever the better for it, it is not owing to her friendship. But whatever the world said of my behaviour to her, I never failed in performing all manner of decencies and faithful services to her, while it was possible for me to do it.”



At the moment when the triumphal cavalcade had awakened the popular enthusiasm, the duke himself traversed the streets in one of the royal coaches, accompanied by the lord treasurer and the chief officers of the royal household, and attended by a splendid train of coaches filled with the foreign ministers and nobility, and with the principal officers, who had shared the honours which he acquired in the field of Ramilies. At Temple Bar he was received by the city marshal, with the same formalities as are shewn towards the sovereign. With difficulty pursuing his way through the crowded streets, where every eye was eager to behold his person, and every tongue to hail his presence, he was conducted to Vintners' Hall, and partook of a splendid entertainment, given by the lord mayor and magistracy of the city.

The renewal of this public spectacle increased the popularity of the victorious general, and not only silenced the malice of his enemies, but gave additional zeal and energy to the administration of which he was the principal support.

Amidst these scenes of exultation and festivity, the important business of the state was not suffered to languish. The failure of all attempts to secure the protestant succession, by the guaranty of the confederate powers, rendered the ministers doubly anxious to promote that object at home by the union with Scotland. As this was a domestic measure, and principally confided to Godolphin, it belongs rather to the province of the national historian, than to that of the biographer. It is,

therefore, sufficient to observe, that Marlborough, though engaged in military and diplomatic transactions, yet took a warm interest in an arrangement which he considered as involving, not merely the actual, but the future prosperity of England, and the permanent tranquillity of Europe. For this purpose he exerted his influence with the duke of Argyle, lord Mar, and the scottish nobility and gentry, and uniformly pressed Godolphin to employ no one in the administration of that country, who was even suspected of disaffection, but in all cases to regard the paramount interests of England.

A single extract from his correspondence, written at the time when the measure was yet in agitation, strikingly exhibits the warmth of his sentiments, on a subject of such national moment.

*To Lord Godolphin.*

“ *Helchin, August 9th.* — What you say of both parties is so true, that I do, with all my soul, pity you. Care must be taken against the malice of the angry party ; and notwithstanding their malicious affectation of crying the church may be ruined by the union, the union must be supported ; and I hope the reasonable men of the other party will not oppose the enlarging of the bottom, so that it may be able to support itself. \* \* \* \*

“ I had last night the honour of yours of the 13th; and am very glad to find that the commission has so unanimously agreed. I do with all my heart wish the parliament of both nations may do the same, so that her majesty may have the glory of finishing this great work, for which she will not

only deserve to be blessed in this, but also in future ages."

Before his departure for the continent, the measure had been matured by Godolphin and the whigs; and the commissioners, who had been already appointed in behalf of the two nations, had proceeded with such address and promptitude, that the difficulties arising from the leaven of jacobitism in Scotland, as well as from the independent character of a high spirited nation, were gradually overcome. The conditions were prepared for the deliberation of the english legislature early in the spring.

It may easily be imagined that an arrangement of this nature called forth all the hostility of the violent tories, who found warm auxiliaries in the jacobites. The arguments of Nottingham, Rochester, and their adherents, were, however, successfully combated by the treasurer and the whig lords, in the house of peers, and in the commons by the ablest of the same party, as well as by the plausible eloquence of Harley and St. John, and the legal acuteness of Sir Simon Harcourt, who framed the bill of ratification. The combined efforts of the whigs and moderate tories vanquished all opposition, and it was carried through both houses with a vigour and dispatch, which has seldom distinguished any public measure of equal moment. Finally, on the 6th of March it received the sanction of the queen, who addressed the legislature in a speech strongly expressive of her satisfaction, declaring it a peculiar happiness that in her reign so full provision was made for the peace and quiet of her people, and for the security of the national



religion, by so firm an establishment of the protestant succession throughout Great Britain.

No national measure more deeply involved the welfare of the whole island ; nor were the interests and even prejudices of two nations, once in the highest degree hostile, ever more happily combined.

The act of security was repealed, and the same order of succession, in the protestant line of Hanover, established in both kingdoms. The two legislatures were blended and consolidated, and the share assigned to Scotland in the national representation was so liberal as to make ample amends for the loss of her own independent parliament. Similar address was evinced in arranging the delicate point of a religious establishment ; and the permanence of the two distinctions of protestantism, which existed in both countries, was secured by collateral provisions, rendering each system of worship independent and predominant in the respective kingdoms.

On points of trade, the subjects of both countries were admitted to the same privileges ; the burthen of taxation was regulated according to the means and revenues of each ; and in matters of justice and police, care was equally taken that the prejudices of the scots might not be shocked by the introduction of new laws and regulations, even though superior to their own. \*

\* Numerous volumes have been written on the Union, which it would be endless to specify. We may, however, refer the curious reader for the secret history of that transaction to the work of De Foe, the Stuart Papers, printed by Macpherson, for the year 1707, and the Lockhart Papers, recently published, which contain many curious particulars of this great event. But the most satisfactory, as well as candid and impartial account, appears in Somerville's History of Queen Anne.

The greatest blow was thus given to the hopes of the Stuart family, which had been struck since the revolution ; and it may be recorded as an answer to the numberless accusations and surmises against the principles of Marlborough and Godolphin, that such a measure was accomplished by them, in opposition to the efforts of a powerful combination of tories and jacobites, both in England and Scotland, and under a queen who not only detested the Hanover line, but who was beginning to turn with renewed affection towards the surviving members of her unfortunate family.

Marlborough remained in England as long as the foreign affairs would permit, and assisted at several of the discussions, which arose on the subject of the union. He had the satisfaction to observe the legislative provisions completed before his departure, and quitted England in full confidence that the same harmony which had proved of such advantage in the important transactions of this session, would continue to subsist between the whigs and moderate tories.

Scarcely, however, had he reached the continent, before he received the unwelcome intelligence of a misunderstanding between Harley and the whigs. Fears being justly entertained that advantage would be taken of the interval before the establishment of the union, on the first of May, to evade the duties on import, which were then to be common to both countries, a law was proposed in the lower house to prevent the expected abuse. On the third reading of the bill, Harley introduced a clause, tending to render the provisions more

complete by a retro-active effect. This regulation greatly offended the scots in general, who regarded it as an infraction of the union, and was no less obnoxious to the whigs, either from national or personal motives. By the interest of the whole tory party it was, however, carried through the house of commons, but thrown out by the whigs in the lords. Harley still persisted in his design, and to give time for digesting a new regulation, the queen was induced to adopt a proposal for a temporary recess. Accordingly she repaired to the house on the 8th of April, and announced a prorogation till the 14th. On the resumption of business, the measure was again brought forward, and a new law passed the commons; but as it created great disputes and difference of opinion, it was quietly withdrawn.

Marlborough received notice of this transaction from Harley, St. John, Godolphin, and Sunderland. The two former merely announced the fact, without a comment. Godolphin, though briefly, assigned it to the true cause. "The close," he observes, "of the best sessions of parliament that England ever saw, has been unhappily hindered by a broil between the two houses, which is not yet ended. It would be tedious to trouble you with all the particulars, but it is chiefly imputable, as most other ill accidents, to private animosities." But Sunderland bitterly inveighed against the duplicity of the secretary, in a tone which shews the incurable jealousy reigning between the two parties. "I believe," he says, "you will be surprised at this short prorogation. It is entirely



occasioned by him who is the author of all the tricks\* played here. I need not name him, having done it in my last letter to you. I will only say, no man in the service of a government ever did act such a part. I wish those for whom he has acted it, were ever capable of thinking him in the wrong, for I fear it may be, some time or other, too late.

“ I don’t write so full of professions to you as some do, but I am sure my heart is more sincere.”

\* Meaning Harley, who is often called in the whig pamphlets and ballads, “ *the Trickster*.”

## CHAPTER 54.

1707.

*Character and victories of Charles the twelfth. — His irruption into Saxony. — Agitation and suspense of the european powers. — Attempts of Louis to obtain his mediation. — His complaints against the king of Denmark and the emperor. — Attention of Marlborough to the designs and character of the swedish monarch. — He receives communications on the subject, from general Grumbkow and the elector of Hanover. — Is importuned to visit the swedish camp. — Departs for the continent. — Obtains the acquiescence of the dutch. — Completes the military arrangements for the campaign.*

THE great advantages which the allies had gained in the preceding campaign, were suddenly exposed to imminent danger, by the appearance of a new and extraordinary actor on the theatre of affairs.

Charles the twelfth, king of Sweden, at an age when the mind scarcely begins to display its faculties, or the body its vigour, suddenly rose into distinction, as a hero and a statesman. Attacked at once by the three northern sovereigns, his latent energies were roused into action. The youthful warrior not only repelled the invaders, but turned the tide of war on his enemies, with an energy and success which had not been shewn since the days of Alexander the great, whose enterprising charac-

ter he both studied and emulated. Gathering strength from exertion, and extending his views in proportion to his success, he first reduced the king of Denmark to sign a dishonourable peace; and then bursting into the russian territories, on the shores of the Baltic, he defeated the czar, Peter, in a series of victories, which assume the character of romance. Turning next into Poland, he dethroned king Augustus, and gave the crown to Stanislaus Letzinski, a nobleman whom accident first offered to his notice. He next directed his course into Germany, and leading his invincible army into Saxony, the electoral territory of the dethroned monarch, forced him to resign the crown to Stanislaus, to renounce his alliance with Russia, and to grant quarters and accommodations to the army which had effected his humiliation, allowing him only the name and honours of a king. As if meditating new enterprises, he took up his quarters at Alt Ranstadt, and imperiously required the european powers to acknowledge Stanislaus, and to guaranty the treaty of peace concluded with Augustus.

The apparition of this military meteor, and the presence of a numerous and victorious army, attracted the attention of all the states who were engaged in the mighty struggle for the spanish monarchy. It was evident that the accession of so considerable a force would give the preponderance to the party whose cause its chief should espouse. The king of France, in his distress, was anxious to gain the aid of so powerful a coadjutor, and spared neither money nor intrigues to tempt the



king of Sweden, either to become the arbiter of peace, or to direct his hostilities against the allies. The ancient connection of France and Sweden was recalled to his remembrance ; the glory of Gustavus Adolphus was held forth to dazzle his imagination ; and attempts were not spared to work on that hereditary jealousy which he entertained of the house of Austria. The allies also felt similar hopes and fears ; and the greatest solicitude was evinced by all parties to penetrate the mysterious designs, and conciliate the vain-glorious character of the Swedish monarch.

While Charles continued in this commanding attitude, and while he wrought on the hopes or fears of all parties, he brought forward various complaints for real or fancied injuries, from different powers, as well as a series of demands for the reparation of several infractions in the constitution of the germanic empire, of which he considered himself the guaranty, as heir to the crown and fame of Gustavus Adolphus.

The first related to the conduct of Denmark in a contested election for the see of Lubeck. This see being among the ecclesiastical territories secularised at the reformation, a stipulation was introduced in the peace of Westphalia, that the six next bishops should be chosen from the house of Holstein Gottorp. The disposition was ratified by the treaties of Gluckstadt and Travendahl, and sanctioned by a recess of the diet, as well as by an imperial rescript issued in 1701. It was, however, secretly opposed by the king of Denmark, and a double election took place for the coadjutorship or

reversion of the see ; Christian Augustus, prince of Holstein, being chosen by one part of the chapter, and prince Charles of Denmark \* by the other. By the recent death of the bishop, this contest was aggravated into an open rupture. The king of Sweden warmly espoused the cause of his relation, the prince of Holstein, whose pretensions he maintained with his usual arrogance and pertinacity. Appeals were made to the emperor, and to all the powers who were considered as interested in the arrangement ; and the elector of Hanover in particular, not only testified great indignation against the danish court, but even manifested a resolution to join the king of Sweden in enforcing a regulation, which had been guarantied by a solemn treaty, and embodied in the germanic constitution.

This grievance was, however, lost in the more vehement complaints which the swedish monarch advanced against Joseph, both as chief of the empire, and head of the house of Austria.

The first of these complaints was against the infraction of the religious privileges secured to the protestants of Germany, by the introduction of an article into the treaty of Ryswick, which declared the catholic the dominant religion in all places where it had been once re-established after the peace of Westphalia.

The second was for the suppression of the numerous protestant churches in Silesia.

\* Augustus was administrator to his nephew Charles Frederic, duke of Holstein, then a minor. It has been erroneously supposed that this dispute related to the duchy only.

To these other causes of complaint were added, before Marlborough could accomplish his journey to the swedish camp.

The first was the connivance of the emperor in permitting the evasion of 1500 muscovites who had sought refuge in the austrian territories, after one of the recent battles with the czar.

The second regarded an affront offered to the swedish ambassador by count Zobor, an hungarian nobleman, who, at a public entertainment, impudently used an expression derogatory to the king of Sweden. Although the insult was resented on the spot by a blow, and afterwards punished by imprisonment, Charles was not satisfied, but insisted on the delivery of the offender, that he might himself inflict the chastisement due to his injured honour.

The third was the massacre of two swedish officers, who had fallen in some popular brawl, while recruiting at Breslau.

The effects arising from these contentions threatened the most serious consequences. The troops of all the sovereigns and states, who were near the scene of danger, were diverted from a co-operation with the allied powers ; and the attention of the emperor in particular, seemed more engrossed by the peril which he apprehended from Sweden, than by the advantages which he hoped to acquire by a vigorous prosecution of the war against France. The complaints on the subject of religion appeared even likely to produce a schism in the empire. Charles not only laboured for the formation of a protestant league, but infused similar sentiments into the king



of Prussia ; he also endeavoured to gain the concurrence of the elector of Hanover, whose example was likely to operate on the minor princes and states. The emperor and the catholics, on the other hand, caught the alarm, and active steps were taken for the formation of a counter-alliance, to preserve the catholic faith and interest.

These jarring pretensions and mutual jealousies gave scope to the intrigues of the french monarch. He fomented the dissatisfaction of both parties, made overtures to both, and was ready to join with either, as soon as the combination had attained sufficient consistency to forward his views. Finding difficulties in opening a negotiation with the emperor, he redoubled his assiduities towards the king of Sweden. He sent to his camp the *Sieur de Ricoux*, a distinguished officer, whom he furnished with a series of instructions, suggesting such arguments as were likely to weigh with a sovereign of such a romantic and imperious temper. He even solicited his mediation, which he declared the allies would not venture to reject. To give effect to these representations, the agent was authorised to gratify count Piper, the prime minister of Charles, with a sum of 300,000 livres, if he could persuade his royal master to hasten a peace by his intervention ; and bribes in proportion were offered to the two subordinate ministers, *Hermelin* and *Ciederholm*, who were deemed favourable to the french interest.\*

The attention of *Marlbrough* was deeply oc-

\* Instructions pour le sieur Ricoux, &c. A copy of these instructions is preserved in the curious collection of the Cardonel Papers.

cupied by the alarming predicament in which the allies were placed. He so vigilantly watched the intrigues of the french court, that from some of his numerous channels of communication, he obtained a copy of the instructions furnished to the sieur de Ricoux. He anxiously endeavoured also to gain an insight into the character and views of the swedish monarch. Among other means employed for this purpose, he recurred to the agency of general Grumbkow, who had been dispatched by the king of Prussia on a mission to the head quarters. The letters written by this adroit and intelligent observer, exhibit a curious picture of the habits of a warrior, who has been no less the wonder of posterity than of his own age.

“ My lord duke ; *Berlin, Jan. 11. 1707.*

“ I returned yesterday from Leipsig, and I deem it my duty to give your highness an account of my journey. Last Sunday week I departed from hence, and arrived the Monday at Leipsig. On the next day I waited upon the king at his dinner. I was much surprised at the manner in which the table was served ; and I do assure your highness that the fare with which M. de Hompesch regaled you, was divine in comparison with this. On the following day I saw king Augustus at dinner with the king of Sweden : the latter appeared pleased and contented, the other disconcerted and pensive. The repast continued, according to custom, only a quarter of an hour, during which an unbroken silence was preserved, which I attributed to the consideration that there was only time to swallow some morsels in haste. On Saturday I visited

count Piper, and after an hour's conference we sat down to dinner; and as his fare was much worse than that of his royal master, your highness may judge of my wretched situation. Count Piper is rude and boisterous, and has all the manners of a pedant, without his learning. He resembles, in his person and manners, Mr. \* \* \* excepting that he has not a martial voice. I conversed with him on all subjects, and particularly dwelt on the confidence which your highness reposes in the word of the king his master. He said, that english lord is a brave and intelligent man; the english and the allies are extremely fortunate that he is their general: the king, my master, esteems him infinitely. He then said that his master was not prodigal of promises, but kept his word most religiously; adding, that those who were not inclined to believe him, need only let him follow his own way.

“ Having insensibly turned the discourse on the great designs of the king, his master, he said, we made war in Poland only to subsist; our design in Saxony is to terminate the war; but for the muscovite, he shall pay *les pots cassés*, and we will treat the czar in a manner which posterity will hardly believe. I secretly wished that he was already in the heart of Muscovy.

“ After dinner he conveyed me in his carriage to the head quarters, and presented me to the king. His majesty was standing in a small apartment, dressed in the swedish fashion. I made my bow, and having received proper instructions, accosted him boldly, that I esteemed myself very fortunate in paying my respects to a sovereign, who was so



renowned in Europe for his distinguished actions, valour, and equity. He asked me whence I came, and where I had served. I replied, and mentioned my good fortune in serving three campaigns under your highness. He questioned me much, and particularly about your highness and the english troops; and you will readily believe that I delineated my hero in the most lively and natural colours. Among other particulars, he asked me if your highness yourself led the troops to the charge. I replied, that as all the troops were animated with the same ardour for fighting, your highness was not under the necessity of leading the charge; but that you were every where, and always in the hottest of the action, and gave your orders with that coolness which excites general admiration. I then related to him that you had been thrown from your horse; the death of your aide-de-camp, Brinfield, and many other things. He took such pleasure in this recital, that he made me repeat the same thing twice. I also said that your highness always spoke of his majesty with the highest esteem and admiration, and ardently desired to pay your respects. He observed, ‘that is not likely, but I should be delighted to see a general of whom I have heard so much.’

“The conversation continued more than an hour, to the great annoyance of count Piper, who came in three or four times, but the king always turned his back to him. It was at length interrupted by a singular accident. The king leaning upon a small table, it broke, and his majesty fell down upon the floor. The noise of the fall, and the crash of the table brought in count Piper and

Hermelin ; and as they entered at the moment while I held the king in my arms, and was assisting him to rise, their frightened countenances induced me to think that in the first moment of surprise they imagined the prussian was in the act of assaulting his serene majesty. The king laughed heartily at the accident, and after a conversation of some minutes, dismissed me with a gracious smile."

" *Berlin, Jan. 31. 1707. \* \* \** After taking leave of the king of Sweden, I paid a visit to field marshal count de Reinschold. He was sickly, but the weakness of his body made no impression on his mind. He conversed with a precision and vivacity very uncommon ; he seemed to me well informed of public affairs, and not inclined to France. The king, his master, he observed, instead of dissuading king Augustus, would rather exhort him to furnish troops to the empire ; and if ever he concluded a peace with the muscovite, he himself would supply his contingent. He dwelt on the extraordinary manner in which his master made war, saying that he placed great reliance on his cavalry, and was extremely fond of his dragoons, whom he occasionally employed like infantry, adding, that next March, the king would have on foot 2000 dragoons and 8000 horse. He farther observed, that the principle of the king's motions was always to undertake what was most difficult ; because the enemy were less on their guard, and took less precautions. He related several movements, which appear incredible ; such as marching eighty leagues without unsaddling the

horses, and feeding them on the thatch of the houses. In a word, I remarked as well from this discourse, as from that of count Piper, that they intend vigorously to attack the muscovites, and expect to dethrone the czar, compelling him to discharge all his foreign officers and troops, and to pay several millions as an indemnification. Should he refuse such conditions, the king is resolved to exterminate the muscovites, and make their country a desert. God grant that he may persist in this diversion, rather than amuse himself with demanding the restitution, as some people assert, of the protestant churches in Silesia. \* \* \*

“As to the character of the swedes in general, they are modest, but do not scruple to declare themselves invincible, when the king is at their head. \* \* \*

“I have received the honour of your highness's letter of the 28th of December, and read it to the king, my master. His majesty orders me to assure your highness, that he is fully convinced of your good inclinations, but he refers to your own judgment, if he can prudently send away his troops at a time when he cannot penetrate the designs of the king of Sweden, nor foresee the effects which may result from the abdication of king Augustus. He requested your highness's opinion; and convinced as he is of your sincere affection, will listen with pleasure to your advice, well aware that his interests are indissolubly blended with those of the queen.

“P. S. Mr. Pratt is arrived from the court of



Sweden, and his majesty is satisfied he has nothing to fear from that quarter." \*

For the same purpose Marlborough maintained an intimate correspondence with the elector of Hanover, from whom he received repeated declarations that the king of Sweden was by no means inclined to favour the cause of France. The other allies were, however, too much alarmed, to be satisfied with indirect assurances, even from so high and respectable a quarter; particularly as reports were hourly circulated, that Charles was on the point of concluding a subsidiary treaty with Louis; and not only meditated the restoration of the elector of Bavaria, but was preparing to kindle a civil war in the empire, and consolidate the revolution in Hungary. Marlborough, therefore, was importuned by his friends in England and Holland, and above all by the court of Vienna, to visit the swedish monarch, and penetrate his designs.

In this dilemma he recurred to the advice of the elector of Hanover, expressing his readiness to undertake the journey at his recommendation, and requesting information on the best means of gaining the swedish ministers. The elector, in answer, not only intimated his acquiescence, but hinted that an annual pension of £2000 should be granted to Piper, and £1000 to Hermelin, and the first year paid in advance. If he could not himself undertake the journey, he recommended that this negotiation should be intrusted to the british envoy,

Mr. Robinson, the confidential friend of count Piper.\*

Considering, however, the shortness of time, and the necessity of maturing the military preparations, Marlborough left London in a state of hesitation.

While he was detained at Margate by contrary winds, we find several letters proving the perplexity in which he was involved by this critical situation of affairs, and the general reliance placed on his interposition.

As the object of more immediate interest was to induce Charles to suspend his offer of mediation, Marlborough opened a correspondence on that subject through Mr. Robinson. His first idea was, to conduct the negotiation by the agency of some confidential person, and draughts of letters to the king of Sweden and his ministers were transmitted to the cabinet. The method was approved with some trifling alteration; but the more he reflected on the delicate and arduous task, the more he felt the necessity of a direct and efficient application. He deemed it imprudent to consign to writing instructions of so delicate a nature, as it was necessary to employ. He discovered also that he had not merely to soothe the high spirit of the king of Sweden, but to satisfy the emperor, who considered his dignity as humbled; and the dutch, who apprehended that any engagement with Sweden, or any acknowledgment of Stanislaus, as king of Poland, might eventually implicate them

\* Letter from the elector to the duke of Marlborough, March 13. 1707, Macpherson, v. ii. p. 90.

in a new contest. His resolution was finally decided by a declaration of Charles, that he would treat with no other person except with the duke of Marlborough.\* This proposal being warmly approved by the cabinet, he announced his intention through Mr. Robinson, under the condition of the strictest secrecy; and on his arrival at the Hague, prepared for his journey.

In Holland he first communicated his design privately to the pensionary, and afterwards to the deputies from Holland and Friesland, assembled at the Hague, leaving the communication to the other provinces to be made after his return. He gave an account of this delicate transaction to the treasurer, in a confidential letter, dated Hague, April 9-20.

“ After four tedious days I got to Helvoetsluys, and with difficulty made these people easy as to my journey to Saxony; but as to the acknowledging of Stanislaus, and the guaranty of the peace, they dare not give me any powers, without the consent of the States, and for that the form of the States does require their sending to the provinces, which would require too much time. But the truth is, they are unwilling to come into the acknowledging and guaranty for fear of disobliging the czar.

“ Since my being here I have received letters from Vienna, by which I see they persist in the expedition for Naples, and at the same time they complain of the king of Sweden. I find that the

\* Lediard, vol. ii.



behaviour of the french has given occasion to these people to wish heartily for good success in this campaign.

“ In two conversations I have had with M. de Buys, he has been very plain in telling me that he should think it a very good peace, if we could persuade the duke of Anjou to be contented with Naples and Sicily. I am afraid there are a great many more in Holland of his mind ; but as we are very sure, I think, of making this campaign, there may be many alterations before winter.

“ The ambassador of Muscovy has been with me, and made many expressions of the great esteem his master has for her majesty ; that he would do every thing to merit her friendship, and as a mark of it, he had resolved to send his only son into England ; but he desired nobody but the queen might know it, since he must pass *incognito* through several countries. He is also very desirous of the honour, as he calls it, of the queen’s appointing him a house. As it can be of no precedent to any country but their own, and as the expence is so very inconsiderable, I hope her majesty will do it ; for it is certain you will not be able to gratify him in any part of his negotiation.

“ I have undertaken this journey to Saxony to comply with the great desire of our friends ; but I own to you that the pensioner and Slingeland have shewn me several intercepted letters, which have been deciphered, that shew very plainly that almost all about the king receive french money except count Piper.

“ The agreement for 3390 foot and 1125 horse,

is almost concluded with the saxon ministers. Mr. Secretary will have a particular account of it from Mr. Stepney. The 70,000 crowns that are to be given, to put them in a condition to march, must be speedily paid, for the troops can't march till one month after the payment. I have this afternoon received a letter from the king of Spain of the 6th of March, concerning some employments in the Low Countries. He also tells me that he is resolved to go to Barcelona, for some short time, till his presence may be necessary in the army. I have not time to have his letter copied, but by my next you shall have it. I have left orders that the first letters that come from England, should be sent after me, there being now six posts due."

## CHAPTER 55.

1707.

*Journey of Marlborough to the swedish camp at Alt Ranstadt.— Visits in his way the elector of Hanover.— His interview with count Piper.— Audiences of the king of Sweden.— Extracts from his correspondence.— Interview with Augustus.— Succeeds in the objects of his mission.— Conclusion of his proceedings at Alt Ranstadt.— Visits the court of Prussia in his return.— Arrival at the Hague.— Effects of his success.— Congratulations of Godolphin and Harley.— Disappointment of the french court.— Curious account of his first audience, transmitted by the french envoy, Besenval, to Louis the fourteenth.*

SATISFIED with the partial acquiescence of the dutch, Marlborough hastened his military arrangements, and taking his departure from the Hague on the 20th of April, traversed Osnaburg in his way to Hanover. He reached that capital on Sunday, the 23d, and spent the remainder of the day in visits of respect to the electoral family, and secret conversations with the elector. At four, the ensuing morning, he resumed his journey, and passed through Halberstadt to Hall, where he was met by count Zinzendorf, by Cranenburg, the dutch minister, and by the british envoy, Mr. Robinson. After a short, but interesting conference, he proceeded in the evening to the camp, at Alt Ranstadt, accompanied by Mr. Robinson and Cranenburg.



His grace immediately drove to the head-quarters of count Piper, with whom he held a conversation of an hour, and from whom he received assurances that the king was highly gratified with his arrival. In this interview he gained the confidence of the minister, acquired considerable insight into the character and views of the monarch, and arranged the mode in which he was to treat on the subjects of his mission. The time of his audience was fixed at ten the ensuing day, after the king had attended divine service. He then repaired to the quarters assigned to him, which were about half a league distant from those of the king.

Early on the 28th count Piper conveyed the duke in his carriage to the royal head-quarters; and he was immediately introduced into the cabinet, by the minister, accompanied by Mr. Robinson, who acted as interpreter. He found the king surrounded by his senators and generals, and was received with becoming marks of regard and attention. Presenting letters of credence from the queen and the prince of Denmark, he made a short compliment in English, which was interpreted by Mr. Robinson.

“I present to your majesty,” he observed, “a letter, not from the chancery, but from the heart of the queen, my mistress, and written with her own hand. Had not her sex prevented it, she would have crossed the sea to see a prince admired by the whole universe. I am in this particular more happy than the queen, and I wish I could serve some campaigns under so great a general as

your majesty, that I might learn what I yet want to know in the art of war.”\*

This flattering address from so illustrious a commander pleased the monarch, whose foible was a passion for military glory. His satisfaction was visible in his countenance, and he returned, through count Piper, an answer unusually gracious.

“The queen of Great Britain’s letter and your person are both very acceptable to me, and I shall always have the utmost regard for the interposition of her britannic majesty, and the interests of the Grand Alliance. It is, likewise, much against my will if I have been obliged to give the least umbrage to any of the parties engaged in it. But your excellency cannot fail to be convinced, that I had just cause to come into this country with my troops. On the other hand, you may assure the queen, my sister, that my design is to depart from hence, as soon as I have obtained the satisfaction I demand, but not sooner. However, I shall do nothing that can tend to the prejudice of the common cause in general, or the protestant religion

\* The authenticity of this speech has been questioned, merely on the ground that it was too adulatory to have been spoken by the duke of Marlborough. But, with the french biographer, I see nothing in it too extravagant to be addressed by a skilful negotiator to so vain-glorious a monarch as Charles the twelfth. I have, therefore, adopted it as genuine, because it is given in the periodical publications of the time preserved by Lamberti, and above all, repeated by Lediard, who was then in Saxony, and asserts, that he heard the substance from several officers in the suite of the duke.

Since this note was written, I have discovered an account of this discourse which was transmitted by Besenval, the french envoy at Leipsig, to Louis the fourteenth, and which strikingly corroborates the preceding statement.

in particular, of which I shall always glory to be a zealous protector.”

At the conclusion of this reply, the duke continued the conversation in the french tongue, which the king understood, but did not speak, either from prejudice or timidity. The discourse turned on military and political subjects, and lasted till mid-day, the usual hour of dinner, when the king graciously invited the duke to partake of his repast. At table he was placed on the right hand of the monarch, and count Piper on the left, and the sitting was prolonged more than half an hour beyond the usual time, in honour of so distinguished a guest. On rising from table, Charles again retired with Marlborough into his closet, accompanied by Piper, Hermelin, and Robinson. The conversation was continued with great animation, the king listening to his illustrious visiter with the utmost attention and interest.

In the course of this address the duke entered into a full exposition of the state of affairs, and a discussion equally full on the demands of the king. He justified the principle on which the queen had entered into the war, and enlarged on the dangers to be apprehended, from the usurpations and preponderance of France. His arguments and manly eloquence wrought so powerfully on the king, that he even went farther than Marlborough had anticipated. He censured the domineering spirit of the french monarch, and dwelt on the mischiefs resulting from the extent of his empire. He even argued that France, although humbled, was not yet brought to listen to reasonable terms, and added,



there could be no safety to Europe till she was reduced to the same condition as she was left by the peace of Westphalia. On the subject of Dunkirk, to which Marlborough adverted, he evinced the same sentiments. The duke observing, that although Dunkirk once belonged to England; yet the queen was not desirous to retain it at a future peace, but thought it necessary that the fortifications should be demolished; the king perfectly concurred in the remark, adding, that it had proved equally injurious to his own trading subjects, whom he recommended to the indulgence of the queen.

On the delicate point of religion Marlborough evinced consummate address. The king having expressed his anxiety for the protestant interest in general, and particularly his wish to revive the privileges guarantied to the german protestants, by the peace of Westphalia; Marlborough represented the queen as equally interested in the protestant cause, but deprecated any interference in the religious system of Germany, as tending to create jealousy among the Catholics, and frustrate the object of the Grand Alliance, which was, to preserve the balance of power, and prevent the destruction of religious liberty. He suggested that the proper time and means for furthering such views would occur in the treaty for a general peace, for which the queen was ready in due time to accept his mediation, and would join with his majesty in all measures conducive to their mutual benefit.

After some farther discussion, the king not only acknowledged the weight of his arguments, but

even proposed a secret connection with England, for the promotion of the protestant interest. This embarrassing proposal was, however, parried with equal dexterity. Marlborough delicately hinted that it would appear inconsistent with the character of a mediator, which the king of Sweden was desirous to sustain. At the same time he offered to communicate to the queen any proposal which his majesty might think proper to make.

This discussion embraced the personal demands of the king, respecting his dispute with Denmark on the bishopric of Lubec, in which he appeared to take great interest. It also comprised his complaints against the emperor, on which he dwelt with peculiar emphasis. The affair of Lubec was referred to a discussion with count Piper and Goertz, minister of Christian Augustus, the candidate supported by Charles. The most difficult point was the dispute with the emperor; but the conciliating eloquence of Marlborough in some degree soothed the irritation of the king, and afforded hopes that an accommodation might be ultimately effected through the mediation of England.

In the course of this conversation, Charles expressed the greatest esteem for the queen, and declared that he would accept no proposal of mediation, till informed by Marlborough that it was agreeable to her britannic majesty. The conversation continued until the kettle-drums announced the hour of evening prayer, when Charles took leave, and retired to his customary devotions.

Marlborough passed the afternoon in visits of ceremony to the ministers and generals, and did

not fail to pay his respects to the two ladies of count Piper and marshal Renschold, who held assemblies in honour of the illustrious visiter.

The greatest difficulty, which he perhaps experienced during this delicate negotiation, was the conduct to be observed towards the dethroned monarch. On his entry into Saxony, Augustus had sent a nobleman to compliment him, and the ensuing day a messenger appeared with an invitation for an interview at Leipsig. It required all the matured prudence of so able a negotiator to shew proper attention to the sovereign from whom the allies had derived such essential advantage, and yet to avoid exciting the jealousy of the capitious prince, by whom he had been expelled from his throne. Marlborough, however, not only managed this interview without giving umbrage to Charles, but employed, with the happiest effect, his influence over Augustus. We give the account of this conference in his own words.

*To Lord Godolphin.*

“ May 6. — I must now acquaint you that I had an audience of king Augustus at Leipsig, the day before I came away ; at which, besides many repeated assurances of his respect for the queen, and of his strict adherence to the interest of the allies, he complained to me of the great hardships and extortions he had suffered from the swedes, and insinuated his desire that the guarantees, at the same time as they accepted the guaranty of his treaty, would take care that he might have some satisfaction for seven millions of crowns, he pretends, they have exacted, beyond what the treaty



allows. To which I gave him my opinion, that it was no ways advisable for him to offer at any thing at this juncture, that might give the least handle to the king of Sweden to delay his march out of Saxony. You will have heard when the treaty was concluded here, by Mr. Stepney, for the saxon troops, upon the notice I had of it, and the pressing instances the king made me ; I was prevailed with to give Sir G. Wacherbart, who is to command there, a bill on Mr. Sweet for 40,000 crowns, payable at fifteen days' sight, to enable them to hasten their march, which he promised should be done before the time appointed by the treaty ; so that I must pray your care in ordering timely remittances for this service. The rest of the king's troops I find are a greater burden to him than he is able to bear, his country being very much exhausted ; so that, at his desire, I have pressed the court of Vienna to take three or four thousand horse into their pay, which they assure me are in a good condition."

Returning from Leipsig, the duke dined at the quarters of count Piper, and the afternoon was spent in a conference with that minister and count Goertz, on the affair of Lubec. On this delicate point Marlborough testified the inclination of the queen to gratify the wishes of the king ; and it was finally referred to a discussion at Hamburg, which was to take place under the mediation of Mr. Robinson, in whose integrity Charles expressed perfect confidence. After this satisfactory arrangement, the duke concluded the evening by supping with field-marshal Renschold, where he was met by the courtiers and officers of high rank.

On the 29th he received a final visit from Piper and Ciederholm, the result of which is best related in his own words.

*To Lord Godolphin.*

“ On Friday the 29th past, which was the day I left Alt Ranstadt, the count came to me, accompanied by M. Ciederholm, the secretary de cabinet, to recapitulate, in the king's name, the essential of all that had passed before, Mr. Robinson being with me at the same time.

“ He began by acquainting me with the great esteem his master had for the queen, and how sensible he was of the obligations he owed her majesty, for the assurances I had brought him of her majesty's friendship, which he would endeavour, by all possible means, to improve, by making such returns as might be most acceptable to her. He was very particular in the king's acknowledgments for the communication he had received by me, of the reasons which induced her majesty to come into the present war ; which, as he allowed to be very just, so he wished the like glorious successes might attend her majesty's arms as hitherto, in order to the restoring a due balance of power in Europe, and securing and supporting the protestant religion, wherein he said his master was entirely of the queen's opinion. He added farther, that the king agreed the treaty of Westphalia ought to be the foundation of a future treaty of peace, as to the affairs of Germany ; and that what has been done in derogation thereof by subsequent treaties, especially in point of religion, ought to be redressed and reduced to that standard ; his master being likewise of opinion we ought to go one step farther,

by explaining the right of reforming, which by the treaty of Westphalia is reserved to each german prince in his own territory, by virtue whereof, any protestant prince that turns to the romish religion, has a kind of right to oblige his protestant subjects to change theirs. This he would have explained in such manner, and with such limitations, as the safety of the protestant religion may require.

“ This point of religion was what the king seemed most warmly bent upon ; and it was not without difficulty that I convinced him and count Piper of the necessity of deferring every thing of this nature till we come to treat of a general peace, for fear of weakening the alliance, by creating unreasonable jealousies among such of the allies as are of the romish religion. Hereupon I took occasion to acquaint count Piper, that as the king and his ministers had a better insight than we could be supposed to have in the affairs of Germany, if his master would, on occasion, freely open himself to the queen, her majesty, on her part, would be ready at all times to concur with him in every thing that might be judged for the mutual interest and benefit of each other ; that I should gladly charge myself with laying before the queen whatever his master might think fit to communicate to her majesty ; and that with all the secrecy and faithfulness the matter should require. To this, count Piper assured me I might depend upon the queen’s being informed of whatever offers should be made to the king, with reference to the peace, that their majesties might take just measures together, against we came to a general treaty.



“ Here you will allow the caution he gave me of keeping this under the greatest secrecy ; since it may otherwise seem in the eyes of all others concerned, a little too partial in a mediator, as well as inconsistent with his neutrality.”

After this interview, Marlborough dined with count Goertz, in the same illustrious company as before ; and in the afternoon was admitted to his audience of leave. On this occasion, Charles evinced, if possible, still higher respect and esteem than on the former ; and in particular, testified his satisfaction with the arrangement which had been made on the preceding day, relating to the affairs of Lubec. Their parting was marked by those sentiments which their characters mutually inspired.

At this audience an event occurred, which called forth no less management and dexterity, than the interview with Augustus. When Marlborough was quitting the closet, news arrived that king Stanislaus was in the anti-chamber. A meeting with a sovereign who was not only not acknowledged by England, but the successful rival of Augustus, was an affair of peculiar delicacy. To withhold from him the respect due to his rank, might have produced an unfavourable impression on the mind of the swedish monarch ; to acknowledge him, might be construed into an instance of disrespect towards Augustus. Charles, by whom this interview was planned, seems to have felt this delicacy, and desired count Piper to make the proposal to the duke. Marlborough bowed assent, and the king advancing to the door, himself introduced the dependent monarch. The british

general paid his respects to Stanislaus without compromising the dignity of his own sovereign; and the countenance and manner of Charles shewed the gratification which he derived from this proof of attention.

Before his departure, he did not neglect to gain an influence with Piper and Hermelin, in whom the king appeared to repose the greatest confidence. Finding them favourably inclined, he adopted the advice of the elector of Hanover, in securing their good will, by the promise of annual pensions, of which he offered a year's advance. Piper, indeed, affected to make some difficulty, but his scruples were overcome by his countess, with whom Marlborough had an interview for the purpose. A pension of £1000 a year, was also bestowed on Ciederholm.

The good effects of this well-timed liberality appeared in his interview with the minister, count Piper. He observes, in the conclusion of his letter :

“Count Piper, at my taking leave of him, promised to acquaint me, for the queen's information, with whatever offers might be made to his master from the court of France. Whereupon I assured him he might certainly depend on the like returns from us, the king himself having been pleased to give me particular assurances that he would adhere to no proposals that might be made him in relation to the mediatorship, until he heard from me that the queen thought it seasonable. He also declared his opinion very freely, that the french were not yet reduced to such an ebb as would make them reasonable.

“ I shall trouble you,” he adds, “ but with one observation more, that is, the uneasiness I perceive in the king of Sweden at the conduct of the court of Vienna. He complains of three particulars, on which he expects satisfaction: the first, for the affront offered to his minister at that court; the next, on account of the two swedish officers killed at Breslaw; and the third, in relation to the muscovites on the Rhine, whom he insists to have delivered up to him: but as for this last article, I hope an expedient may be found, by returning the muscovites to king Augustus, and the swedes engaging at the same time, that upon the czar’s releasing the like number of swedes, these shall be set at liberty. I have pressed the ministers at Vienna to endeavour to satisfy the king on these articles, as fearing, otherwise, when he comes to march through Silesia, in his way to Poland, he may make them very uneasy. It is certain the king designed likewise to have insisted on that court’s giving satisfaction to the protestants in Silesia, for the usurpation and innovations committed in that province, had I not had the good fortune to convince him, as I told you before, of the unseasonableness of it at present. This is the substance of all that passed between me and the court of Sweden, which I hope will meet with her majesty’s approbation, it being very much for the public good and her majesty’s service, that we are sure the king has not, nor will have any engagements with the french, so as to disturb us in the prosecution of the war.”

At the conclusion of this important negotiation,



the duke received a mark of favour, which was not only peculiarly flattering, but highly advantageous. Although Charles, with that jealousy which he always manifested in his military operations, would permit no foreign minister to attend him in the field; he yet relaxed so far from his general rule as to allow Mr. Jefferys, the secretary of Mr. Robinson, to accompany the army, in the character of a volunteer, by which means a constant communication was maintained with the british commander.\*

In his return, Marlborough complied with the earnest request of the king of Prussiat, by paying a visit at Charlottenburg. Here his presence was peculiarly necessary, to counteract the petty intrigues of lord Raby, who not only endeavoured to sway the prussian court, but imprudently threw reflections on the conduct of the ministers most attached to England, by representing them as sacrificing the interests of Prussia to gratify the duke of Marlborough. It would have been easy to procure the recall of a minister, who was personally disagreeable to the king and disliked in the court; but it was difficult to fill his place, as well from his connections and interest with the

\* This narrative is principally drawn from some brief letters of Marlborough, written during his continuance in the swedish camp, and from a more detailed account sent to Godolphin after his return to the Hague. — Some information has also been derived from a letter written by Mr. Robinson to the earl of Manchester, and printed in Cole's Memoirs; and from Lediard. These authentic sources render it unnecessary to detain the reader with any refutation of the idle and improbable narratives which Voltaire and others have given of this transaction.

† Letter from the king of Prussia to the duke, April 25.

grand chamberlain, as from his rank and diplomatic abilities, and favour with his sovereign. Marlborough, therefore, overlooked his own complaints, and laboured to restore lord Raby to such a cordiality with those whom he had offended, as might enable him to fulfil the object of his mission; and although he could not obliterate, he suspended the effects of their mutual jealousies. He prevailed also on the king to desist from his instances for the removal of so obnoxious a minister. During the pause of a day, which was the limit of his stay at the prussian court, he received from the king many proofs of regard, and settled some points of delicacy. He in particular obtained his consent for the restoration of the Upper Palatinate to the elector palatine, and for putting the duke of Mantua to the ban of the empire. "At parting," the duke observes, "he forced on me a diamond ring, valued at 1000 pounds," an unusual instance of liberality, in a prince by no means extravagant in presents.

Pursuing his journey with his usual diligence, he passed through Hanover, only to acquaint the elector with his success, and reached the Hague on the 8th of May, having accomplished his disagreeable journey and delicate negotiation, within the short space of eighteen days.

This important mission succeeded in every point beyond his expectations. The swedish monarch was highly flattered by the attention of so celebrated a general, and not only repeatedly expressed his regard and admiration for his person, but acknowledged with pleasure and gratitude the con-

viction he had drawn from the force of his arguments, and the correctness and extent of his information. Marlborough himself, on his part, was struck with the chivalrous character of the young warrior, and under the rusticity of his manners, and eccentricity of his character, saw much to admire and esteem. In a letter to the duchess he observes : —

“ *Hague, April 29.—May 10.* — I returned to this place last Sunday, by which you will see that I have used such diligence, that I was but eighteen days on the journey. Now that it is over, I am extremely well pleased to have made it, since I am persuaded it will be of some use to the public, and a good deal to the queen. I shall not enter into particulars, having writ at large to lord treasurer.

“ This journey has given me the advantage of seeing four kings\*, three of whom I had never seen. They seem to be all very different in their kinds. If I was obliged to make a choice, it should be the youngest, which is the king of Sweden.”

In a conference held with the deputies of the States General, the day after his return, Marlborough repeated the assurances of friendship and good will which he had received from the king of Sweden. He thus dissipated the alarm which the dutch had conceived of the hostile designs and supposed engagements of the swedish monarch with France, which was hourly fomented by the

\* The king of Sweden, Augustus, Stanislaus, and the king of Prussia.



french emissaries, and had already operated with a sinister effect on the minds of so timid a people.

All his friends in England, and every well-wisher to the Grand Alliance, concurred in applauding his success, and in giving due praise to the ability and judgment, which he had manifested in the negotiation. Godolphin in particular expressed his satisfaction in the unstudied language of friendship.

“ *May 3-14. 1707.* — I can never thank you enough for the pains you have taken, in writing so much and so exact a relation of all that has passed ; and I think the kingdom can never thank you enough for having settled all things where you have been, so much to your own satisfaction and to our advantage.”

Harley also expressed similar sentiments, in his usual style of respect and devotion.

“ *April 15-26.* — Though I am very sorry that your grace has had so much fatigue as in this journey to Saxony, yet I am sure there was no expectation of any success from any other sort of negotiation. Your grace is born to do those great things for your country, which no man else ever did, or can do ; and therefore to your greater share of glory there falls out a greater share of fatigue.”

“ *May 3.* — It is a fatiguing journey, but I hope your grace will not receive any detriment or prejudice to your health by it. It is your grace’s peculiar felicity to have your noble undertakings crowned with success ; and it would be a public calamity that you should suffer in your health while you are serving the public.”

“*May 6.* — I hope this will find your grace safely returned to the Hague after your troublesome journey. But as you have a zeal for the public; which makes you refuse no trouble to serve your country, so your grace has a felicity and faculty to do that for the honour of the queen and the nation, which nobody else could perform.”

But the best eulogium on his conduct was conveyed in the language of his enemies. The king of France contemplated his mission with a mixture of hope and anxiety. He flattered himself that Charles would not readily forego so honourable a mediation; and he expected that the high spirit of Marlborough would not bend to circumstances; but that by recurring to menaces, he would wound the pride of a monarch, who was no less vain of his success than tenacious of his purpose. These sentiments are strongly expressed in two letters, one from the king himself, and the other from Torcy to Besenval, the french envoy to the king of Sweden; which were intercepted in their passage, and transmitted by the duke to Godolphin.

The reply of Besenval not only dissipated these hopes, but detailed, in the most distinct manner, the heads of the discourse held by Marlborough. It was written under the feigned character of a merchant or tradesman, and transmitted under a cover to M. de Monasterolle, with the address “*Pour le Principal,*” which is evidently intended to designate Louis the fourteenth. It is dated Leipsig, April 28. the day after the audience, and the substance must have been derived from the

communications either of Piper or Hermelin, but most probably of the latter.\*

“A gazette written by a tradesman, who has no share in the secrets of the times, cannot relate what the king of Sweden replied, or caused to be replied, in secret, to the duke of Marlborough, on the propositions, remonstrances, or solicitations which he may have made in the name of the queen, his mistress, or on the part of all the allies; since the king of Sweden and his ministers are accustomed to observe silence on all such subjects, and since the duke of Marlborough will not readily communicate to any others, but to the parties con-

\* This letter was either intercepted in its passage through Germany, or surreptitiously copied by some spy at the court of France, and is one among many proofs of the accurate and extensive intelligence which Marlborough obtained from every court of Europe. The person by whom it was transmitted, and who was actually the principal agent in this correspondence, was Robethon, who, from an humble origin, raised himself to the post of confidential secretary, first to the duke of Zell, and afterwards to the elector of Hanover. For this purpose he was supplied with large sums of money by the duke, and the number and value of his communications prove that these largesses were not ill bestowed. To him Marlborough was also principally indebted for a disclosure of the communications between Louis and the french agents in Saxony; and his own correspondence, which this year is extremely voluminous, contains an ample detail of the secret proceedings, and even the private sentiments entertained by the different courts of Europe.

From the papers published by Macpherson, we also find Robethon engaged in an active correspondence, as well with the ministers as with the whig leaders in England.

The events of the time gave consequence to so active and intelligent a secretary; and he was among those confidential servants who accompanied George the first on his accession to the british throne. Growing presumptuous from the royal favour, he interferred in political transactions, and excited the jealousy of sir Robert Walpole. — *Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole*, chapter 15.



cerned, the result of his mission. Yet it is allowable to imagine what sort of language the british general must have held at the court of Sweden, particularly as he must have employed different channels to insinuate indirectly, and under the guise of conversation, the principles with which the allies have endeavoured for some time to inspire his swedish majesty. That english lord, who is sense and politeness itself, would doubtless begin by persuading his swedish majesty *that her sex alone prevented queen Anne from waiting on the king in person*; and that the fame of his great and heroic virtues, of his numerous victories, and of his transcendant genius, both in the art of war and in the science of government, was the motive which induced the duke of Marlborough to quit England, where his important occupations would otherwise have detained him longer, to visit the bravest and most glorious king in the world, and to avow, in his presence, that all the advantages granted by the grace of God to the arms of the allies against France, in the glorious reign of queen Anne, and under the command of the duke of Marlborough, must yield to the illustrious exploits of his swedish majesty.

“ By the opening of so elegant a discourse, to which the pen of a tradesman is unequal, we may more readily judge of the rest. Besides, the maxims which he would insinuate are not difficult to divine, from the first principles here laid down, which he attempted to establish.

“ After speaking of the preparations for the approaching campaign, he affected to dread the su-

perior forces of the two crowns in the Netherlands, and represented them as the more formidable, because they are under the command of two brave chiefs, the elector of Bavaria and Vendome, who are perfectly in unison.

“ That Louis 14. had concluded the treaty for the neutrality of Italy only to deceive the allies, and that the general propositions and the offer of holding a congress, made through the elector of Bavaria, were merely illusory.

“ That the king of France affects to be too much humbled, in order to separate the allies, by raising mutual jealousies of their respective interests, and draw to his support the sovereigns of the North. With this view he had offered the mediation to the king of Sweden, although he had previously made the same offer to the pope, and lastly to the catholic cantons of Switzerland, and the Venetians. Finding it rejected, he has now recourse to the king of Sweden, hoping that he will either force the allies to accept his mediation, on in case of their refusal, will take revenge for the rejection by force of arms.

“ That the king of France has doubtless endeavoured to cover his secret views, and to touch his serene majesty with compassion for the house of Bavaria, to which the king of Sweden is allied. That he has also excited the princes of the empire to profit by this occasion, and in conjunction with the swedish monarch, to vindicate the infraction of their privileges, against the exorbitant authority exercised by the emperor, as well as to animate the zeal of the king for the protestant religion,

persecuted by the emperor, and to irritate his majesty still more against the elector palatine.

“ That the allies well knew that this last commission employed the attention of the colonel, who is now at Leipsig, on the part of the elector of Bavaria, and that the other instructions have been executed during the winter by the secretary of Bonnac, and by another person whom France maintains among the Poles.\*

“ That the allies are conscious the king of Sweden will not give any credit to these false representations, and are convinced that he is too wise to be prejudiced unfavourably, and against his own interests; since France ardently endeavours to create a civil war in the empire, and to gain by the ruin of the germanic body.

“ That it is not the object of England and Holland to lower France too much; because if from any motive, commercial or otherwise, the two maritime powers should be at variance, it is their common interest that France should be as powerful as the house of Austria would be, if possessed of the spanish monarchy, as it was before the death of Charles the second. For should Spain support one of the contending parties, France might support the other, and thus maintain the equilibrium of Europe.

“ That this balance is the sole object of the allies, and particularly of England; and for this reason it was necessary to take from France the power of making offensive war, daily, and alone

\* One of these doubtless alludes to the sieur de Ricoux, whom we have mentioned in the preceding chapter.



against all Europe, insulting her neighbours, invading their territories, and rendering the will of her king an universal law.

“ That the queen is ready to acknowledge king Stanislaus, and to guaranty the peace of Alt Ransstadt, and will use all her efforts to remove the objections of the dutch, against concurring jointly with her majesty in regard to those two points. . . .

“ That her britannic majesty well knows the king of Sweden has no reason to be satisfied with the dutch ; perhaps she is not so herself, and does not know what may in future happen ; that she relies most on the king’s friendship, and desires him to be well convinced of her friendship on all occasions.

“ That the conduct of the emperor in Italy opens the eyes of all the world ; while the absolute principles with which the court of Vienna affects to govern the whole empire, are neither consonant to the interest nor to the inclination of England and Holland ; but it is not yet time to announce this sentiment. That it is allowed the emperor has given many causes of resentment to the king of Sweden, and that the latter has a right to protect the college of princes, and the protestant religion, unjustly persecuted in Silesia and in the palatinate, as well as to obtain satisfaction for the elector palatine.

“ That the queen intreats the king of Sweden to take no public cognizance of these affairs, until the general peace, and in that case promises to act in concurrence with him for the affairs of the empire, to confine the emperor within just bounds,

and to exact full satisfaction, in regard to religion, to the germanic empire, and to his swedish majesty in particular.

“ That if the king of Sweden will permit the allies to make this campaign without interference, by withdrawing his army from Germany, and undertake nothing which may directly or indirectly divert them, the next winter they may listen to propositions of peace ; because France may become more weary of war, when she sees the allies resolved to continue it. While the king of Sweden, who is justice itself, is well inclined to support the equilibrium of Europe and the common security ; France will not fail to make more equitable propositions for the re-establishment of general tranquillity. That if the king of Sweden maintains a corps in the empire or on the frontiers, it will create alarm in some, and jealousy in others.

“ This is the political rhapsody of an idle tradesman, who loves to exercise his ingenuity, in divining what were the arguments, which *perhaps* the duke of Marlborough employed at the court of Sweden, to persuade the king not to accept the mediation offered by France.”\*

\* Translated from the intercepted letter in french.

## CHAPTER 56.

1707.

*Plans of Marlborough for the invasion of Provence, and the reduction of Toulon.—Overcomes the aversion of the emperor and the duke of Savoy to the enterprise.—Project of the imperial court for the conquest of Naples.—Disputes with the allies.—Fatal defeat of the combined forces in Spain, at the battle of Almanza.—Letters from lord Galway.—Difficulties relative to the command.—Appeal of Charles for reinforcements.—Fruitless application to the court of Vienna.—Remonstrances of the allies, and counter-justification of the imperial ministers.—Joins the army at Anderlecht.—Military movements.—Unable to bring the enemy to a battle.—Correspondence.*

THE satisfaction which Marlborough experienced from the happy result of his journey to Saxony, was considerably abated by intelligence, which announced the fatal defeat of the allied forces at Almanza, and by the perverse and selfish conduct of the court of Vienna,

The extraordinary success of the allied arms in Italy, inspired the court of Vienna with new hopes and new plans, which contributed to increase their misunderstanding with the duke of Savoy, as well as to excite the displeasure of the english cabinet. Hitherto embarrassed by the rebellion in Hungary, and alarmed at the preponderance of the french



in Italy, the emperor had strained every nerve to maintain the war, and zealously co-operated in a system which deeply involved his own safety, as well as that of the allies. But no sooner was Italy liberated, and the frontier on the side of the Tyrol secured from attack, than he began to render the interest of the Grand Alliance subservient to his own. He first cavilled with the duke of Savoy, and resorted to every artifice, to avoid the cession of the provinces which had been promised as the price of his defection from the Bourbon alliance. He also affected to regard the Milanese as no part of the spanish dominions, and endeavoured to substantiate an eventual claim to the duchy, by [conferring it on his brother as a fief of the empire. But, above all, his jealousy was roused by the overtures which Louis had recently made to the Maritime Powers, to resign Spain and the Indies, together with the Netherlands, in return for the cession of Naples and Sicily to the duke of Anjou. Knowing that this plan was strongly favoured by the dutch government, and dreading that it might be carried into effect, he took the resolution to frustrate it, by an immediate invasion of Naples, where his numerous partisans called for assistance.

On the other hand, the duke of Savoy transferred his apprehensions and jealousy of the french to his late deliverers; and laboured secretly and earnestly for the re-establishment of that system, which had enabled him to hold the balance of power between the houses of Austria and Bourbon. Aware, also, that Austria was no less desirous to rule in Italy than the french, he clamoured for the

fulfilment of the promises made under the guaranty of England, and rejected with scorn the evasive expedients of the imperial court. From the same principle he was anxious to prevent the occupation of Naples and Sicily, unless his acquiescence was purchased by an equivalent in Lombardy. He was, at length, gratified by an accommodation effected through the agency of Marlborough, by which he obtained the promise of the emperor to fulfil the treaty of 1703.\* Joseph also renounced his claims to the Milanese, as an imperial fief, and agreed to consider it as part of the spanish dominions.

The great object of the Maritime Powers was, to employ the combined forces in Italy in an invasion of Provence, with the view of ruining the naval power of France in the Mediterranean, by the capture of Toulon, which was in an ill state of defence. Marlborough was now engaged in arranging the plan of operations, and accumulating the means of attack. With this view, he obtained the consent of the german princes, for the continuance of their troops in Italy, and persuaded the dutch not only to furnish pecuniary assistance, but to join their fleet in furtherance of the design.

He found, however, great and unexpected obstacles. Both the emperor and the duke of Savoy were less solicitous for the destruction of the french navy, which they considered as the peculiar object of the Maritime Powers, than for an attack against Dauphiné and the Lyonnois, which would more effectually contribute to the safety of Italy. Their consent was, however, at length extorted,

\* See chapter 17.

and preparations were made for the execution of this momentous enterprise, as soon as the return of the season opened the passages of the Alps.

But neither party entered cordially into the design, and the emperor in particular resolved to render it secondary to his own views on Naples. With this intention, he secretly concluded with France, on the 13th of March, a treaty of neutrality for Italy ; and for the sake of accomplishing the speedy reduction of the Milanese and Mantuan, permitted the french garrisons to withdraw unmolested. This accommodation was not disclosed until it was too late to prevent its completion ; and the consent of the duke of Savoy being extorted, the Maritime Powers had no other alternative, than to acquiesce in an arrangement of which they foresaw the fatal consequences.

The primary object of the emperor became now apparent, by the orders issued for a detachment of the austrian army to take the route towards Naples. The consequences were also equally felt in every part of the theatre of action. Relieved from the constant drain occasioned by the war in Italy, the king of France not only reduced his army on the side of the Alps, but sent the troops which he could thus spare, as well as those which he drew from the blockaded fortresses in Lombardy, to swell the army on the Upper Rhine, to give new energy to the contest in Spain, and to complete the unexpected successes which had marked the close of the last campaign.

His designs were favoured by the imprudence of the allied generals, and the disputes in the court of Barcelona, which had already marred their



operations. In conformity with the resolution adopted in the preceding year, lord Galway and Das Minas were anxious to profit by their supposed superiority of force. The news which arrived of the neutrality concluded for Italy, and the march of reinforcements from France, induced them to commence their operations before the gallo-spaniards could receive the expected succours. Unable to obtain intelligence in a country, where every peasant was a spy or an enemy, they collected their troops, and made a hasty attempt to break up the quarters of Berwick, at the very moment when he was joined by part of his reinforcements.

After a fruitless attempt to reduce Villena, they descended into the plains of Almanza, under the walls of which town they found the army of Berwick encamped. They hurried to the attack, on ground highly favourable for the manœuvres of cavalry, in which the enemy were greatly superior. This desperate, but ill-judged effort, was repelled ; and the portuguese cavalry being seized with a panic, abandoned the field in the utmost confusion. The foot, left without support, were broken on all sides, and the rout became complete. Thirteen battalions of infantry, after cutting their way through the hostile lines, took post in a wood, but were surrounded and reduced to surrender. Great part of the baggage and artillery, with an hundred and twenty standards, fell into the hands of the enemy. Galway was severely wounded in the onset of the battle ; and the remnant of the army, amounting to scarcely 6000 men, effected their escape by a disorderly retreat towards Tortosa. This

stupendous victory was purchased by the enemy with the loss of only 2000 men.

A more striking picture of the misfortune cannot be drawn than in the words of the defeated commander.

*Lord Galway to Lord Sunderland.*

“*Alegre, April 27.* — My lord ; — Your lordship will have heard by my letters, as well as by Mr. Stanhope’s, that in all the councils held at Valencia this winter, it was resolved we should march to clear this frontier; ruin the enemy’s magazines, and destroy the country between them and us, in case they retired, thereby to secure this kingdom and our march into Aragon ; but that if the enemy did assemble upon this frontier, we should fight them. Accordingly, our forces removed from their garrisons the 6th instant ; we were all joined the 10th. We marched to Yecla, and from thence to Montealegre, the enemy’s troops retiring before us. We consumed and destroyed their magazines in both these places. We afterwards marched to Villena ; the enemy, in the mean time, joined all their force, and marched to Almanza. All the generals were of opinion to attack them there, our army being then in a better condition than it would be any time during the campaign, for it daily weakened by sickness. So we marched the 25th, and fought the enemy close to Almanza.

“ I am under deep concern to be obliged to tell your lordship we were entirely defeated. Both our wings were broke, and let in the enemy’s horse, which surrounded our foot, so that none could get off. I received a cut in the forehead in the first

charge. The enemy did not pursue their advantage, so that all the baggage got off. Major-general Shrimpton, count Dohna, and some other officers, got into the mountains with a body of english, dutch, and portuguese foot, where they surrendered the day after the battle, being, I suppose, surrounded by the enemy's horse. I have sent a trumpet to enquire after the prisoners.

“ I cannot, my lord, but look upon the affairs of Spain as lost by this bad disaster : our foot, which was our main strength, being gone, and the horse we have left chiefly portuguese, which is not good at all. Most of our english horse that got off were of the two new raised regiments of dragoons, who did not do their duty. All the generals here are of opinion, that we cannot continue in this kingdom, so I have desired Sir George Byng to take on board again the recruits he had just landed at Alicante ; and to call at Denia or Valencia for our sick, wounded, and baggage, and have sent all to Tortosa, where we shall march with the remnant of our horse.”

On the first receipt of this melancholy intelligence, the attention of Marlborough was employed to obviate the fatal consequences which the defeat was expected to produce, and it became the subject of immediate deliberation, in a conference which he held the same day with the deputies of the States.

“ At this last conference,” he writes to secretary Harley, “ we had also under consideration what measures were to be taken upon the news from France of the defeat of our army in Spain ; and it



was agreed that the court of Vienna should be immediately written to, to dissuade them from the expedition to Naples, and to press them in the most earnest manner to proceed with the greatest vigour on the design of entering France, as the only means left to redress our affairs in Spain. This I have already done, as you will see by the copy of my letter to count Wratislaw. The States have written to the same effect, as I hope the queen will do, by the first return of the post ; and that her majesty will please to order you to speak very seriously to count Gallas, that he may make the same representations."

This melancholy reverse gave redoubled energy to the feuds which had reigned in the petty court and army of the austrian prince, even in the midst of success. The different parties endeavoured, as on the former occasion, to throw the odium of their misfortune on each other, and appeals and accusations poured in to Marlborough from all quarters. The most vehement of these complainants was the king himself, from whom we find numerous letters, filled with invectives against the british generals, ascribing his misfortune to his want of authority, means, and influence, earnestly soliciting new succours, and requesting the removal of lord Galway, whose fidelity he even questioned.

The effect of this defeat was scarcely less felt in Portugal than in Spain. The court of Lisbon was not only unable to make exertions proportionate to so critical an emergency ; but fears were justly entertained, lest from a sense of weakness, and a desire to relieve themselves from the pressure of

a long and tedious war, they should listen to the overtures secretly made by France.

The immediate consequences of the disaster were still more fatal than had been foreboded. Before a month had elapsed, the bourbon commanders recovered Valencia, Murcia, and Aragon, except the strong holds of Lerida and Tortosa, and the maritime fortresses of Denia and Alicante. The authority of Charles was confined to the province of Catalonia, where his collective force did not exceed 10,000 regular troops, and this single campaign appeared likely to terminate the unequal struggle between the two rival candidates for the spanish throne.

But notwithstanding the despondency manifested by the defeated commander, Marlborough saw that the contest was not yet hopeless, though it was difficult to select a general who, with abilities and energy to stem the torrent of misfortune, possessed the temper and address suited to so delicate a situation. He was fully convinced of the integrity of Galway; but he felt the impropriety of continuing him in a post where his fidelity was suspected, and his person disliked, by the sovereign under whom he was appointed to act, particularly as the accusations against him were warmly seconded by Eugene, in the name of the austrian court. In this predicament he concurred in the proposal of lord Godolphin, to offer the command to lord Rivers, who had found means to obtain such flattering recommendations from king Charles. His pretensions being, however, deemed inadmissible, Marlborough next recommended the appoint-

ment of general Erle, or some officer of similar rank ; and suggested the policy of confiding to the young monarch himself the same authority as the king of Portugal exercised over the forces in his dominions. But in these views he was thwarted by the whigs, who strenuously opposed the removal of lord Galway. He accordingly employed the interposition of the queen to allay the suspicions which still rankled in the mind of Charles, and to restore that cordiality and union, which alone could remedy the misfortune.

The difficulty of choosing a general, who possessed all the requisites for so perplexing a situation, was still less than that of furnishing reinforcements to save the eastern provinces of Spain. England, which had already supplied so large a proportion of force, was unable to increase her contingent ; and the dutch, wearied with the contest, were lukewarm in the cause, and seemed to regard the defeat of Almanza less as a misfortune than as an event, which might relieve them from the burthen of a distant and expensive war.

No other resource remained but in the court of Vienna, who had hitherto left to the Maritime Powers the maintenance of hostilities in Spain. The strongest appeals were made by the british commander, both to the affection of Joseph, as a brother, and to his interest as the chief of the empire, and head of the house of Austria ; but these appeals were counteracted by the perverse spirit which impelled the austrian cabinet. The means of the emperor were exhausted by the civil war in Hungary, which he was unable to terminate by



force, and unwilling to close by concessions, which he deemed a sacrifice of his sovereign rights. He was also in hourly apprehension of an attack from the king of Sweden ; yet, at this moment, he was consulting rather his feelings and dignity, than his strength or interest, by meditating plans of aggression, and hoping for the aid of the Maritime Powers. He had consented also to spare part of his forces for the invasion of Provence ; yet, instead of prosecuting that design, with a vigour which might counterbalance the disasters in Spain, his principal attention seemed absorbed in his plans for the acquisition of Naples. In vain Marlborough and the british cabinet represented the danger and impolicy of this ill-timed enterprise. The imperial court pursued their object with a perseverance which seemed to acquire strength from opposition. Every post brought letters from the prince of Salm, Wratislaw and Zinzendorf, vindicating the measures of their sovereign, and expatiating on the advantages which would accrue, not merely to the emperor, but to the common cause, from the occupation of Naples. One of these epistles we select as a proof of the infatuation which reigned at Vienna.

Count Zinzendorf, by a letter dated May 21st, informs the duke that he could not give a positive answer to his request for immediate reinforcements ; but that on the first appearance of the business, he was of opinion that the reverse in Spain was an argument for hastening the expedition to Naples ; because the army would march on the 14th, and before the orders of recall could reach them, they

would have advanced to the vicinity of Rome, and the austrian partisans in Naples would have already declared themselves.

“As to the affairs of Spain,” he adds, “though I consider them as much deranged, yet they are not entirely ruined. The diversion which you are desirous of making for their advantage, will no longer avail, as that army is not in a situation to march to Madrid. Nevertheless, it will be attempted, and there will be troops enough, if Sweden leaves us in repose. At least the conquest of Naples will in some degree indemnify us for this fatal loss.

“Notwithstanding the defeat, the remains of the army must have retired to Barcelona; and as we are superior by sea, that city can always be provisioned by the fleet, and the enemy will not be able to besiege it, for want of heavy artillery and other necessaries. The king therefore may remain there in safety, until means can be taken to succour him with fresh troops towards the autumn, on the return of the fleet. These troops may be the palatines, in the pay of the two powers; and if the agreement be made in time with the elector, they may be left for the defence of Piemont, and be in better condition when they are conveyed to Spain. His imperial majesty, in that case, may perhaps be induced to detach some regiments, but under the condition that the two powers shall furnish their subsistence, which we cannot provide.

“I can suppose that Valencia and Aragon will be lost before the arrival of those succours; but I

ask you if they are not already lost? and you cannot but recollect how often you anticipated that our diversion in Italy would be of no advantage to Spain; since you well knew, that according to your own project, and the nature of the country to be passed, the movements could not commence before the middle of June, at which time the french would either have struck the blow, or suspended it, on account of the excessive heats.

“ But the misfortune is, that we are eager to act in conformity with our wishes, and not according to what is practicable; and unless taught by a reverse, we never relinquish our eager desires. The examples of Bavaria, Hungary, and Spain, prove this truth, and God grant that Sweden may not afford a similar instance! The chimerical prospect of a premature peace, draws us on to wish for an accommodation. To that end all things appear feasible. Meanwhile we lose whole months in inactivity, and when from experience things are found to be impossible, we are compelled to take in hand, with risk, that which we might have done with security and ease, if we had acted with resolution and concert at the beginning.

“ I do assure you that, in my opinion, there is no other part to take for the purpose of remedying the affairs of Spain, than that which I propose. Communicate my thoughts to whomsoever you please, but do not haggle, and be convinced that the emperor is not in a situation to maintain the troops in Spain.”\*

\* Translation from the french original.



Mortified by these untoward events, and anxious to remedy the effects by his own efforts, Marlborough hastened his arrangements at the Hague, and on the 13th of May reached Brussels. From this place he communicated to Godolphin his reflections on the melancholy situation of affairs.

“ *Brussels, May 15.*—Since my last, I have seen several relations of the unfortunate battle given in Spain, and am sorry to tell you the news does no ways mend on our side. The enemy pretend to have taken five english, five dutch, and three portuguese regiments prisoners, with all our cannon and baggage, and 120 colours and standards, which last I think almost impossible. However, we must expect the worst, and begin to take our measures for repairing this great loss. When we come to hear directly from Spain, I fear we shall find our people confine themselves to the preservation of Alicante and Catalonia.

“ The States received the news of this fatal stroke with less concern than I expected. However, it is very likely their deputies may have orders to act here with more caution than the urgency of affairs requires; and I can’t but take notice, that ’tis observed this blow has made so little impression in the great towns in this country, that the generality of the people have rather shewn a satisfaction at it than otherwise, which I don’t attribute so much to the inclination they have for the french, as to their aversion to the present government, and the disorders it lies under, to which I do not foresee any proper remedy can be applied

during the war. In the mean time it will make us uneasy.

“ I do from my heart pity you for all the trouble you are forced to undergo, and should be glad it were in my power to give you any ease. .

“ Upon Saturday the army will be encamped at Hall, so that by the end of this month I shall be able to guess at what the French intend. The dutch think they are stronger than we are ; if they continue of that opinion, we shall do nothing.”

At Anderlecht, Marlborough found the combined forces assembled, to the amount of 97 battalions and 164 squadrons, and was apprised that 102 battalions and 168 squadrons were collected in the vicinity of Mons, under the command of the elector of Bavaria and the duke of Vendome.

It has been generally asserted, that the remarkable inactivity of this campaign in the Netherlands, was owing to the superiority of the french, which curbed the enterprising spirit of the british commander. It appears, however, that in the early movements, his army was equal, if not superior, in effective force, though the french enumerated more squadrons and battalions ; that his troops were in the highest spirits ; and that he himself was indignant at suffering the confidence of a victorious army to evaporate in defensive operations. The real causes, therefore, to which we may ascribe the peculiar character of this campaign, are the timid policy of the dutch, and the renewal of that system of controul and restraint which had before palsied his efforts.

Vendome, though anxious to signalise his mili-

tary reputation, may rather be said to have been awed by the skill of his antagonist ; for while he spread rumours of his superior force, which gained credit with the dutch, and while he occasionally assumed an attitude which gave colour to these rumours, he carefully avoided committing the fate of France to the decision of another battle, though he, as well as the cabinet of Versailles, knew that the dutch government would not suffer the british commander to display the same spirit of enterprise, which he had manifested in the preceding campaign.\*

These preliminary considerations are requisite to explain the operations of this campaign, and the correspondence of Marlborough.

On the 21st of May the duke joined the army at Anderlecht. Hearing that the french commanders had publicly declared their intention of offering battle, he approached their lines by moving to Lambeck. From hence we find a letter to the duchess, in which he complains of the violent effects of party spirit in England, and the exultation shewn by the disaffected on the misfortune in Spain.

“*Lambeck, May 25.*—If I were in the place of the lord treasurer, I should take it very unkindly of the city to drink confusion to generals. If it

\* The anonymous biographer of Marlborough is almost the only writer who has assigned the true cause of this inactivity. He observes, “Not that the duke of Marlborough himself was for sitting still, but the States were so frightened with the invasion of Germany, and the battle of Almanza, that they would not let him stir. Thus his grace was not permitted to make fresh conquests, or to act with his accustomed vigour.”—*Lives of Marlborough and Eugene*, p. 113, 114.



were not for the concern I have for the queen and England, I could wish they had Peterborough and such like favourite generals, and that the lord treasurer and I were at quiet. But I am afraid there must be some time before that will be allowed of; for this ill success in Spain has flung every thing backwards; so that the best resolution we can take is to let the french see we are resolved to keep on the war till we can have a good peace. As to what you desire to know of the strength of the french army, I am afraid they think they are strong enough to hinder us from doing any thing; but I believe they have not so good an opinion of their army, as to venture a battle."

Receiving intelligence that the enemy had occupied a position behind the Haine, their left supported on Mons, and their right extending to St. Pol, he on the 26th advanced to Soignies, that he might be enabled to take advantage of their movement; but notwithstanding their apparent resolution, he considered their advance as a mere bravado; for he observes to lord Godolphin: —

"*Soignies, May 26.* — The superiority the french persuade themselves to have, has encouraged them to quit their lines. Their camp is very strong, and I believe they will not stay in any place where they may with reason be attacked; for tho' they have more squadrons and battalions than we, yet I believe we have as many men; and for certain, our troops are better than theirs. We do hope that their strength here, makes them weak both on the Rhine and in Dauphiné; so that we flatter ourselves they can't be long before they will be

obliged to make detachments, and then we may act with more advantage. Being obliged to be on horseback at four o'clock to-morrow morning, I shall give you no farther trouble at this time."

The bourbon commanders, however, instead of awaiting the advance of their antagonist, moved laterally into the plains of Fleurus, and extending themselves from Fleurus to Sombreuf, evinced an intention of attacking the great towns of Brabant. On this movement, Marlborough advanced from Soignies, with twelve squadrons of horse, to reconnoitre the enemy; and having called a council of war, obtained the approbation of the dutch deputies to march towards Nivelles and attack them. But, unfortunately, a detachment being sent forward to examine the pass of Ronquieres, through which the army must approach the enemy, brought back a report, that it was occupied by a hostile corps, and from its strength and situation, could not be forced without great loss. This communication being laid before the council, with an exaggerated account that the enemy had considerably increased their disposable force, by draughts from the neighbouring garrisons, a general opinion prevailed, that it would be advisable to remove to their former position, in order to cover Brussels and Louvain, which were then exposed to plunder. To this opinion, Marlborough prudently, though reluctantly yielded, from a conviction that no arguments would conquer the apprehensions of those with whom he was associated. Accordingly, he retreated to Beaulieu, from whence he details to lord Godolphin the motives of his conduct.

“ Since my last, the french have not only drawn as many troops as was possible out of their garrisons, in order to make themselves stronger than we ; but they have also abandoned their lines, so that we had it in our power to attack any of their towns. But as we could not have our cannon in less than a fortnight, and that we had not troops enough to make a siege and cover it, we thought it best to make this march, in order to hinder the farther designs of the french, which you will see by the inclosed copy of my letter to the pensioner. The true meaning of my letter to the pensioner is to let him see that I am not of the opinion to venture a battle, unless the advantages be on our side. This caution of mine is absolutely necessary ; for instead of coming to this camp, I would have marched yesterday to Nivelles, but the deputies would not consent to it, telling me very plainly, that they feared the consequence of that march might be a battle. So that unless I can convince the pensioner that I am not for hazarding, but when we have an advantage, they will give such orders to their deputies, that I shall not have it in my power of doing good, if an advantage should offer itself ; besides, the news which we have from the Rhine will make the dutch, I fear, persist in their opinion of not venturing. I am also apprehensive that M. Vendome knows, from the french partisans in Holland, that the States are against venturing a battle, which encourages him to act as he does ; for he can’t but know that our army is better than his, and that if we should beat him, his master must submit to such terms as the allies



should think reasonable. I take care not to let the army know that the dutch are not willing to venture, since that must have an ill effect ; and tho' it be a very unpleasant thing not to have full power at the head of an army, yet I do please myself that I shall do some considerable service this campaign ; for I do believe we shall find the elector and M. Vendome grow insolent, by which they will either attack, or give me occasion of attacking them.

“ I am sorry to tell you that we have every day instances that the greatest part of this country are much more inclined to 45 \* than to king Charles, which is occasioned by the unreasonable behaviour of the dutch.”

In the letter to the pensionary, after describing the movements which had taken place, he continues : —

“ M. Vendome's quarters are at Sombreff, a proper camp for their horse, on which they put their greatest hopes, thinking they have the superiority ; but I am very confident ours are much better, and as many, if not more in number. They have more battalions than we, but ours are stronger. Upon the whole, I believe our army is stronger than theirs ; but considering the circumstances of France, which I take to be much worse than ours, I shall not be for venturing, unless we have the advantage on our side, in order to which, we must lose no time in taking an advantageous camp near them, which will also have the good effect of disheartening their army, and encouraging our own.

\* Probably the duke of Anjou, or France.

Besides, it will hinder them from ravaging the country, which otherwise they must do, their army being ill paid.

“I beg you to believe I do not say this in order to venture, for I am very sensible of the many difficulties France labours under; but if we do not act with some vigour, they will be so encouraged, that they will force us to some action, which may be to our disadvantage, which cannot happen, if we keep the army in the heart they are now in, for 'tis impossible to see finer troops.”

Still farther to secure the open towns east of the Senne, Marlborough did not linger at Beaulieu; but moving again the 31st, he crossed the Dyle below Louvain, and advanced to the strong position of Meldert, which covered the opening into Brabant, between the Dyle and the Gheets. The french, who had spread rumours of their design to besiege Huy, were satisfied with preventing his advance, and encamped in the vicinity of Gemblours.

His friends in England could not, however, contemplate the awful situation in which he appeared to be placed, without the deepest anxiety; and knowing the magnanimity with which he always exposed his person, they expected every post the intelligence of a battle, which, from the equality of the two armies, and the spirit of the respective commanders, could not fail to be in the highest degree desperate and bloody. Godolphin writes:

“*May 23. — June 3.* — I have just now received the favour of yours of the 26th and 30th of May, by which I find the french act otherwise than you

expected, and the dutch no otherwise than you expected. I wish you may have an opportunity of as much advantage as you seem to hope for. In the mean time, I am eased at present of a good deal of agitation of mind for the event of an immediate action, which I did not think so remote as it now seems to be ; for whether M. de Vendome has any notice of the States' inclinations or not, I never looked upon him as a man that would care to be cooped up within lines, having so great an army. I wish the duke of Savoy may be so forward as to oblige them to make a detachment very soon ; but if you should have any opportunity, in the mean time, it may be of ill consequence to baulk your own troops, while they are in so good heart. I make no question but you will have every thing in your thoughts, and I hope God will direct you for the best, and keep you in his protection."

On this also, as on former occasions, the duchess evinced her tender solicitude for his safety, by importuning him not to expose his person. We find an affectionate letter, in which he calms her apprehensions, by assuring her that the french would not venture a battle, although their numbers had been recently increased by the junction of the reinforcements from Italy, which rendered their army superior in strength, though not in courage.

" *Meldert, June 13.* — I have had the happiness of yours of the 27th of the last month, by which I find you were still under the apprehensions of a battle. My former letters, as well as this, ought to put you at ease ; but for the public good, it were to be wished it might be had, for our affairs go



very ill in Germany as well as in Spain. For my own part, notwithstanding the noise the french have made, I think they would less care to venture a battle than our friends; for if they had a real mind to do it, it must have been decided before this time. In the army, I must do them right, that there is all the desire imaginable to venture their lives for the public good; but all other sorts of people on this side of the water are so very wise, that I am afraid at last they will bring us to a bad peace. For myself, I am old, and shall not live to see the misfortunes that must happen to Christendom, if the french be suffered to get the better of this war."

Then alluding to the building at Blenheim, he adds, "By the inclosed, which I received but yesterday, though it be of an old date, you will see the country takes notice that the work does not go on as they expected. Say nothing, but burn the letter; for when it is half built, it may be enough for you and me; and I do from my heart assure you, that I should be much better pleased to live with you in a cottage, than in all the palaces this world has without you."

## CHAPTER 57.

1707.

*Marlborough remains stationary at Meldert.—Remarks on the state of foreign affairs illustrative of his correspondence.—Death of the prince of Baden, and appointment of the margrave of Bareith as his successor.—Disorganised state of the army.—Irruption of Villars into the empire.—Attempts to remove the unsuccessful general.—Marlborough obtains the transfer of the command to the elector of Hanover.—Revival of the disputes between the king of Sweden and the emperor.—Final accommodation concluded by the interposition of Marlborough.—March of the king of Sweden into Muscovy.—Embarrassments derived from the conduct and intrigues of lord Peterborough.—Correspondence at Meldert, on these and other transactions.*

THE inactivity of the campaign gives but little interest to the letters of Marlborough on military transactions. On the contrary, his negotiations with foreign powers are of high importance; and the political intrigues which agitated the court and cabinet of England, form a prominent feature in his correspondence. As, therefore, the few military incidents are completely blended with diplomatic and domestic business, we shall present the letters in a continued series, prefixing such explanations, notices, and details, as appear necessary to connect the whole, and explain particular passages and allusions.

The ill-timed expedition to Naples, was not the only subject of contention with the imperial court; for the arrangements relative to the command of the german army produced delays and difficulties, which operated with a sinister effect, at a time when concert and decision were doubly necessary to retrieve the late disasters.

After a tedious illness the margrave of Baden closed his long and laborious career on the fourth of January. Although his dilatoriness or jealousy had repeatedly marred the splendid designs of the british commander, his death was peculiarly unfortunate, at so critical a period as the opening of the campaign; for his high rank and eminent services gave him a degree of consideration in the empire, which it was difficult to supply. By a concordate among the German States, it had been stipulated that the direction of the army should be alternately vested in a catholic and a protestant; and, accordingly, after some delay, the choice fell on the margrave of Bareith, a prince of the house of Brandenburg.\* The new general was, however, more aged and inactive than his predecessor, and far inferior in influence and military skill. The petty states and princes taking advantage of the embarrassments arising from the change, withheld or withdrew their contingents; and the army was reduced to such a weak and disorganised condition, that the french were encouraged to depart from the defensive system which they had lately maintained on the Rhine. On the 22d of May,

\* Barre Histoire de l'Empire, t. x. p. 510.



Villars attacked and forced the lines of Stolhoffen, destroyed the magazines, and ruined the dikes and sluices. Leaving a body of cavalry on the Lauter, he followed the margrave to Gemund, and after levying contributions, and spreading terror on every side, pushed his predatory parties as far as the plains of Hochstedt.

The diet, which was then sitting at Ratisbon, was seized with a panic, and the most earnest appeals were made to the court of Vienna for protection against the impending danger. The two circles of Suabia and Franconia, as well as several of the imperial towns, even evinced a disposition to accept the neutrality which was offered by France.

Active measures were therefore adopted to awe the bavarians, and collect the contingents of the circles; but the most obvious expedient was, to remove the margrave of Bareith from a situation to which he had proved himself incompetent. Marlborough turned his attention to the elector of Hanover, as the most proper person to succeed in the command; not only from a wish to throw lustre on the house next in succession to the british throne, but with the hope that a prince, in the prime of life, would retrieve the military honour of the germans. The greatest difficulty, however, occurred in effecting this change; for the elector, though ambitious of military fame, was unwilling to accept a command, where the want of force, and the deficiency of money and supplies, as well as the jarring interests of the German States, afforded but little prospect of success. On the other hand,

the margrave of Bareith laboured to avert the disgrace of a forced resignation, by attempting to interest the prussian court in his cause, and ascribing his misfortune to the lamentable deficiency of his army. The emperor also was unwilling to transfer the command to another protestant, and hoped to secure the direction of the war on the Rhine, by associating with the margrave one of his own generals of distinguished skill and activity. For this purpose he sent general Heister, who had signalled himself in the hungarian war, and issued orders for the army to make a retrograde march through the mountains of Wirtemberg, with a view to join the troops from Westphalia and the northern circles, and compel Villars to retrace his steps towards the Rhine.

The delay in the nomination of a new general augmented the fear and confusion which reigned throughout the empire, and aggravated the dissatisfaction which the impolitic conduct of the imperial cabinet had already excited in England and Holland. It likewise suspended the operations of the german army, till a great portion of the summer had elapsed. At length the sense of common danger operated on the fears of the German States; and even the catholic princes, with the electors Palatine and Mentz at their head, concurred in urging the elector of Hanover to accept the command. But still the selfish views of the court of Vienna obstructed a definitive arrangement; and it was not till the season was considerably advanced, that Marlborough had the satisfaction of attaining

an object for which he had so long laboured in vain.

Other causes of disquietude continued to arise in the intercourse with the court of Vienna. Though apprehensive of an attack from the king of Sweden, and though dreading his co-operation with the insurgents in Hungary, the emperor was so far transported by the impulse of personal resentment, as to listen to a project of the czar, for deposing Stanislaus, and giving a new king to Poland. To forward this chimerical scheme, Peter the great had offered the crown to prince Eugene, whose illustrious birth and military fame were calculated to captivate a chivalrous people, and whose influence was likely to sway the decision of his own sovereign.

The prince himself was too prudent to give countenance to this chimerical project\*; but the emperor did not so easily recede from a design, which he conceived likely to mortify and embarrass the king of Sweden. After in vain attempting to gain the concurrence of the allies, he declined announcing his refusal to the czar, until the long-pending negotiation at Alt Ranstadt was nearly brought to a conclusion.†

Although the swedish monarch had yielded to the instances of Marlborough, in agreeing to conclude an arrangement with the emperor, and had even appeared inclined to recede from his demands, relative to the protestant religion in Silesia;

\* Letter from Eugene to Marlborough, Milan, May 11. 1707.

† Count Wratislaw to the duke of Marlborough, Vienna, May 23. 1707.



yet his haughty tone and hostile threats of entering the austrian dominions, deeply wounded the pride of the imperial court, and the dispute continued in a state of suspense. Appeals, on both sides, were made to the british chief, and his interposition was employed in soothing the contending parties, and endeavouring to restore cordiality. Above all, he laboured to impress the imperial court with a due sense of their weakness, and inforced the necessity of yielding, in points of formality and minor importance, to a monarch who held in his hands the fate of Germany. At length he succeeded in inducing the emperor again to depute his minister, count Wratislaw, to the swedish headquarters; and the king to give ear to a proposal for a final settlement. When, however, Wratislaw arrived at Alt Ranstadt, Charles refused to admit him to his presence, either from motives of pride, or from resentment for the attention which the emperor had shewn to the chimerical proposal of the czar. Instead of the demands relative to the affair of count Zobor, the massacre of the swedish officers at Breslau, and the escape of the muscovites, which were now deemed the only points in dispute, a new series of complaints was brought forward, and urged in a manner the most ungracious, towards the first sovereign in Europe. Charles required the emperor to ratify, without delay, the election of the prince of Holstein, as bishop of Lubec, and insisted on an immediate acquittance for the contingent, which Sweden had neglected to furnish as a member of the empire, as well as an exemption during the continuance of

his war with Russia. He also claimed the sequestration of the county of Hadelen, and the subsistence of the swedish troops, in their intended passage through Silesia. At the instances of the silesian protestants, he renewed his demands for the restoration of their religious privileges, and even sent four regiments of horse, to take free quarters, for the protection of their worship.

These new and unexpected pretensions, as well as the aggravating mode in which they were urged, created the highest indignation in the breast of the emperor, and he resented with peculiar warmth the forcible interference in favour of the silesian protestants, which he regarded as a premeditated act of hostility. He importuned the british and dutch plenipotentiaries\* to consider this aggression as a breach of the public peace; and would probably have been driven to act with the rashness of desperation, had not Marlborough soothed his wounded feelings, and pledged himself that the swedish monarch would enter into no engagement with France. The british commander even found it necessary to check the vindictive spirit of Charles, by mixing firmness with conciliation, and hinting that England and Holland, though anxious for an accommodation, yet could not suffer the constitution of the empire to be violated, nor the dominions of the emperor to be endangered. By his discreet, yet dignified intervention, he thus soothed, without offending the haughty swede, and at length effected an accommodation.

\* Mr. Robinson to the duke of Marlborough, August 31. 1707.

Charles accepted an apology for the escape of the muscovites, on the condition that a similar number of his own captive troops should be liberated. The town of Breslau paid a compensation of 4000 crowns to the representatives of the officer who was killed; count Zobor was delivered up, but in virtue of a tacit promise, he was afterwards restored to liberty. In regard to the bishopric of Lubec, the same compliance was shewn to the wishes of the king. Marlborough induced the british and dutch governments to answer for the renunciation of prince Charles, and to guaranty the succession in the house of Holstein; and the emperor at once saved his own honour and satisfied the swedish monarch by summoning the deputies of the silesian protestants to Vienna, and voluntarily confirming their privileges.

Both parties were satisfied with this accommodation, and grateful to the able negotiator by whom it was effected. The pride of Charles was soothed by the indulgence shewn to his wishes, on points which he had particularly at heart; even the emperor did not deem his sacrifices ill repaid by the removal of a danger, which might have produced a revolution in his hungarian dominions, and kindled a civil war in Germany; and he repeatedly acknowledged that the intervention and influence of Marlborough had saved him from farther humiliations. On the first of September, the long-pending transaction was completed. Charles received the ratification of the treaty on the 12th, and on the 25th his whole army passed the Oder, in his advance towards the Vistula.



The danger which had threatened the dissolution of the Grand Alliance, was thus happily averted; and the prince, who had held in his hands the fate of Europe, and raised the admiration of the world, led his veteran army to perish in the wilds of Muscovy, and himself became a fugitive and a supplicant in a distant and barbarous land.

In the midst of the important negotiations with the court of Vienna, other points of minor importance occupied the attention of the british commander. We have already adverted to the difficulty which he had experienced in influencing the court of Berlin; but at this period an incident occurred which afforded an opportunity of gaining additional credit with the prussian monarch. On the death of the duchess of Nemours, the succession to the principality of Neuchatel and the county of Vallengin was contested by numerous claimants. The most considerable, however, were the king of Prussia and the duke of Orleans. In the actual situation of France, the claims of a french prince admitted but little chance of success, in opposition to the interests of the house of Brandenburg, which, at the instigation of Marlborough, were warmly espoused by the Maritime Powers and the emperor. The pretensions of the king were therefore solemnly acknowledged by the States of the country, as well as by the swiss diet; and before the close of the year, he was formally invested with a sovereignty, which was more flattering to his vanity, than advantageous to his interests.

In the course of the correspondence, we find

the name of Peterborough recur in a manner, which shews the disquietude occasioned by his conduct, in the midst of the weighty affairs which pressed on the consideration of the british ministry. Excluded from the direction of the war in Spain, and recalled by his own sovereign, he sought the gratification of his restless and intriguing spirit, in wandering from court to court, and interfering, without authority, in military and political transactions.

Again quitting Spain, he repaired to Turin, where he hoped to renew that confidence which he had acquired in his former visit with the duke of Savoy and prince Eugene; and as he was discountenanced by his own government, he endeavoured to acquire consideration by the nominal credentials which he had obtained from the king of Spain. He also intruded himself into all deliberations, and affected to correspond with the secretary of state, in the same tone as if accredited by his sovereign. We trace his unaccountable behaviour, in an extract from a letter of Mr. Chetwynd, the british envoy.

*To Lord Sunderland.*

“*Turin, May 4.*—As soon as his lordship had left this place, his royal highness was pleased to send for me, to inform me of all that had passed between them, which he did with great confidence, shewing, through all his discourse, a great respect for the queen. His royal highness told me, that his lordship, after having communicated to him a sort of credential from the king of Spain, began to expose his commission, which was a project for

penetrating into Roussillon, &c. which his royal highness perceiving, did not give him time to conclude, but told him that the projects of the campaign being already settled with the queen and the rest of the allies, he would not enter into any new measures which might be contrary to those projects. And farther, that he would not treat with his lordship as a subject of the queen, till he had justified himself in England of what he seems to be accused; and then advised him, as a friend, to lay aside all thoughts of any thing else, but making the best haste he could to lay himself at the queen's feet; which, after a great deal of reasoning, all which tended to his lordship's justification, he promised his royal highness that he would do as he advised him. He went from hence in that resolution, which, I hope, for his own sake, he will put in execution."

We next find him at Vienna, acting a similar part, and by an affected zeal for the expedition to Naples, acquiring temporary favour. He even so far ingratiated himself with the imperial ministers, that he was requested by count Wratislaw to repair to the swedish camp, with the view of acquiring more distinct information, respecting the intentions of the king, than could be gained by a mere diplomatic agent. The degree of interest which he soon inspired, will appear from a letter written by Wratislaw to the duke of Marlborough.

" *Vienna, July 2.* \* \* \* \* \* I am very much vexed to observe in the printed account, that the english are inclined to support lord Galway. To you I can speak with freedom; and if I know any



thing of affairs in England, believe me the lord treasurer will be ruined, if he supports lord Galway, and it will afford fine sport for lord Rochester and his party, should the ministry of England impute to the king of Spain the loss of that fatal battle. It is more natural to confess the truth, and to allow that lord Galway and Das Minas, either from incapacity or some other reason, are the cause of the misfortune; for otherwise, it will appear inconsistent, to support in England a french general at the head of an english army, who is become the abomination of the king and the spaniards.

“ Lord Peterborough is on the eve of his departure to visit you. He has shewn himself sufficiently humble, although his ardour has occasionally transported him beyond the limits of moderation. I have persuaded him not to publish his manifesto, before he converses with you; and if the court does not persecute him, he will not do it. I believe it will be dangerous to offend him, as he is an englishman, and has been supplanted by a frenchman, who has been the cause of this irreparable loss. When you have spoken to him, you will probably be more satisfied with him than you imagine; for prince Eugene has written to me, that his lordship thinks like a general, although he does not always express himself with propriety; and it is likewise true, that he predicted the misfortunes which have come to pass. Moreover, attempts have been made to persuade me, that you are no longer the same friend to me as you used to be. I am convinced I have nothing to reproach myself with on your account, and I am inclined

to serve you with the same attachment. Difference of opinion on the affairs of the world ought not to affect our personal regard, and time will best decide which of us is in the right. You know my disinterestedness, and that I do not desire any thing for myself; but I protest that I shall always feel a sensible pleasure in giving you proofs of my esteem and veneration."

After acquiring such favour at Vienna, Peterborough anticipated the most welcome reception from the hero of the North, to whom he imagined that his high reputation as a soldier, would prove an infallible recommendation. But in this hope he was grievously disappointed; for the stern and inflexible temper of Charles was proof against those blandishments which had been seldom exerted without effect, on persons of a different character. His adventure is well described by Besenval, the french agent at Leipsig, in one of his intercepted communications.

"My lord Peterborough departed last week to return to England. Some days after his arrival, having come to Leipsig in a carriage, to the quarters of the chancery, to pay his respects to the king of Sweden, they would not suffer him to enter the apartment, where that prince had shut himself up with count Piper. He did not conceal his chagrin at this disappointment; and while he amused himself with conversing in a parlour, he was informed that the king of Sweden was going out. He ran to present himself to that prince; but found him gone, and mounting the horse of a groom, he made so much diligence, that joining

him as he was going out of the village, he told him, he was come to have the honour of paying his respects to him, and that his design had been to follow him for that purpose, to his head quarters of Alt Ranstadt. ‘The weakness of my horse,’ he added, ‘obliges me to take the liberty of requesting your majesty not to go so fast, a liberty I would not have taken, if I were mounted on the smallest of the horses with which your majesty’s stables are filled.’ The king laughed, and listened to him afterwards, all the way to Alt Ranstadt, as he understood enough of french to comprehend what his lordship said.

“M. Hermelin told me, that my lord Peterborough, not being content with explaining his ideas in discourse, had written them down, and given them in the form of a memorial to the chancery. He added, that they were contrary to those of the english and dutch ministers, because they tended to engage the king of Sweden to intermeddle in the affairs of Europe, in quality of arbitrator, by the facility which he would find in it from all quarters, the english being so little in a condition to support the war, that they would be obliged, the ensuing year, to solicit peace, if France could preserve the advantages which she had gained this campaign.

“This lord, who is bold, and has been treated as a madman, by those among the swedish ministers who are suspected of being pensioners of England, has sought opportunities of speaking to the king, their master, and has found one, as you may have seen by what goes above, and I hope he has not



failed to profit by it. I do not know, however, whether his too great vivacity, and the ill offices of some swedish ministers, may not have discredited his opinions."

From the swedish camp we find a long and singular letter written by lord Peterborough to the duke. It deserves more particular notice, because it is filled with professions of attachment, and offers of service, at the very moment when he was secretly labouring to frustrate the plans of his former patron, for restoring peace between the emperor and the king of Sweden.

"*Ranstadt, near Leipsig, July 22.*—However unfit for a journey, I was resolved to make the utmost diligence to your grace; but hearing upon the road that her majesty had resolved upon my lord Rivers's return with the forces appointed for the service of his catholic majesty, I concluded that general had given the queen and the ministers sufficient information as to the affairs of Spain.

"Not knowing that your grace had sent passports for me to Cologne, as I have since been informed, I take the road by Bohemia, Dresden, and Hanover, the persons and circumstances in those countries giving sufficient curiosity; believing I might inform myself so as to be able to give your grace fuller accounts than letters can afford, all accesses being cut off from the germans. Count Wratislaw was desirous of what lights I could get in a court, where private persons have the advantage of ministers, especially if they will put on a blue coat and a black cravat.

"Mr. Robinson, at Leipsig, has all the good

qualities a minister can have, and is a man of great integrity. I fear he is apt to confide too much upon the least favourable appearances, and therefore, at present, seems persuaded that the swedes will pass Silesia without halting, in order to pursue a regular war with the muscovites, having accepted the queen's mediation relating to the disputes with the emperor. It is somewhat strange the king will not admit count Wratislaw into his presence, which makes me doubt a longer stay in Silesia than some imagine. From Hanover I shall wait on your grace in the army. \* \* \* \* \*

“To what relates to myself, I am sure I shall give your grace satisfaction as to all my actions, and shew how little I deserved any hardships. I have always depended upon your impartiality, but demonstration is the best security. If I have not done my duty, I desire no favour; if I have served well, I hope I may meet with a suitable protection, at least justification, as to all absurdities raised to my prejudice. I should be glad to have it from the queen, and I have waited with great patience to that end. If not, my lord, I can give it myself at any time; and cannot doubt but that the queen will permit me to employ myself elsewhere, if her majesty has no occasion for my services.

“I cannot but think Mr. Stanhope's politics have proved very fatal, having produced our misfortunes, and prevented the greatest successes. If my poor thoughts had taken place, her majesty's fleet had had the honour of the conquest of Naples, instead of complaining of the attempt, which could

not but succeed ; and that force which has now prevailed, had been employed against France. The addition of my lord Rivers's forces at Valencia, did but procure our defeat, which was certain in the measures they took. I hope our good fortune is but delayed, and heartily wish your grace may finish this war with the same glory with which you have hitherto maintained it."

Discovering, at length, that the camp of Alt Ranstadt was as unpromising a theatre as Turin, Peterborough directed his course to Hanover, where the bickerings of the electoral family with the british court seemed to afford ample scope for intrigue. He was honoured with unusual marks of favour, and gained the attention of the electress Sophia, by flattering her inclination to visit England ; but his cabals awakened the displeasure of the elector, and he had the mortification to discover, that he could not acquire the consideration to which he aspired abroad, while he continued in disgrace with his own sovereign.

His last expedient was, therefore, to conciliate Marlborough, whose character he had alternately lauded and censured. Accordingly, he repaired to the confederate camp in the Netherlands, under the plea of justifying his conduct to the commander, by whose interest he had obtained his appointment, and with whose friendship he had once been honoured. The result of their interview, and his subsequent proceedings, will appear in the correspondence.

After these explanatory remarks, we resume the correspondence.



*To the Duchess.*

“*Meldert, June 6.*—I find by your last letter, that lord Halifax is not well pleased with lord Rivers, which I am not surprised at. However, remember when he is dissatisfied, you will find that the whigs will be of his side, for partiality will show itself when party is concerned. I have received a letter from lord Rivers, with one enclosed from king Charles. As the whole letter concerns lord Rivers, I send him a copy of it by this post, though I no ways doubt his having seen it before it was sealed. God knows what is to be done for the recovery of the great disorders that are now in Spain; for by what lord Rivers says, it is too plain king Charles apprehends that lord Galway betrays him, which can never enter into my head; however, if they believe it, it will poison all the undertakings on that side.

“Your kind expressions in yours of the 16th have given me infinite pleasure, and it is true what you say of Woodstock, that it is very much at my heart, especially when we are in prosperity, for then my whole thoughts are of retiring with you to that place. But if every thing does not go to our own desire, we must not set our hearts too much upon that place, for I see very plainly, that whilst I live, if there be troubles, I must have my share of them. This day makes your humble servant fifty-seven. On all accounts I could wish myself younger; but for none so much as that I might have it more in my power to make myself more agreeable to you, whom I love with all my soul.”

To add to the indignation which the british cabi-

net felt at the conduct of Austria, in consulting its impotent resentment against Sweden, and still more in sacrificing the cause of Spain to its selfish views on Naples, some rumours appear at this period to have reached the lord treasurer, of a design, on the part of the emperor, to conclude a more general neutrality for Italy, which involved the relinquishment of the expedition against Toulon. In the height of his indignation, he proposed to forestal the design of the imperial court, by making overtures to France, through the agency of the elector of Bavaria. He expresses this opinion in a letter to the duke, dated May 17.-28.

“It was but yesterday that I troubled you with two letters; however, I have so many thoughts concerning the obstinate proceedings of the court of Vienna, after all the obligations they have to the allies, that I cannot help observing to you, that in case, by the answer you expect from the prince of Salm, you should find reason to be confirmed in M. Robethon’s suspicions, of their being inclined to a neutrality for Italy, which I look upon as a separate peace, I cannot see any good objection why it might not be worth your considering with the pensioner, whether measures might not be taken to be beforehand with them.

“I am sensible this matter is very nice, but I mention it only upon supposing you are thoroughly satisfied of their intentions; and then I should think, by restoring the elector of Bavaria to his country, which would be no small mortification at Vienna, he might be induced to prevail with

France, rather to gratify England and Holland in the terms of the peace, than the house of Austria.

“ And upon this supposition, taking it for granted that they will put themselves quite out of the war, and stick to their acquisitions in Italy, and apply themselves to reduce Hungary, I must own very freely, I do not see how the rest of the allies can carry on the war without great disadvantage; nor can I hope the dutch would be long afterwards before they followed that example; though, at the same time, I agree France is in so ill circumstances at home, that they must necessarily sink if the allies would but hold together. And this consideration makes the *contre-tems* of the imperial court so much the more unfortunate, and the more grievous to the whole alliance. When all this is said, if the duke of Savoy can or will go on, notwithstanding this detachment for Naples, I shall not quite despair but the project may succeed; yet, in all events, I think we ought, at least, to be very watchful of the steps of these gentlemen, and take every occasion, great and little, to let them see we are very far from being satisfied with all their late behaviour.

“ I ought to ask you a great many pardons for persecuting you with such repeated trouble upon this subject. I am sure it gives me a great deal of trouble myself, and I wish there may be no occasion of my having given it you.

“ The greatest objection I can find myself against what I have here hinted is, your telling the pensioner that we are capable, in any case, of receding from the preliminaries settled with Hol-



land. But I make you judge of that, as of all the rest ; and if you please, when you have read my letter yourself, though you should never think of it again, I shall be very well contented.

“ It is with the same submission that I trouble you with the enclosed reply, which I made to count Wratislaw’s letter, of which he sent you a copy. You may seal and send it forward to him if you think proper, and if not, you may please to burn it.

“ Our last french letters brag that they will venture a battle in Flanders. I think it is what we ought to wish for ; but, at the same time, one cannot help being in a great deal of pain, till we know their intentions more certainly, and that you are not like to be much exposed.”

“ *June 1.-12.* \* \* \* \* I think your letter to count Piper \* is as right as is possible, and I hope you will approve as well the queen’s letter to the king of Sweden, of which Mr. secretary Harley said he would send you a copy by the last post. If these letters come in time, or are in themselves sufficient to prevail with the king of Sweden, I think we are very lucky ; for in case they do not, the court of Vienna seems to me neither to do one thing nor to have one thought, that is not directly opposite to the interest of the allies ; and by all the copies of the letters you send me, it is not only plain that they persist with more obstinacy than ever in sending their detachment to Naples, but it seems

\* This letter is printed in Lediard, v. ii. p. 105. and contains an exhortation to the king of Sweden to conclude an accommodation with the emperor.

to me as plain, that if the king of Sweden be uneasy to them, they will encourage the chimerical proposal to prince Eugene, and send for him and all his troops in Italy to support it, leaving the expedition against France to take care of itself. I take these consequences to be extremely probable, and that nothing can hinder them, unless you will let them plainly understand, that such proceedings as these will oblige the allies to break with them, and abandon the house of Austria to the mercy of France.

“What you say of lord Galway is certainly right; and considering the unjust impressions of the king of Spain in his prejudice, he cannot be of use there. But who can? Every body that is there desires to leave the service, and come home; and I know nobody to send but lord Rivers, who, perhaps, will not care to go neither, without troops from hence; and we neither have them; nor, if we had them, would it be of any use to send them, as you will see by the enclosed from M. Montandre.

“There is nothing thought so essential here as to preserve Catalonia this winter, if it be any way possible; and it having been fully considered this night at the cabinet council, Mr. secretary Harley has orders to write to you by the messenger, to see if you can, either by count Wratislaw or Zinzendorf, bring this to be agreed with at the court of Vienna, which is at this time so unpopular here, that our two dukes\*, last Sunday night, would have been contented, I think, to have broke with them;

\* The dukes of Somerset and Devonshire.

and the least unreasonable of the two would be satisfied with nothing less than a joint complaint and representation from England and Holland together, at their unaccountable conduct. But if they will be easy in sending troops to Spain, that matter will be set right again.

“ I find by the letters from Turin that lord Peterborough is returned thither again, though he had formally taken his leave of the duke of Savoy. He has written a very angry letter to my lord Sunderland, in which he says he is coming very soon to your camp ; and you seem to be so much more in his favour than any body else, that I cannot but impute it to my lady’s good offices, for last winter’s visits to her.”

Fortunately for the interests of the Grand Alliance, the views of Marlborough were too enlarged to enter into the resentment of his friend. Though disapproving the perverse and selfish spirit which actuated the imperial cabinet, he contemplated their conduct with the eyes of a statesman, and would not consent to sacrifice the public welfare to the feelings of personal resentment, however justly founded. He therefore combated the opinions of Godolphin, by arguing that the emperor would not persist in pursuing a line of conduct, which was so contrary to his own interest ; and that it was necessary to connive at these selfish projects, for the sake of the common cause.

“ *Meldert, June 9.* — By yours of the 17th, I see you are very apprehensive of the court of Vienna’s making peace. I think them extremely to blame in every thought they have, but such a proceeding



would be direct madness. I think they have many projects more at heart than that of Toulon; but till I am cheated, I must rely upon what prince Eugene promises, which is, that he will do his best; so that I do not apprehend a neutrality. But I very much fear that count Wratislaw and the other ministers may persuade the emperor to such a behaviour as may force the king of Sweden into war, which I think would be destruction to themselves, as well as to their friends. I have said all that is possible for me to do to the court of Vienna; and have this morning sent your letter to count Wratislaw.

“Yesterday the count de la Motte joined the duke of Vendome’s army, so that I think they have now all that is possible for them to have; and notwithstanding the noise they have made of being in the plains of Fleurus, they have always been in very strong camps. They may in their next march, if they please, go into the plains of Fleurus, and then, if the deputies would allow of it, we might have a decisive action; but by what I can learn, they are no ways inclined to it.”

“*Meldert, June 13.* — I had yesterday yours of the 27th, with the inclosed letters that you had received from Alicante and Lisbon. I have also received a copy of a letter from general Erle to lord Rivers, by which, and what the king of Spain says to me in his letter of the 3d of May from Barcelona, I find lord Galway in very bad circumstances. For my own part, I think him incapable of being guilty; but if there be no confidence, the consequences must be fatal. I send copies of my

letters from prince Eugene and the king of Spain to lord Sunderland, it being in his province, as also my answers; so that if her majesty would have me write any thing more, I might have her pleasure.

“The count Maffei\*, who is now with me, presses very much that more powder might be sent to the fleet, assuring me that there is none to be bought in Italy; he also desired me, in his master’s name, to let you know that all the money he had, or could borrow, he has employed for the project. He begs that the second £50,000 might be sent, so that they might not fail for want of money; and if they should be so unfortunate as not to succeed, you might then stop it from his subsidy. As this is the most likely project to make this campaign end well, if possible, they should have no excuse.

“As to myself, I am sure you are so kind as to believe that I will be careful of taking the first opportunity of doing good, as far as in me lies, but you know I am not entirely master; however, I will not despair of doing service. By the express from prince Eugene, I received the enclosed from lord Peterborough, and if he does not change his mind, I am like to be happy in his company. Whatever his project may be, you shall be sure to know. I suppose the queen’s intentions are, that he should return for England, and not stay on this side the water. I shall not pretend to give him much advice, but shall govern myself by what you

\* Minister of the duke of Savoy.

shall write me; for I believe I may have your answer before I shall see him."

"*Meldert, June 16.* — I had this morning yours of the 30th of the last month, with the order of battle, by which it appears that the enemies were very much stronger than lord Galway, which makes it very strange, that by choice, they should go to attack them in a plain.

"I have sent the queen's letter to Mr. Robinson. I hope it may have a good effect, but I believe nothing can hinder the king of Sweden from mortifying the emperor, by staying in some of his hereditary countries, and I am afraid it will fall upon Silesia; but though he is angry to the last degree, I dare say he will not declare war, since that cannot but turn to the advantage of France.

"You are very much in the right to make no answer to general Erle's letter till you hear from lord Galway. I know his presence in England is wanted for the board of ordnance. However, I think him the properest man you can leave in Spain, for he has never disobliged king Charles, and I think is of a temper to please him; and I confess I think there is the same reason that the king of Spain and his general should command in Spain, as there was for the king of Portugal and his general in Portugal. This is my opinion only to you and her majesty, and if this should be thought reasonable, then Erle will be proper to be left, for I take it for granted, that my lord Galway neither can nor will stay.

"You will see by the letters I send Mr. secretary Harley, that the saxon troops are desired for



the Rhine, and that the emperor would give the command of the army on the Rhine to the elector of Hanover. I believe he will refuse it; so that army will be without any commander for at least one month longer."

*From Lord Godolphin.*

"Windsor, Sunday, June 15.—26. — One letter of last post from the Hague, tells us the count de Noyelles has written a letter to the States, in which he is pleased to take great liberties with my lord Galway. We think it pretty hard here, at the same time, that he who has been the visible occasion of our misfortunes in Spain, for two years successively, should have the confidence to lay the blame at the doors of others, who have suffered so much, and at so great an expense. And as most people are forward to think and say that nothing can succeed, while lord Galway is with the king of Spain, so here we shall enter into no expense, with much satisfaction, as long as we find the king continues under the same ill influence against us.

"As yet nothing has gone right for us, nor do I much like Mr. Robinson's last letter from Leipsig; but whatever uneasiness happens to the court of Vienna, they deserve it richly, who would not, in all this time, send general to the Rhine, though they have been pressed to do it, to my knowledge, ever since last Christmas.

"I reckon the duchess of Nemours's death engages us to assist the king of Prussia, as far as we can, in his pretensions to Neufchatel; but I am sorry it comes to bear at this time, for fear it may put him upon recalling his troops from Italy to

take possession. I hope you will endeavour to prevent this consequence of it."

*From Lord Sunderland.*

"*Whitehall, June 10.-21.* \* \* \* \* What you say in relation to lord Galway is very right, that nothing should be done hastily in a matter of that consequence; but the account that colonel Wrede has brought, sets that matter in quite another light, and I am afraid there is too much partiality in lieutenant-general Erle, to lay much weight upon what he writes to lord Rivers. As for king Charles, it is plain lord Galway is very ill with him; but I am afraid that will be the case, in a month's time, of any body else that may be sent, if they do their duty. When I have said this, I don't pretend to say, or judge, what is right or proper to be done with such a court as that of Barcelona."

*To the Duchess.*

"*Meldert, June 20.* — I have had the happiness of your kind letter of the first of this month from St. Alban's. From my soul I wish I were with you, but every day gives me less prospect of that happiness. Your reasoning for not venturing at this time, agrees exactly with that of the dutch; for my own part, I beseech God Almighty to put into my heart what is right. I am very apprehensive of the consequences on both sides, so that I am resolved not to let slip any favourable occasion; but will not undertake, unless others be of the same opinion.

"I have received a letter from general Erle, by which, and by every thing that comes from that country, I find there is such a contempt and anger

against lord Galway, that it will be impossible for him to continue with any satisfaction to himself, or advantage to the public; but if this be not the opinion of your friends\*, I desire what I say may go for nothing. The being too much in the sun this day has made my head ache, so that I must end with assuring you, with the truth of my heart, of being entirely yours."

*From Lord Godolphin.*

"*Friday, June 13.-24.* — Not having any thing from you since my last, nor likely to have before this post, I shall only trouble you with some farther reflections on the affairs of king Charles.

"I find lord Halifax, lord Somers, and their friends, are pretty indifferent as to lord Rivers, and unconcerned whether he is to return or not. But they are very uneasy to think of recalling lord Galway, though sensible he must be useless; for they carry that matter so much farther, as to think all these misunderstandings are industriously fomented by count de Noyelles, whom they take to be the principal occasion and contriver of lord Galway's misfortunes; for which reason they seem to think, unless he be called home either before, or at the same time, with lord Galway, it will look as if he had been in the right, in all he had suggested to the king of Spain, and all the reflections which belong to that matter, must light upon lord Galway and England.

"Now I know no remedy so probable for these difficulties, as that, if any troops go to Spain from

\* The whigs.



Italy, the emperor might order some proper person to take the command of the whole, and count Noyelles and Galway be both recalled.”

*To Lord Godolphin.*

“*Meldert, June 23.*—I received yesterday yours of the 1st and 3d by the messenger. What you write of the court of Vienna is certainly right; but by the abstract I sent you by the last post, as well as by other letters, I am convinced they have no intelligence with France. Notwithstanding that, I have writ very plainly to them already, that if, upon any account whatsoever, the project concerted for the entry of France should miscarry, they must expect that all the fatal consequences would, with justice, be laid at their door. However, I shall obey your commands in writing, and at the same time propose to them the sending the greatest part of their detachment of Naples to the relief of king Charles in Catalonia. I hope you have not as yet told the count de Gallas that the queen would be contented to pay them. If you have not, I beg you will not let him nor Sir Philip Meadows\* know any more, than that the queen, as a mark of her zeal for the public good, and the particular concern she has for the person of king Charles, would be contented to allow a subsidy, towards the support of such troops as the emperor should send from that detachment of Naples. I am particular as to that detachment, so that they may not pretend to send any of their troops which are to enter France; for when that expedition is

\* British minister at Vienna.

over, I should be in hopes that we might be able to spare the king from that army the 7000 palatines, which are paid by England and Holland. That expence would not fall upon the queen alone, as I am afraid any other would do. For the dutch have so much mind to peace, and so just a pretence to poverty, that it was with great difficulty I was able to persuade them to come into one half of the expence of the regiment of Bothmar. That regiment, and the saxons, make together 5400 men. The money that is saved by the regiments of foot, will more than pay the queen's part."

"*Meldert, June 23.*—Believing it might be reasonable for you to shew my long letter to some that may have a much better opinion of lord Rivers than I have, I send you my opinion as to the command in Spain, apart, so that it may be known to none but yourself and her majesty. As I have already told you, that it is impracticable for lord Galway to continue in that service, and as you approve of the reasoning in Montandre's letter, the number of the queen's subjects in Spain will be too few for the command of lord Rivers; so that the best for the service would be to give the command to general Erle, and leave no other officers with him, but what may be suitable to the number of men. And as the troops of necessity that go from Italy, must be all foreigners, I think the chief command should be left to the king and his generals, and that general Erle should have directions to concern himself only with the queen's subjects, and be obedient to whatever the king should command. At the same time, I think he

should be encouraged by having the commission of general of the foot. The train of artillery might be very much lessened, so that you might be the better able to give subsidies for german troops that shall go thither. I should think that you might in confidence tell lord Rivers, that it is impossible to send from England such supplies as are necessary for the support of king Charles, but by the consent and assistance of the parliament; so that if they shall in the winter resolve on such a supply as shall enable the queen, she will then desire him to take the command."

*From Lord Godolphin.*

" *Windsor, June 16.-27.* \* \* \* \* I never did once imagine that the emperor had a thought of making separate terms with France; but yet all his behaviour has been so unaccountable, as to put the rest of the allies under the same difficulties as if he had acted by directions from Versailles.

" For what relates to Spain, my own opinion agrees exactly with what you write, in your private letter to myself; and in that matter, there will be no difficulty with the queen. But, as I have told you in my former letter, some of our friends here will be unwilling to bring home lord Galway, while count de Noyelles stays with the king of Spain; so the true way of making all this easy will be, for the emperor to send a good general with the troops from Italy. The very best would be the count de Thaun\*, who went to Naples with the detachment.

\* He is more commonly known by the name of Daun, and was the father of the celebrated austrian commander, in the seven years' war.



“ The queen will be very careful not to let the duke of Newcastle, or any body else, make you uneasy about governments. That of Tinmouth waits your orders ; that of New York will be made vacant, whenever you propose a proper man ; that of New England is also like to be vacant very soon, there being great clamours depending this time against col. Dudley, the present governor.”

## CHAPTER 58.

1707.

*Intrigues and feuds in the cabinet.—Resentment of the whigs at the favour shewn by the queen to the tories, in the disposition of church preferment.—Their consequent bickerings with Marlborough and Godolphin.—Misunderstanding between Marlborough and Halifax.—Imprudent conduct of admiral Churchill.—Threatened accusation against him in parliament.—Decline of the influence which the duchess had hitherto enjoyed with the queen.—Rise and intrigues of Mrs. Masham.—Cabals of Harley.—Altercations between the duchess and the queen, on the subject of Mrs. Masham.—Independent, but impolitic conduct of Marlborough and the treasurer.—They offend both the queen and the whigs.—Continuation of the correspondence from Meldert.*

WHILE Marlborough was employed in superintending the operations of foreign policy, and the details of the camp, the intrigues in the court and cabinet no less seriously engaged his attention, and furnished still greater cause of perplexity.

Notwithstanding the success which attended the perseverance of the whigs, in procuring the appointment of Sunderland, their victory was not complete. It was of the highest consequence to favour their party, in the disposition of church preferment, not only as the means of increasing their interest in parliament, but of securing the influence attached to the clerical character in public opinion.

On this point, however, the queen was still more tenacious than on questions of state policy. Zealously attached to the doctrines of the high church, she was anxious to fill the ecclesiastical dignities with persons of congenial sentiments, and to exclude those of contrary principles, whom she regarded as little better than infidels. Jealous of the favour which the two ministers had recently shewn towards the whigs, she withdrew from them that confidence which she had evinced on former occasions, and consulted only her own partialities, or the recommendations of her secret advisers, in the disposition of ecclesiastical preferment.

Two instances of this kind form a prominent feature in the correspondence of the year. The first was her refusal to nominate Dr. Potter to the Regius Professorship of divinity, in the university of Oxford. Although this learned divine had been warmly recommended by Marlborough himself; yet his attachment to the doctrines of the revolution was a sufficient demerit with the sovereign; and she designated for the appointment Dr. Smalridge, who, to equal talents and learning, added the merit of a zealous devotion to the tenets of the high church, and to the tory maxims of policy.

The second and most prominent instance was in the designation to the two sees of Exeter and Chester, which became vacant at the close of the preceding year. Without waiting the recommendation of the ministers, or rather to prevent their interference, she promised these two dignities to Sir William Dawes and Dr. Blackall, who were no less distinguished for their tory zeal than for their



merit and learning; and to evade the remonstrances of Marlborough, she concealed her intentions until he had taken his departure from England.

Such striking proofs of favour to the opposite party, awakened the indignation of the whigs; and, at their instigation, Marlborough and Godolphin were involved in a new contention with the queen, which lasted during the whole year. The effects even recoiled on the two ministers themselves; for when their remonstrances failed in inducing her to desist from her purpose, the junta relapsed into the same suspicions of their good faith, as they had manifested on former occasions, and recurred, as before, to importunities, complaints, and threats.

This political discordance with the whigs in general, gave rise to a misunderstanding between Halifax and Marlborough in particular. We have already adverted to the increasing importunities of the whig chief for some post, which he could hold with the situation of auditor of the exchequer. He had indeed been gratified with the appointment of ambassador to the court of Hanover, in the preceding year, and was afterwards engaged in negotiating the treaty of barrier. But this employment being temporary, only increased his anxiety to move in a diplomatic sphere, and he aspired to the situation of joint plenipotentiary, for the conclusion of peace. Marlborough, however, disliking his temper, endeavoured to elude his demand, by offering the appointment to lord Somers; and on his refusal, he recommended lord Townshend, hoping by this choice, at once to conciliate the

whigs, and to prevent the nomination of a colleague, with whom he could not cordially act. Halifax was grievously mortified at this slight, and expresses his chagrin in a letter to the duchess.

“ *March 28.*—Madam; I am extremely concerned that the contrary winds keep my lord Marlborough on this side of the water; but I am at present under so great a mortification, that I think nobody but myself would trouble themselves about the public. Your grace has been so obliging to me, that I cannot forbear any longer from unburthening my heart to you.

“ I was the last man in England to think myself qualified for any foreign business, when last year I was put upon going to Hanover, as a service particularly acceptable to the queen. I knew how ungrateful and difficult a task I undertook; yet at the desire of lord Marlborough and lord treasurer, I submitted, and went uneasily, but successfully through it. It happened while I was in Holland, that a treaty for securing our succession, and a barrier for the States, was set on foot; and, by lord Marlborough's orders, I was employed in that, and had many conferences with the ministers upon it, and letters from them since, which, by the directions of lord treasurer and lord Marlborough, I answered; and by their commands, against my own inclinations, entered into that negotiation, and took upon me the ungrateful part of opposing the unreasonable pretensions of the dutch. Afterwards, lord Marlborough desired me to persuade lord Somers to join with him in treating of peace, when the time should come. I did it very zealously, as

lord Sunderland can witness, but could not prevail. And after that, when perhaps your grace will think I might have expected, at least, to be asked the question, I heard, in a very extraordinary manner, that lord Townshend was named.

“ I have told your grace a short, but melancholy story, by which I think it appears, I have been treated with great contempt or unkindness, as will be judged both at home and abroad, at a time that I am not conscious myself of having deserved either from lord Marlborough.

“ Madam, I will make no other reflections, and forbear saying any more upon a subject so afflicting to me. I beg your grace will not imagine me so vain, as to be much disturbed for missing the most expensive, most troublesome, and most dangerous commission in the world; but I own I am almost distracted to find I can no way get any share of lord Marlborough’s esteem and friendship. I have done all I could to merit them, and for that intention I hope your grace will pity me and forgive me.”\*

The offended peer soon found an opportunity, of which he did not fail to profit, to shew his resentment for this slight.

We have already alluded to the tory principles of admiral Churchill, and the zeal with which he was supposed to have inflamed the queen and

\* As this letter is without the date of the year, I first considered it as written in March 1708, when the appointment of lord Townshend took place. But the detention of the duke of Marlborough at Harwich by contrary winds, and the mention of the embassy to Hanover in the preceding year, combine to fix the date of the letter in March, 1707.



prince of Denmark against the whigs. His conduct naturally excited their resentment, and they expressed their resolution of directing an accusation against him in parliament. The complaints which had arisen on the mismanagement of the navy, afforded an opportunity of selecting him as the person who possessed the highest influence in the council of the lord high admiral, and to whom many of the recent losses, sustained by the trading part of the community, were attributed. The duke was naturally anxious to spare the feelings and character of a brother, and not only appealed to the whigs in general, but particularly addressed himself to lord Halifax, who was one of the principal movers of the accusation. Although he wrote in a style of unusual humility and condescension, the offended peer disdained to give any reply. This contemptuous treatment weighed on the mind of the duke, and drew from him the strongest expressions of regret and indignation, in his letters both to the duchess and Godolphin.

The duchess, who had invariably censured the conduct and principles of her brother-in-law, espoused the cause of the whigs, and by her reproaches and interference, aggravated the disquietude of her husband.

Admiral Churchill, at the same time, imprudently increased the odium against him, by imitating the example of the tories, in stigmatising the conduct of the war in Spain, and the character of lord Galway. He was even accused of joining at a public dinner in a sarcastic toast, which was then current, reflecting on the military

talents of the unfortunate commander. Another act of imprudence was, his demur in taking the usual oaths, which were rendered necessary, by the appointment of a new board of admiralty, into which Walpole and other zealous whigs were introduced. This hesitation was construed, and perhaps not unjustly, into a proof of his attachment to the exiled family.

At the same time, a private cabal was forming in the household of the queen, which no less embarrassed, and still more deeply affected the duke, both in his public and private capacity.

From the account of the domestic transactions in the preceding year, it appears that the great credit which the duchess of Marlborough had at first attained with the queen, had continued to decline. The external appearances of friendship and confidence were still preserved; because the queen was a perfect mistress of dissimulation, and because the spirit of the duchess was too lofty, even to suspect that the empire which she possessed over her royal mistress could be undermined. In this she resembled most favourites, who neglect to maintain their power, by the means employed to acquire it, and overlook appearances, which seem trifling only to themselves. Nothing, in fact, could perhaps have shaken her interest, but an inferior agent, in whom she placed the most implicit confidence, and on whose situation and abilities she looked down with indifference, if not contempt.

Averse to the restraint of constant attendance, the duchess had endeavoured to lighten the fatigues

of her envied, but not enviable situation, by placing about the person of her royal mistress, as one of the bed-chamber women, Mrs. Abigail Hill \*, an humble relation, whom she had rescued from penury, and whose family she had maintained and patronised. Considering this dependant as too lowly in situation, and too confined in abilities to create jealousy, she little imagined that a person whose post was held only by her protection, and who was bound to her by the ties both of gratitude and affinity, would attempt to form an interest against her benefactress. For a time, her cousin answered all her expectations, and seemed a faithful and vigilant observer of the transactions at court, and the feelings and conduct of the queen. The duchess therefore relaxed still more in her attendance; and proud of her husband's splendid services, she gradually became more presumptuous and domineering.

Mrs. Hill had not, however, long filled her confidential office, before she likewise aspired to a higher degree of consideration; and the state of the cabinet and parties offered a temptation which overcame her sense of gratitude. The violent bickerings which continually arose between the

\* Mr. Hill was an eminent Turkey merchant; but, becoming a bankrupt, his numerous family was reduced to the greatest straits. Some letters from Mrs. Hill, the mother of Mrs. Masham, are preserved in the Marlborough papers, which convey the warmest expressions of gratitude for the favours of the duchess, and shew that she obtained places and establishments for all the children. Abigail was so reduced, as to enter into the service of lady Rivers, wife of Sir John Rivers, bart., of Chafford, in Kent, as I was informed by the late James Rivers, esq. She was raised from her humble situation by the duchess.



queen and the duchess did not escape the vigilant eye of a daily attendant. By the confidential complaints which frequently burst from the queen, Mrs. Hill found herself growing into consequence; and her rising influence was perceived by the candidates for court favour, almost before it was known to herself.

Besides that suppleness of temper natural to dependants rising into favour, which formed so advantageous a contrast with the overbearing and provoking conduct of her patroness, the political principles of Mrs. Hill were in unison with those of the queen. She was deeply imbued with the maxims of the high church party, and was classed among those who were adverse to the house of Hanover, if not partisans of the Stuarts. Such a congeniality of character and sentiment, joined to the most flattering humility of demeanour, and a watchful observance of her royal mistress's wishes, made a rapid progress in the affections of Anne, whose character was turned to the familiar and romantic friendship which her station forbade, and who, at this period, peculiarly felt the want of an adviser and confidant.

The bed-chamber woman found a skilful counsellor and abettor in secretary Harley, to whom she was related in the same degree by her father, as to the duchess by her mother; and by whom she and her family had been likewise assisted. Their relationship produced intimacy; and in the secret intrigues which Harley was equally meditating against his patrons, he naturally courted the aid of so useful an auxiliary. Mrs. Hill, therefore,

was easily estranged from her benefactress, and became the channel of a constant communication between the queen and the secretary, more dangerous, as it was less suspected.

Harley was, perhaps, of all men, the best calculated to win his way through the crooked paths of political intrigue. He had hitherto figured as a whig or tory, as it suited his interests; and under the guise of moderation, had gradually acquired a considerable body of adherents, to whom his parliamentary talents gave strength and consistency. He was supple, plausible, and insinuating, adroit in flattery, and profuse in his professions of duty and attachment. To these qualities he joined uncommon discernment of character, a cool and calculating head, a spirit of profound dissimulation, and an exterior of familiarity, courtesy, and candour, which deceived the most suspicious.

Owing his political consideration principally to the countenance of Marlborough, he loaded him with declarations of respect, zeal, and duty, and professed to emulate his principles of moderation and independence. By this affectation of attachment, he won on his open and unsuspecting temper; and we find from the correspondence, that at the very moment when he was accused of duplicity, Marlborough himself became a pledge for his sincerity, and even advised the treasurer to employ his interposition with the queen. Knowing the tory partialities of his royal mistress, her growing aversion to the duchess, and her anxiety for peace, to free herself from the power of the whigs, Harley skilfully formed his attacks against the chiefs of

the ministry. By the intercourse with the queen, which he enjoyed in virtue of his office, and still more through the channel of Mrs. Hill, he found means to inflame her indignation against the duchess, to work on that high sense of prerogative, which she had imbibed from her father, and to represent the treasurer and general, as favouring the efforts of the whigs for engrossing all the offices of state, and reducing her to a degree of dependence unworthy of a sovereign.\* These insinuations were too much in unison with her feelings to fail of the desired effect, and the secret cabals of Harley in the preceding year, had encouraged her to resist the attempts of that party for the appointment of Sunderland. At the same time, the artful secretary fomented the discontent of the whigs against Marlborough and Godolphin, by insinuating that the two ministers were lukewarm in their cause, and the only obstacles to their admission into power.

The confidential friends of the duchess, among whom was Mr. Maynwaring, had made repeated representations on the rising influence and secret views of Mrs. Hill. But for a considerable time, they remonstrated without effect; for the duchess was rejoiced at the relief which she had gained

\* These facts are usually considered as depending on the authority of the duchess alone; and, therefore, have been often questioned; but we find them also stated in a letter from Mr. Vernon to the duke of Shrewsbury, dated Feb. 10. 1708, and even avowed and justified by the tory advocates of Harley. His insinuations and charges against the Marlborough family, and the measures which he adopted to promote a negotiation for peace, are stated no less strongly by the author of "The Other Side of the Question," than by the duchess herself, p. 324.



from restraint, and could not be convinced of the danger arising from the machinations of her own dependant. At length, the conduct of the queen, combined with the evident favour of Harley and Mrs. Hill, dissipated the cloud which had hitherto obscured her judgment, and she communicated her apprehensions to Godolphin and the duke.

It is, indeed, singular, that the intrigue had escaped the matured sagacity of Godolphin, until it was become notorious; and that Marlborough, to whom the secrets of all the courts in Europe were known, should have been ignorant of a cabal in his own, in which he was himself so deeply interested. It is still more extraordinary, that after he was acquainted with the influence of the rising favourite, he should think so lightly of its consequences, as to suppose that it might be checked by a mere remonstrance. In reply to the first communication from the duchess, he says, "I should think you might speak to her with some caution, which might do good; for she certainly is grateful, and will mind what you say." \*

In conformity with this advice, the duchess not only remonstrated with Mrs. Hill, but assailed the queen with reproaches, and accused her of suffering her political antipathies to be inflamed by the insinuations of a dependant, who conversed only with jacobites, and disaffected tories. To these accusations, which were urged both in conversation and writing, the queen replied in a style of

\* Meldert, June 2. 1707.

affected humility, and real sarcasm, denying, with the utmost solemnity, the charge advanced against Mrs. Hill.

“ *Friday, five o’clock, July 18.* — I give my dear Mrs. Freeman many thanks for her letter, which I received this morning, as I must always do for every thing that comes from her, not doubting but what you say, is sincerely meant in kindness to me. But I have so often been unfortunate in what I have said to you, that I think the less I say to your last letter the better ; therefore, I shall only, in the first place, beg your pardon once more, for what I said the other day, which I find you take ill ; and say something in answer to your explanation of the suspicions you seemed to have concerning your cousin Hill, who is very far from being an occasion of feeding Mrs. Morley in her passion, as you are pleased to call it ; she never meddling with any thing.

“ I believe others that have been in her station in former times, have been tattling and very impertinent, but she is not at all of that temper ; and as for the company she keeps, it is with her as with most other people. I fancy that their lot in the world makes them move with some, out of civility, rather than choice ; and I really believe, for one that is so much in the way of company, she has less acquaintance than any one upon earth. I hope, since in some part of your letter you seem to give credit to a thing, because I said it was so, you will be as just in what I have said now, about Hill ; for I would not have any one hardly thought of by my dear Mrs. Freeman, for your poor un-

fortunate, but ever faithful Morley's notions or actions."

The concealed sarcasm conveyed in this epistle, wounded the feelings of the duchess. She applied to herself the reflection on those who, in a similar situation, had been guilty "of tattling and impertinence," and gave utterance to her resentment in a style still more acrimonious than before.

The doubts of all parties were, however, soon turned into certainty, by the discovery that Mrs. Hill had secretly contracted a marriage with Mr. Masham, whom the duchess had likewise protected, and placed in the royal household. This match, concluded without her privity, and, as she soon afterwards discovered, solemnized in the presence of the queen and Dr. Arbuthnott, was a thunder-stroke of evidence. It proved, not only that Mrs. Masham had forgotten her obligations, but that she possessed the highest degree of confidence. At the moment when this fact transpired, Godolphin also obtained unequivocal proof of Harley's machinations with both whigs and tories, and of his private intercourse with Mrs. Masham.

In this crisis, the duchess, instead of attempting to conciliate her royal mistress, and to regain her favour, by renewing her former attentions, assailed her with bitter reproaches, which were the more revolting, because partly just. On the first intelligence of the marriage, she burst into the royal presence, and expostulated with the queen for concealing a secret which nearly regarded her as a relation. The mortifying replies of the queen, who warmly vindicated the silence of her favourite, by



imputing it to fear of offending, rather inflamed than soothed her resentment ; and, from this period, their correspondence exhibits a tone of dissembling humility on one hand, and on the other, of acrimonious reproach. By the interposition of Godolphin \*, however, Mrs. Masham was induced, at length, to make an overture of reconciliation ; though the interview which ensued, shewed that the breach was irreparable.

Marlborough and Godolphin acted with dignity, but without that decision and address which the emergency required. They neither resolved to join cordially with the whigs, and by their assistance to crush the rising cabal ; nor did they yield to the prevailing passion of the queen, and coalesce with the tories. They continued to maintain their moderate, but imprudent principle, to be swayed by neither party ; and endeavoured to alarm the queen with threats of resignation, which had been too often repeated to produce the desired effect. The

\* In the account of her Conduct, p. 245. the duchess does not allude to the interference of Godolphin ; but in a letter to Mr. Hutchinson, which was written soon after the accession of George the first, she expressly mentions the apology of Mrs. Masham, as produced by his representations to the queen.

“ Lord Godolphin,” she says, “ also took an opportunity of speaking to the queen on this matter, and when he gave me an account of all that had passed betwixt them, in relation to it, I remember he told me, that he had convinced the queen, indeed, that Mrs. Masham was in the wrong ; but that she shewed she was very desirous to have had her in the right. The effect of this was, that Mrs. Masham condescended at last to write to me, to desire me to appoint a time when she might wait upon me, which accordingly I did, &c.”

From the narrative of the duchess to Mr. Hutchinson, copied from her original draught, and corrected with her own hand.

progress of their feelings and opinion will best appear from the correspondence.

*To the Duchess.*

“*Meldert, June 23.*—I have had the pleasure of receiving yours of the 3d from St. Alban’s, and that of the 6th from St. James’s, by which I find something is doing, by way of promotions in the church, that makes the whigs uneasy. I do assure you I am very sorry for it, but you know I have very little to say in those matters. You know how often I spoke about Dr. Potter, and I do not hear that it is as yet done ; though the consequence is, that if he has not the professor’s place, I will never more meddle with any thing that may concern Oxford.”

“*Meldert, June 26.*—Though the post is not to go till to-morrow, and I hope to have the happiness of hearing from you before that time, yet I would not lose this hour, which I have to myself, of assuring you that you are always in my thoughts, and if it were not for the happiness I propose to myself of living some part of the remainder of my life quietly with you, I could not bear with patience the trouble I struggle with at this time. The weather is so very hot, and the dust so very great, that I have this hour to myself, the officers not caring to be abroad till the hour of orders obliges them to it. It is most certain, that when I was in Spain \*, in the month of August, I was not more sensible of the heat than I am at this minute. If you have the same weather, it must make all

\* This must allude to his journey to or from Tangier, where he served as a volunteer. — See p. 4. v. i.

sorts of fruit very good ; and as this is the third year of the trees at Woodstock, if possible, I should wish that you might, or somebody you can rely on, taste the fruit of every tree, so that what is not good might be changed. On this matter you must advise with Mr. Wise, as also what plan may be proper for the ice-house ; for that should be built this summer, so that it might have time to dry. The hot weather makes me think of these things, for the most agreeable of all presents is that of ice.”

*To Lord Sunderland.*

“ *Meldert, June 27.*—Nobody can have a better opinion than I have of lord Galway ; but when I consider the court and king of Spain, I think it would be the most barbarous thing in the world to impose upon lord Galway to stay ; for I am very confident he had rather beg his bread ; I am sure I would. About ten days hence, I hope we may hear something good from the duke of Savoy ; for as to the affairs of Germany, I expect nothing but confusion. However, I have sent the order to the saxons to march to the Rhine, as you will have seen by my letter to the elector of Mayence. As to our affairs here, we begin to think ourselves as strong as the enemy, which most certainly we are, and our foot infinitely better than theirs ; so that I hope in a little time, every body will consent to venture, and that God will bless us with success. I might be trusted with full powers, for I protest to you, that I would not venture unless the probability were on our side ; for the inclinations in Holland are so strong for peace, that should we



have the least disadvantage, they would act very extravagantly. I must own to you that every country we have to do with, in my opinion, acts so very contrary to the public good, that it makes me quite weary of serving. However, till the end of this war, I see a necessity of my serving; after which, I hope for yours and our friends leave of living the little remainder of my life in quiet. I am, with all my heart, &c."

10 " *June 27.*—You may assure 255 that no man living is more desirous of a good peace than I am. The emperor is in the wrong in almost every thing he does; but what she writes concerning his having correspondence with France, is certainly not so. The people in Holland, which seem to be favourable to Peterborough, are of all the worst in that country. I hear by my last letters from Italy, that he is gone to Vienna, to solicit troops for king Charles; but his mind changes so often, that there is not much weight to be laid upon his motions, nor have I answered any of his letters, not knowing where to send them. I am glad to hear that the duke of Shrewsbury is easier than the last year. I do not think he can ever be of much use, but it is much better to have mankind pleased than angry; for a great many that can do no good, have it always in their power to do hurt. What you say concerning the uneasiness between the queen and the lord treasurer; if that continues, destruction must be the consequence, as the circumstances of our affairs are abroad, as well as at home. I am sure, to the best of my understanding, and with the hazard of my life, I will always en-

deavour to serve the queen. But if she inclines more to be governed by the notions of Mr. Harley than those of Mr. Montgomery, I would sooner lose my life than persuade him to continue, in such circumstances, in the service of the queen. This is only to yourself; but you may depend upon it, that if ever I be advised with, this will be my opinion. All that I know concerning lord Peterborough is, that he would do any thing to get the payment of an arrear of about 3000 pounds."

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"*Meldert, June 27.*—I have, since my last, had the favour of yours of the 8th and 10th, and am very glad to find you are so near an end of your scotch business; for what you are obliged to leave to the british parliament, I am not in much pain; for I think there must happen so many things on this side of the water, that of consequence I think will make the sessions either easy or uneasy; and as I can't but hope that God will bless the project of entering France, as well as this army, with some success this campaign, I will flatter myself that her majesty will have a very easy sessions. That which gives me the greatest trouble is, what you say concerning the queen; for if Mrs. Morley's prejudice to some people is so unalterable, and that she will be disposing of the preferments now vacant, to such as will tear to pieces her friends and servants, that must create distraction. But you know my opinion was, and is yet, *that you ought to take with you Mr. secretary Harley*, and to let the queen see, with all the freedom and plainness imaginable, her true interest; and when she is sensible of that, there will

be no more difficulty ; if there should, you will have performed your duty, and God's will be done. For my own part, I see in almost every country, they act so extremely against their own interest, that I fear we have deserved to be punished. I will endeavour to serve to the best of my understanding, and then shall submit with much resignation to the pleasure of God, whose mercies and protection I am very sensible of. And as I do freely venture my life in gratitude for the favours I have received from the queen, so I do hope and beg that you will take a proper time of letting the queen know my heart and firm resolution, with her leave, that as soon as the war is at an end, I might be master of myself, by which I might have both time and quietness to reconcile myself to God, which ought to be the end of every honest man."

*To the Duchess.*

" *Meldert, July 4.*—By yours of the 13th, I find 162 \* is gone into the country in great delight, which I am very sorry for ; for it is most certain, that whatever pleases him, can't be for the service of the queen. If I were ever capable of giving advice, it would be rashness to do it at this distance ; but I believe nothing can cure this matter, if I guess right, but lord treasurer's giving himself the trouble of writing very plainly what he thinks is wrong, and send it to the queen, without offering to quit, or expecting any answer ; but, as in duty bound, to leave it to her consideration. I

\* Probably the archbishop of York.



should hope this would do it; but if it should not, the last and only thing must be, that the solicitor-general speak very freely to Mr. Harley. \* \* \* \*

“As to what lord Sunderland says concerning the king of Spain, that nobody will please him that does their duty, I am of his mind, and I have also as good an opinion of lord Galway as any body can have; but that is no argument for lord Galway’s stay; for as it is, it will be impossible for those two \* to serve together; but as I am resolved to meddle as little as possible, pray say nothing of this.”

*To Lord Godolphin.*

“*Meldert, July 4.*—Since my last I have had the favour of yours of the 13th, old style, with the inclosed letters of Mr. Methuen and Montandre. I agree with you, that the alliance with Portugal should be maintained, if possible; but by Mr. Methuen’s letter, I fear it will be very difficult. However, there ought to be care taken that the fault should not be on our side. I own to you, that I am a good deal of the mind of Montandre, by which I am confirmed in the opinion, that the war in Catalonia must be carried on by troops from Italy, and not by the queen’s subjects, by which you may save money, and the service be better done; and by that, the king and his general will naturally have the command, which is itself very reasonable. I hear the court of Vienna has had a copy of my letter to count Piper, and that they

\* The count de Noyelles and lord Galway.

dislike two expressions \* ; the one where I mention the court of Vienna, and the other, the treaty of Italy. If I hear any thing from them of it, I shall let them know the truth, that I meant the letter for their service. If they take it ill after that, it will not give me much trouble.

“ I have received letters from Turin of the 15th of the last month, by which I see they will not begin their operations till about the 25th. I shall not be at ease till I hear they are in France ; for the fear of the king of Sweden is so great at Vienna, that God knows what orders may go from thence. I send to Mr. secretary Harley a letter from the elector of Hanover’s minister at the Hague, and my answer. You will see by it, that the elector desires that M. Bothmar’s regiment of dragoons, which is paid by the queen and Holland, might go with him into Germany. It was by no means proper for me to give him the answer ; but I should think if it serves with him in Germany, it would be very unreasonable for the queen and Holland to pay it. I have writ the same thing to the pensioner, but have desired him not to make use of

\* The two passages which displeased the court of Vienna, in the duke’s letter to count Piper, were these : “ All this you will easily conceive gives us a great deal of uneasiness ; but may I frankly own to you, that the new instances of dissatisfaction which the court of Vienna has so lately given the king, is a greater trouble to me than the latter of these accidents.”

“ We caused the army to be assembled immediately, as did likewise the enemy on their side ; for taking advantage of the treaty of Italy, they have drawn so many troops from those posts, that they are come out of their lines with a pretty large superiority.” — Lediard, vol. ii. p. 196.

my name. Besides, if we allow of this, we may be sure, either this campaign or the next, he will press to have more of his troops.

“ I have had letters of the 22d of the last month from Vienna this morning, by which I see they have resolved to send count Wratislaw once more to the king of Sweden, and if possible to give him satisfaction. If they had done this sooner, it would have been better, but I am glad he goes. I have this morning received your two letters from Windsor, of the 15th and 16th of the last month. As to what you say concerning Neufchatel, I have said so much to the king, of the positive orders her majesty has given to her ministers, for their acting in whatever way he shall think proper, that I am sure he is satisfied ; so that you need apprehend no ill consequences by the death of the duchess of Nemours. The king of Prussia is so zealous for the entering France, that he has already desired that some of his troops may take possession of the principality of Orange.

“ Tho’ my letter is already too long, yet I must answer your desire of knowing how long the enemy and we may continue in our camps. I believe, with some difficulty, we might stay in ours till the end of this month ; but I have been some time endeavouring to persuade the dutch deputies that I might take the camp of Genappe ; when I can prevail, you will hear of my being there. The reason of their backwardness is, that they apprehend that might engage the two armies to some action, which they are willing to avoid, till we hear some good news from Italy.”



*To Lord Sunderland.*

“*Meldert, July 7.* — My lord ; I have but too many reasons to think that the dutch would be glad of pretences to excuse the earnest desire they have of a peace. I now send a letter to Mr. secretary Harley, which I have received from the States General, in order to have her majesty’s commands. There can be no question of the great advantage it would be to the allies, if the emperor could put an end to the war in Hungary. But I do very much fear the advantages the french have had in the beginning of this campaign, as also the king of Sweden’s being still in the empire, has heartened the hungarians to that degree, that whatever inclinations the emperor may be brought to for peace, it would be of little use in this conjuncture ; so that, in my opinion, I can see no use in taking such measures as this letter seems to desire, but that of using the emperor very harshly, and by it, shewing to France that the continuance of the war must be with great difficulty. For it is not possible that England and Holland can speak to the emperor, as is desired, but that it must be known in France.

“ I have not acquainted any body, either in England or Holland, what my thoughts are of this matter, which makes me beg you will communicate them to nobody but lord Halifax and lord Somers ; and pray assure them that I shall govern myself agreeably to their opinions, so that you must take care of the directions I must receive from Mr. Harley. The dutch deputies will not own to me that they have any other orders or directions, but

that of being cautious not to venture any thing, till they hear what is done in Provence. But I have reason to believe that they have more positive orders from the States ; and let the success be good or bad in Provence, I believe they will continue of the mind they are now in ; since it is the daily discourse in this army, as well as in Holland, why should they venture, since they have already in their hands what will be a sufficient security to them ? If an occasion offer, I no ways doubt but God will both incline us to make use of it, and bless us with success, which will not only be the endeavours, but daily prayers of, &c."

*From Lord Godolphin.*

"*Windsor, June 24.—July 5.*—I am sorry to find you have your doubts on the affair of Toulon. I confess I have had mine a good while, and the more, because I see them upon all occasions so pressing for money beforehand. But I knew no remedy ; they were not to be refused, and we must trust them, if we are deceived. Upon that, and many other accounts, I am like to pass my time but indifferently next winter ; especially, since the queen's proceedings in some things will give the whigs a handle to be uneasy, and to tear every thing to pieces, if they cannot have their own terms. And Mr. Harley does so hate and fear lord Somers, lord Sunderland, and lord Wharton, that he omits no occasion of filling the queen's head with their projects and designs ; and if Mr. Montgomery should take him with him upon any occasion of that kind, he would either say nothing, or would argue against what the other says, as he

did upon some subjects, some months since, when Mr. Freeman himself was present.

“Lady Marlborough went to Woodstock very early this morning.

“Since I had written thus far, I have seen the queen, who desired me to tell you that she would write to you in a post or two, as soon as her hand was a little stronger. I suppose the occasion of her letter will be upon my having read to her some expressions in your letter of the 27th, which she calls splenetic. However, I think this use may be made of it, to say in your answer what you think proper upon the state of the queen’s affairs.”

*To Lord Godolphin.*

“*Meldert, July 11.* \* \* \* \* Since you think it will be of no use to take Mr. Harley with you to the queen, you must find some way of speaking plainly to him; for if he continues in doing ill offices upon all occasions to lord Somers, lord Sunderland, and lord Wharton, it will at last have so much effect upon the queen, whose inclinations are already that way, it must occasion that no measures will be followed. If Mrs. Morley writes to me, I shall be sure to send you a copy of my answer.

“You have so much business, that I am afraid you have forgot to settle with Mr. Bridges the allowance out of the poundage, which I desired for Mr. St. John.\* I beg the favour of your doing it.”

\* The duke of Marlborough had requested lord Godolphin to increase the emoluments of Mr. St. John, as secretary at war, by augmenting the poundage, and did not desist from his instances till he succeeded.



*To the Duchess.*

“ *Meldert, July 11.*—As I believe I shall stay in this camp the greatest part of this month, and if we can find forage, longer, I shall make use of this time in beginning to take the waters of Spa next Wednesday; and as I am obliged to be abroad every day, I shall content myself with one bottle. I wish you could take them with me, for besides the satisfaction I should have, I am very confident they are better here than they can be in England. I cannot express to you the joy I have when your letters are kind, as that of the 23d of the last month was; I received it last night. And as I find you intend to return from Woodstock in a week, I shall be impatient to hear you approve of what has been done. Your expression of the ice-house, that it can't be of use this three years, is a very melancholy prospect to me, who am turned on the ill-side of fifty-seven.

“ I am very sorry that you think you have reason to believe that Mr. Harley takes all occasions of doing hurt to England. If lord treasurer can't find a remedy, and that before the next winter, I should think his wisest and honestest way would be, to tell the queen very plainly which way he thinks her business may be carried on; and if that be not agreeable, that she would lose no time in knowing of Mr. Harley what his scheme is, and follow that; so that lord treasurer might not be answerable for what might happen. If this were said plainly to the queen and Mr. Harley, I am very confident the latter would not dare undertake

the business, and then every thing might go quietly.

“ Mr. Montgomery writes me word, that upon reading some part of my letter of the 27th of the last month to Mrs. Morley, she thought what I said proceeded from the spleen; but, if I may be believed, my resolution is taken, though, at the same time, if I could see that my life could do her any good, I would venture it a thousand times for her service; but when a peace is made, I can’t but think it very reasonable for me to dispose of the little time I may have to live.”

*From Lord Godolphin.*

“ Windsor, June 27.—July 8.—Not having any letters from you since my last, nor from Lisbon, this serves chiefly to cover the inclosed letter from the queen. My next will be from London, her majesty going thither for two days in the beginning of the week, to accompany the prince, who is to qualify himself as well as myself, for renewing our offices of admiral and treasurer of Great Britain. This will necessitate some other renewals, as in the prince’s council, and the officers of the exchequer, which may occasion brangles and disputes next winter, of which there will be no need; for I never saw more preparation for uneasiness in my life.

“ The queen has indulged her own inclination in the choice of some persons to succeed the bishops, which gives the greatest offence to the whigs that can be; and though the whigs were, from other things, in a disposition to lay more

weight upon it, than in truth the thing itself ought to bear, yet it must be allowed, taking all circumstances together, to be a very great *contre-temps*. And, indeed, Mr. Montgomery is particularly sensible of the load it gives him; but at the same time, he sees plainly, that the queen has gone so far in this matter, even against his warning, as really to be no more able than willing to retract this wrong step.

“One of the measures, which I fear is laid down by the whigs, is, to disturb your brother George, as soon as ever they have an opportunity. He is sensible of this, and seemed to have thoughts of preventing any thing of this nature, by not *renewing* upon the occasion I hinted before. He spoke to me; and though I am of opinion it would be right for himself, and every body else, I entered no farther into it, than to say that was an affair in which I thought nobody could advise so well as one's self. I am sorry to have nothing but such disagreeable subjects to entertain you with. Lady M. is at Woodstock, but I hope she will be here again next week.”

“*Windsor, June 30.—July 11.* — There being now two posts wanting from you, and no other foreign letters since my last, in which was one inclosed from the queen, I shall therefore only trouble you now with what relates to England, though that be a very disagreeable subject.

“By all the conversation I have had since my last, I have a good deal of reason to be confirmed in the great uneasiness of the whigs, as well as of the consequences of it; and though I will not



neglect any thing that is possible to prevent the inconveniences that threaten, yet the difficulties one meets with are such, and particularly in the unwillingness of the queen to do any thing that is good and necessary for Mrs. Morley, that unless I may hope for Mr. Freeman's assistance, even before the winter, there must be the greatest confusion imaginable in all the affairs of the parliament."

"*Sunday, July 8.-19.* — By the bishop of Norwich's being made bishop of Ely, there are now three bishoprics vacant; and I have so little hopes of their being well filled, that I am resolved to use all my endeavours to keep them vacant, till I can have Mr. Freeman's assistance, in those spiritual affairs, which seem to grow worse and worse, ever since I saw you last, with the queen and me, and another person, who, I doubt not, has not much changed his mind in those matters, though he won't own any thing like that to Mr. Montgomery."

"*July 10.-21.* — After I had written thus far, I received the favour of two letters from you, of the 13th and 16th of June, in one of which is inclosed a copy of a letter from my lord Peterborough."

"You seem to desire my advice what you may answer to his proposal. I cannot imagine first, what he will propose, or, indeed, that he can propose any thing practicable; but I observe, he laments the emperor's persisting in sending the detachment to Naples, when you cannot but remember it was his own proposal last winter, to the duke of Savoy and to prince Eugene; and, perhaps, the expectation he gave them of the

queen's concurrence in that project, was the ground of their engaging in that unfortunate design. As to his coming into England, I must own myself to have been of a different opinion from my friends on that point. I always thought that when his power was taken from him, and all his commissions recalled, he would do less hurt abroad than at home, and so I think still it will be found; but I don't at all wonder you should like him better any where than with you.

“ I think what you say of Erle's staying, and the king of Spain's commanding, are both very right; and, I believe, as soon as our next Lisbon letters arrive, the queen will take the resolution of allowing lord Galway to return; but if Erle be to stay there, I doubt it will be necessary for you yourself to write to him on that subject, for I don't think any body else has credit enough with him to make him do it willingly, as we must do to serve well.”

*To Lord Godolphin.*

“ *Meldert, July 18.*—Having this safe opportunity by brigadier Macartney, I shall write with more freedom than I durst do by the post. I am very sorry to tell you, but it is most certainly true, that if the king of France would offer the same conditions as he did the last winter, they would be thought by the dutch sufficient for the beginning of a treaty; but the king of France seems positively resolved that the duke of Anjou must have Spain and the Indies. It is as certain, that the dutch will never more this war venture any thing that may be decisive, being of opinion, that they

have already enough in their possession for their security, and that France will assist them in disposing of this possession, as they shall think best for their security ; and you may be assured, that every step they make for engaging the queen in joining with them, to shew the world that the emperor is in the wrong, is for no other end, but to excuse themselves when they appear for peace.

“ The queen’s letter from the king of Sweden is very discouraging ; however, I am persuaded he does not make these wrong steps, intending to favour France, so that I can see no inconveniency in my writing, when you have corrected it, such a sort of letter as I have sent you ; for if we can engage him, we may yet have a good peace.

“ As to the elector of Hanover, I think in the offer that has been made him, he acts more like a merchant than a generous man : so that I am apt to think we shall get very little advantage by it.

“ When my brother spoke to you about his renewing, I could wish you had encouraged him in his resolution of being quit ; for it would be very disagreeable to me to have him receive a mortification ; for I can’t be unconcerned in that matter, after the contempt of lord Halifax, not answering my letter. I meant with all the kindness imaginable. I shall not be surprised at the hard usage any for whom I am concerned shall meet with. I can’t, on this occasion, hinder saying so much to you, whose quiet I wish as much as my own ; but I fear neither of us can have any, till we are at Woodstock, so that I could wish some practicable scheme could be made, by which her majesty



might be well served, and we both out of the ministry.

TO “ The inclosed is a copy of my letter to the queen\*, I writ by Macartney; if it gives you any ease, I am happy; but I own to you, I am very desponding. I am afraid there is too much conversation between the queen and Mr. Harley. You on the place can best judge what may be proper to be done in it, but methinks one or both should be spoke to.”

*To the Duchess.*

“ *Meldert, July 21.*—I received yesterday yours of the 28th, from Woodstock, as also that of the 30th and 3d, from Windsor. My head is so full of things that are displeasing, that I am at this time a very improper judge of what would be best for the work at Woodstock; for really I begin to despair of having any quietness there or any where else. What you say of Mr. Prior† has given me uneasiness; but when you shall know the reason why any consideration was had for him, you will rather pity than reproach me; but as I am taking my measures so as to be out of the power of being censured and troubled, I am resolved to be ill-used for a little time longer. I see by yours of the 30th that I am to be mortified by the prosecution of my brother George. I have deserved better from the whigs; but since they are grown so indifferent as not to care what mortifications the

\* This letter is missing.

† This passage will shew the violence of party spirit, when it is considered, that some petty favour shewn by the duke to Prior, independent of political considerations, was sufficient to provoke displeasure.

court may receive this winter, I shall not expect favour. My greatest concern is for the queen, and for the lord treasurer. England will take care of itself, and not be ruined, because a few men are not pleased. They will see their error when it is too late. I should be glad you would let me know the conversation\* that has been between you and the queen, and if it were before or after the letter sent me by Mr. Montgomery, which I answered by Macartney. The union you mention between the lord treasurer, yourself, and me, for the good of the queen and England; can there be a difficulty in that union? But I will own to you my apprehensions are, that somebody or other, I know not who, has got so much credit with the queen, that they will be able to persuade her to do more hurt to herself, than we can do good. Till I hear again from you, I shall say no more on this subject."

"*Meldert, July 11.-22.* \* \* \* \* I have sent to lord treasurer a copy of my letter to the queen, tho' I own to you I am desponding as to the good it may do; however, I have done my duty, and God's will be done. By my letter you will see that I have endeavoured to do the whigs the best office I can; but I shall think it a very ill return, if they fall upon my brother George. I do with all my heart wish he would be so wise as to quit his place; but I hope nobody that I have a concern for, will appear against him. After the usage I had from lord Halifax, I am concerned but for very few; therefore, if there should be occasion,

\* Alluding probably to one of her violent altercations with the queen.

pray say, as from yourself, two words to lord Sunder-  
land; for it would be very uneasy to me to have  
reason to take any thing ill of him, and it is im-  
possible for me to be unconcerned in this matter.  
I expect no more than what I would do, if he had  
a brother attacked. This, and many other things,  
shews there is no happiness but in retirement."



## CHAPTER 59.

1707.

*Successful result of the expedition against Naples. — Reviving cordiality between the british and imperial courts. — Secret views of the dutch for a peace with France. — Displeasure of the british cabinet. — Proposal of Godolphin and the whigs to form a separate union with the rest of the allies, and to pledge themselves for the prosecution of the war, until the monarchy of Spain was restored to the house of Austria. — Prudent sentiments of Marlborough on this subject. — Correspondence. — Situation of the court of Hanover, and coldness between the electoral family and the queen. — Intrigues of the tories with the electress Sophia. — Mutual explanations of Marlborough and the elector. — Apparent restoration of harmony.*

IN the camp of Meldert, Marlborough was acquainted with the result of the enterprise against Naples.

General Daun, the brave defender of Turin, in the middle of May, led a body of 9000 men across the Appenines, traversed the papal dominions, and reaching the neapolitan frontier on the 24th, was welcomed by the acclamations of the people, who cordially expressed their abhorrence of the bourbon government. On the approach of the imperialists to the capital, the duke of Escalona, the spanish viceroy, withdrew, to escape the popular

fury; while the magistrates advanced to Aversa, and delivering the keys of the city, pledged their allegiance to king Charles. The new government was generally acknowledged; and Gaieta being taken by storm on the 30th of September, the conquest of the whole kingdom was completed before the close of the year, by the reduction of the petty, though strong holds, in the mountainous district of Calabria.

This enterprise being happily accomplished, Marlborough flattered himself that the emperor would detach reinforcements from Naples, for the succour of Charles in Spain. In this hope he was not wholly disappointed; for although some contention arose between the two imperial brothers, relative to the government of Naples, the emperor seemed as if disposed to make amends for his past errors, by a zealous support of the common cause. The correspondence between Wratislaw and Marlborough, which had been suspended, was resumed; and in the letters both of the general and the treasurer, we trace symptoms of returning cordiality.

*To Lord Godolphin.*

“*Meldert, July 25.* — I have had the favour of yours of the 6th from Windsor, but have not time to give an answer by the next post.

“The enclosed letter from count Wratislaw I received this morning; I think it a more reasonable letter than I have seen from that court a great while. I shall not give my answer till I have yours, lord Somers’s, lord Halifax’s, and lord Sunderland’s thoughts of what may be proper to answer.

“ I hope to-morrow we may have the good news confirmed of the duke of Savoy’s being in Provence. You will, by this post, have an account in print, of the reception of the germans at Naples. Pray make my excuse to lord Sunderland, that I can’t answer his of the 8th, by this post. I send Sir J. Norris’s letter, that you may see what he desires concerning the bills of exchange.”

*Count Wratislaw to the Duke of Marlborough.*

[Inclosed in the preceding letter.]

“ *July 13.* — Count Lescheraine delivered to me, the day before yesterday, your highness’s letter of the 18th past, by which I see your obliging complaints on my silence ; and which induce me to hope that I am not quite so ill with you as I have been made to believe. It is true, that at the time of the new misfortune in Germany, and of the battle in Spain, I kept silence for some posts. For with regard to the first, I could not resolve to make my apology, by charging my master, and accusing his first minister ; and for the second, I wished to avoid charging your generals, and blaming the orders of England ; since these kinds of complaints are always useless, and for the most part injurious. However, in process of time, I have done both one and the other ; and I flatter myself that you have assented to my opinion.

“ At present the invasion of Provence is much advanced, or has failed, and you will now be convinced that this court has no concealed views, but concurs in every thing in its power to please the allies. I think, however, that we shall pass the mountains, but I much doubt that we can maintain



ourselves in France during the winter. In addition to the excessive expence for the transport of provisions, we risk our army, in the sole view of pleasing England, and endeavouring to ruin the french marine. This is the only reasonable object to be hoped for from this expedition, of which I also know the importance, if England would avail herself of it, for the continuation of the war.

“ I wished much to converse with you a couple of days, and would have met you in Saxony, had you not declined an interview, under the plea that it would have given umbrage to the king of Sweden; and yet, perhaps, our conversation would not have been entirely useless; for certainly the allies must understand each other better than they have hitherto done. They ought to adopt resolutions which are practicable, and not such as are merely agreeable to their wishes; for the inclination which the Maritime Powers have shewn to abridge the war by extraordinary expedients, has in general retarded the peace which we all desire.

“ First it is necessary to consider whether the war in Spain is to be regarded as a diversion, or as a principal object. According to my scanty knowledge, I am entirely for making it a diversion, because it is too difficult and chargeable to be rendered offensive; whereas, if we wished, we might subjugate all the italian islands with the greatest facility. I do not mean by this to say that Spain ought not to be the principal object of the war itself; but that in obtaining what we may obtain, namely, Italy, we may the more easily

acquire the rest at the conclusion of peace; particularly, if we press France on her own ground.

“For my part, I would send all the portuguese in Catalonia into their own country; and joining with them 6000 auxiliaries, would leave them to make war according to their own good pleasure. In Catalonia I would not have more than 12,000 infantry, and 4000 allied horse, who, being in a central position, may alarm Valencia and Aragon; and in case of necessity, may even make an irruption into Roussillon. I have said 12,000 infantry and 4000 allied horse; for the troops of king Charles would suffice for the garrisons, and this body ought to be under the orders of the king, and at his entire disposition. Neither his catholic majesty nor we know what remains of the allied troops since the battle of Almanza, so that I can make no calculation on that subject.

“On the affairs of Italy I cannot yet speak, for that depends on the progress of this campaign. If we can maintain ourselves during the winter in Provence, and the neighbourhood of Toulon, it will, in my opinion, be necessary to reinforce that army with as many troops as we can draw from all sides. But if we are obliged to retire from France into Piemont, then we must put ourselves on the defensive in Italy. A squadron in the Mediterranean is always necessary and very useful; and the fleet on the coasts of England having troops for a descent, will secure the interior, and at the same time alarm the coasts of France and Andalusia.

“ It is pretended in England that the troops which the emperor may send into Spain, ought to be maintained by us. You know what I have said on that subject in my preceding letters; and if these disputes be continued, we shall never do any thing. It ought to be remembered, that when the archduke was demanded of us, we were reproached in the same manner, for making a difficulty to send him; because nothing was then asked for this war, but his person only.” \*

The latter part of this letter relates to the negotiation with Sweden; and displays the facilities which the emperor had shewn to the demands of the king, and his hopes of a satisfactory result, mixed with expressions of regret, that the Maritime Powers had been restrained by the advice of the elector of Hanover, from taking a decisive part against a monarch, who had insulted the head of the empire, and suspended the progress of the war.

*The Duke of Marlborough to Lord Godolphin.*

“ *Meldert, July 27.* — Being obliged to be abroad almost the whole day of the last post, I could not answer yours of the 6th as I ought.

“ You may be assured that I shall not send the letter to the king of Sweden, but as corrected and approved by yourself and friends; but by what I have from thence, I am in hopes there will be no occasion of writing. If there should, I believe we must do it without acquainting the pensioner, because it is certain that the dutch will never agree



to have the preliminaries sent; for I am afraid they are of opinion they will never be obtained from France. However, I am of your opinion, that England must never depart from them. You will see by my last letter to Mr. secretary Harley, that I shall delay the answer to the States; for by what is writ from Vienna of the behaviour of the hungarians, I think even the dutch will be of opinion, that this is not a proper time for pressing the emperor.

“ You have done very well in sending the memorial of Portugal to Holland; for by it you will gain time, and at last you will be answered with the impossibility of their helping, and their hopes of the queen’s generosity in helping the king of Portugal. Would it not be a good expedient to gain more time, as soon as you have the States’ answer to the memorial, to send lord Galway to Portugal, by which you may amuse that court? for whatever expence you make in that country, I look upon it as money flung into the sea, for they have neither officers nor good inclinations; but by this method you may keep them in hopes till the next spring.

“ I cannot but think it extremely for the queen’s service, that you continue firm in the resolution of paying no more regiments in Catalonia, than there may be english soldiers to complete; and whatever spaniards or other foreign troops, England would be at the expence of, that ought to be by subsidy, and not regular pay; and there ought to be care taken that the clothing which is there, upon account of private regiments, should not be given to

other people ; for that expence at last will fall upon the queen.

“ The copy of count Wratislaw’s letter, which I sent you by the last post, agrees extremely with the notion I have for the scheme of the next campaign ; for should Toulon not be taken, the war must be continued ; but if that should succeed, I should then hope France would be forced to give such conditions as England should think reasonable. I do assure you I am so weary of all this matter, that nothing can make me happy but being in quiet at Woodstock.

“ I received last night the enclosed letters from prince Eugene and Sir Cloudesley Shovel. I am extremely glad to find they have resolved to attack Toulon in the first place. If they succeed, it will be the greatest misfortune could have happened to France. The last two lines in prince Eugene’s letter should not be seen but by few. You must not be too much alarmed at his expression ; for it is his way to think every thing difficult, till he comes to put it in execution, but then he acts with so much vigour, that he makes amends for all his despondency. Though he writes in this manner to me, I am sure to the officers of the army his discourse is the contrary. I would not stay for the post, but send this by colonel Britton, so that her majesty might have this good news as soon as possible. With my humble duty, I beg you will assure her of my hearty congratulation and prayers that she may ever be happy.” \* \* \*

Amidst the awful suspense in which all parties were held, respecting the fate of the expedition

against Toulon, the dutch appear to have manifested, more strongly than usual, those inclinations for peace, which they had repeatedly expressed. Deeming themselves secure of a barrier, by the conquests of the preceding year, they felt less interest for the success of the war in other quarters, than anxiety for such an arrangement with France as might enable them to attain their darling object. Their conduct excited great displeasure in England, and gave additional strength to the reviving confidence between the british and imperial courts. In fact, this selfish and limited policy turned against the republic, those feelings of resentment, which Godolphin and the whigs had conceived against the emperor; and we find the treasurer proposing a separate union with the rest of the allies, to deter the States from tampering with France. He even conveyed a hint that the queen would assist in procuring a general declaration for continuing the war, till the monarchy of Spain was restored to the house of Austria. In these sentiments the whigs expressed their concurrence.

The duke of Marlborough, however, contemplated the conduct of the dutch with more indulgent eyes; and firmly, though delicately opposed suggestions which tended to create a breach with the republic. But the meditated defection of the States, and the new zeal manifested by the court of Vienna, induced him to give a more vigorous tone than he had hitherto assumed, to his negotiations with the king of Sweden; and he encouraged the disposition of his colleagues to conciliate the court of Vienna. The views and pro-



jects to which these sentiments gave birth, will be fully developed in the correspondence.

*From Lord Godolphin.*

“ *Windsor, July 13.-24.*—I am to acknowledge the favour of yours of the 18th with M. Zinzendorf’s letter, and the answer the queen is to have from Vienna, concerning the transporting to Spain some of the troops from Naples. I take the substance of that answer to be, that if Naples be reduced, the emperor will not only send, but maintain them while they are in Spain; and if not, he will still send them, if the allies will maintain them there. I wish either of these ways may be taken; since it is now neither reasonable, nor hardly possible, to send troops to Catalonia from hence; nor is Mr. Methuen of opinion, as, perhaps, he may tell you himself in the inclosed, that it is like to be of much use to send any more troops to Portugal itself. He says, nothing will prevail with them to enter Spain again; and the most that can be expected from those people is, a frontier war. This being the case, all that seems necessary for us is, to support them, so as to keep them firm to our alliance; by which means we shall continue to have the convenience of their ports, which we cannot well do without, while the war against Spain subsists, and can be supported by the allies from Italy, which I hope it may, and cheaper than hitherto from hence.

“ All this shews the necessity of getting as many troops as we can, and as soon as we can, from that side; for I am so far from being of opinion with the States, that the queen’s advantages

in this year ought to incline the allies to accept the proposals of the king of France in the last, that to this moment I think he is every day more and more pressed ; and that if the States will stand firm, they will yet find the effects of it before the end of the year. But in case they do not, or will not see their own interest in this point, it is my humble opinion, with submission to better judgments, that the queen must speak very plainly to them, and let them see that if ever they make any step towards France, but with the participation and consent of England, they must expect the last resentment from her majesty upon such a proceeding.

“ This is, at present, but my own private opinion upon what you have written in yours of the 18th ; but as soon as I have an opportunity of doing it, I will send you the thoughts of our friends, as well as my own, upon this subject, which I take to be extremely nice, and of the greatest consequence.

“ In the mean time, give me leave to add, from myself, that in case we succeed at Toulon, I believe we may have reason from the dutch ; and in case we do not succeed, we shall stand more in need of it than before. I submit it to your thoughts, whether we should not endeavour, without loss of time, to make farther and stricter alliances with the emperor, the king of Prussia, the elector of Hanover, and the rest of the allies, for going on with the war, and not hearing of peace but by general consent. The greatest obstruction I can foresee to this is, the king of Sweden, because of his antipathy to the emperor. But if those differ-

ences were capable of being accommodated, and that king satisfied, that objection would not be so strong. And when, as you say, the dutch are satisfied with the possession of what they have now, and the assistance of France to secure them in that possession; I leave you to judge what the whigs will say to that, and how they will be persuaded, either to go on with the war, only for the advantage of the dutch, or, indeed, to submit to those advantages by the means of peace, without expressing the last resentment at these proceedings of the States.

“ I am glad Britton is with you, for several reasons; because he can give you a full account of all that has passed in Spain, and most exactly of all that relates to lord Peterborough and his proceedings, which may be of use to you to be informed of, before he comes to you.

“ Mr. Freeman’s letter to the queen was as right and as full as is possible, and was no more than is extremely necessary, and it will be as necessary to continue in the same style upon all occasions, both before and after you return.”

“ *Windsor, July 17.—28.*—Since my last we have no foreign letters; two posts will be due tomorrow, but we cannot expect them, as the winds have been. In the mean time I continue to hope for good news from Italy, being more persuaded in my mind than you seem to be, that they will act in earnest on that side; and, indeed, if they do not, it is next to impossible for the allies to continue together as they do, this winter. But if the affair of Toulon succeed, I should think we are in



a better way than ever to have reason from France ; and, therefore, our chief concern at present ought, in my opinion, to be, what measures to take, and how to deal with the dutch, in case the affair of Toulon should not turn as we wish it. By the picture which you have lately made of them, and which I must be so just to myself as to say, I always suspected and expected, it seems to me, that no time ought to be lost, in the queen's endeavouring to make use of the influence of England, to strengthen and augment the alliance, to receive as many into the fraternity as can possibly be procured, and that the foundation of the whole should be, never to admit the inclinations of the States to peace, but in general to declare against it, except as in the letter to the king of Sweden, corrected and altered, as it was sent back from thence. Perhaps it may be thought and said, that this is visionary and impossible, but what will parliament say ? Parliament nor England will not lie down and die, because the dutch find their account in peace, but rather incline to think, so strengthened, as I have been wishing, that they may yet get the better of both France and Holland together. And if the latter be once convinced, as I think they ought to be, and, perhaps, the sooner the better, that the queen and England are capable of coming to this resolution, I cannot help being of opinion, they will think more than once before they give them a just provocation to do it."

" *Windsor, July 21.—Aug. 1.*—The wind continuing contrary, we have now three posts due, so your trouble will be short at this time, since I have

nothing to add to my last letters, but that since I sent them I find that lord Halifax, lord Somers, and lord Sunderland, are certainly of my opinion, as to the measures which England ought to take with the dutch; and that the sooner this is explained to them the better. They agree that this ought not to depend upon the event of Toulon; for as good success there will make the affair less difficult, so disappointment will make it yet more necessary, and consequently that we ought to try it in all events. There may be some niceties to be observed in the method of doing this, but I forbear troubling you with any of my thoughts, as to the method of doing it, till I have yours as to the thing itself."

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"*Meldert, August 1.*—I am very impatient to hear from count Wratislaw; for Mr. Robinson's letter of the 19th from Leipsig, speaks very doubtfully of the reception that count may have. If it be possible the king of Sweden should use the emperor hardly after the advances the latter has made, I agree entirely with you, that we must take such vigorous measures as may put a stop to his proceedings; but it must not be sooner than the end of this campaign. But I own to you, that I can't persuade myself that he will make such a step as must necessarily give so great an advantage to the king of France, for I am sure he earnestly desires the continuance of the war.

"This bearer is a member of Parliament; he comes from Spain, and seems to be a very modest man; but as much as he cares to speak, he is of

the same opinion with all that I have seen, which, in short, is, that lord Galway is neither an officer or zealous. They all say that he has also grown very proud and passionate, which you know is very different from the temper he formerly had. I will not pretend to judge how right it may be, to let the friendship and opinion of the whigs govern in this matter; but I am very certain the opinion king Charles and all the officers have of him, (though unjust,) will make it impracticable for him to do any thing that is great or good.

“I have sent brigadier Palmes to the duke of Savoy and prince Eugene, with orders to stay there till they can judge how the campaign will end on that side, and then to have their thoughts on a project for the next campaign. I have acquainted them with my opinion. I expect him back about the middle of September, so that I may have yours and our friends thoughts, before I settle any part of it with the court of Vienna and the States General.

“I have had the favour of yours of the 13th, which is in answer to mine of the 18th, N.S. I am glad, for the sake of the queen and England, that you are of opinion that the war in Spain ought to be carried on by subsidies, which may get foreign troops; for her majesty's subjects can never come in time, nor, indeed, be kept in good order in that country, for want of recruits. If we succeed at Toulon, when that place is in the hands of the allies, besides the ruin it must be to his naval stores, it will make it very difficult for the king of France to support the next campaign, which I hope will



encourage the dutch to have no thoughts but of war.

“ I allow all your reasonings to be very right concerning England, Holland, and parliament, and that war must be continued ; but no reasoning or success can prevail with the States to think any thing reasonable, but what tends to their own particular interest. However, during war it would be dangerous to make any alliances in which the dutch were not concerned.

“ I have this morning received a letter from the pensioner, who is very much alarmed at the proceedings of the king of Sweden. Whatever does happen, I am very confident we shall hurt ourselves, if we make a noise till the end of this campaign.

“ You will have received the considerations of the court of Vienna, as to sending troops for the support of the king of Spain. I have received a copy from count Zinzendorf, but shall make no other answer, but that we must see the success of the expedition into Provence, before we can judge what may be *faisible* for the relief of king Charles ; by this I shall gain time for the return of brigadier Palmes. I intend to write to the pensioner, that the dutch may give the same answer.”

*From Lord Godolphin.*

“ *Windsor, July 25.—August 5.* The queen approves of your thoughts of sending brigadier Palmes to the duke of Savoy for the reasons you give, and at his return it will certainly be the most proper time to speak to the States and the pensionary ; for you will please to consider, that sooner or later there seems to be an absolute necessity of doing

something of this kind. England had entirely swallowed the advantages hoped for against France this summer; and since it is now likely to pass over without any endeavours or attempts of that kind, the parliament will certainly enter into the reasons and causes of this proceeding, and will not probably be very well satisfied, unless they find there has been some expostulation upon it with the States, and some better regulations made. And if this should have been wholly neglected, or but too long delayed, it would certainly give the greatest handle imaginable against the war.

“ I thank you for the copy of count Wratislaw’s letter, which I cannot think so reasonable throughout as you seem to do. All that he says of what is past, is entirely unreasonable, and particularly his doubts whether England would make the right use of success at Toulon, by continuing the war. And when he talks of their having ventured and exposed their army only to gratify England, had they ever had Italy or an army, but for the extraordinary efforts and expence of England? and is it now thought too much to do what is really the most solid advantage to themselves, only because it is particularly grateful to England. I confess this is a little harsh to my ear.

“ As to the future views, I approve them very much, and shall endeavour, as far as I can, to make them practicable; but I see by your last letter from Sir Philip Meadows, the court of Vienna affects still to have the palatine troops sent to the king of Spain from the duke of Savoy’s army, which cannot be done by any means, if the

enterprise succeeds at Toulon ; for, in that case, even by count Wratislaw's own scheme, the duke of Savoy's army ought to be strengthened and augmented; so as that they may winter in France. It is true; indeed, if we should be baffled there, and be obliged to retire, so great an army on that side would not be necessary, and then the palatines might go to Spain ; but, at present, I think we ought to insist still upon having some of the troops from Naples, as most at hand, and because of the remoteness of the place, very difficult to be made use of this year, any other way than by transporting them to Catalonia by sea.

“ Count Wratislaw touches on one thing in his letter, against which I beg leave to precaution you in time ; and that is, the thought of sending for prince Eugene to the Rhine the latter end of this campaign. Now the affairs of the Rhine for this year seem to be at an end, by the troops detached from Villars's army, and I believe the elector of Hanover would like to have that command another year. Besides, I do really not think him sincere in dropping that expression to you ; for if they had prince Eugene at Vienna, they would not think of sending him to the Rhine, but rather make use of him to bridle the king of Sweden. Upon the whole, I think it might be right to answer him, that, in general, his views are likely to be approved ; and that if the emperor has any doubt whether England would make use of the success we hope for at Toulon, not to continue the war, his imperial majesty has but to make it his request to all the allies not to make peace till the



monarchy of Spain be restored to the house of Austria, and he will soon see if England will not be ready to join with him in procuring such a declaration from them. And perhaps this would not give a very improper rise for what will be necessary to be said to the States upon the subject of the former part of this letter.

“ If count Zinzendorf comes to you, as I hear, he may be of great use in concerting all these things against the return of brigadier Palmes, which I wish might be sooner than the middle of September; both because before that time the siege of Toulon must be over one way or other, and also, because after that time, to speak very plainly, it will be no more than absolutely necessary that you should make haste into England, to look after our affairs at home.

“ I agree with all you say concerning Spain and Portugal, but if they are likely to be pressed in Autumn, as the french brag, we must be at some extraordinary expence to keep them firm to our alliance. At present I think we are on very good terms with them,

“ Mr. Robinson's last letters give us but a very doubtful account of the matters depending between the emperor and the king of Sweden, notwithstanding all the advances made by the former. I hear that my lord Peterborough has been with him; and don't doubt but from thence he will go to Berlin and Hanover, before he comes to you, by which time he will be furnished with sufficient matter for a whole week's conversation.

“ Since I had finished this letter, I have shewn

it to the queen for her approbation. She commanded me to remember her very kindly to you, but did not say the least word of her having received a letter from you.

“ I had almost forgot to observe one thing to you upon what you write, that subsidies would be better than a regular pay for the troops to be sent from Naples to Spain. This is certainly true, if any honesty remained in the world, but as the case now stands, if that method be taken, the subsidies will be sent to Vienna, and the troops, I doubt, will starve in Spain.”

*To Lord Godolphin.*

“ *Meldert, August 4.*—By the last post I had not time for copying the enclosed from lord Peterborough.\* His motions have been so uncertain, that I have writ but one letter in answer to four of his, which I sent to Sir Philip Meadows, who writes me word, that it came after the earl was gone; but that he should send it to Hanover, believing it might meet him there. By one expression in his letter, I believe his justification is meant to be printed. I should think it for his service, as well as the quiet of the queen’s business, that nothing of this kind should be printed. If he gives me occasion, I shall put him in mind of the english saying, ‘ *little said is soon mended;*’ but I know he will govern himself, and I had much rather it should be so, than your humble servant have any thing to do in it.

“ I do not hear the elector of Hanover has yet

\* This is the letter which is already printed in Chapter 57.

declared any time for his going to the army on the Rhine ; so that for this campaign we must not, I am afraid, expect any other thing but obliging M. Villars to keep on the other side of the Rhine, so that they may detach the greatest part of their army for Provence. I hope to-morrow we may have the good news of the duke of Savoy's being at Toulon the 23d of the last month.

“ Having wrote thus far, I have the favour of yours of the 17th, by which I see you want two mails from Holland, in which letters you will find us full of hopes of success of the project of Toulon ; but if that should not succeed, you will find no hearts left in Holland. You must see this month of August pass, before you will be well able to judge what measures may be proper to be taken.

“ I am sorry for the uneasiness your cold gives you, and so with all my heart wish you might never have any other uneasiness, but what of necessity you must undergo for the good of the public. I have been uneasy in my head ever since I left off the Spa waters ; but if the siege of Toulon goes prosperously, I shall be cured of all diseases but old age.”

*To the Duchess.*

“ *Meldert, August 4.*—Since my last we have had so much rain, that I can hardly stir out of my quarter, the dirt being up to the horses' bellies, which is very extraordinary in this month. However, I think we must stay here till we hear what success the duke of Savoy has at Toulon. By a letter I have received from lord Peterborough, he should be at this time at Hanover, where, no doubt,



he will be a great favourite with the electress Sophia; I do not think his humour will be agreeable to the elector. I send a copy of his letter to Mr. Montgomery.

“ I did last winter desire the queen’s favour in giving her picture to comte Wratislaw, which she was pleased to promise, so that I thought it had been at Vienna. But by the last post I received a letter from the emperor’s resident, that Sir Godfrey Kneller says he can’t begin the picture till he has a warrant from lord chamberlain. Pray give my duty to the queen, and that I desire she would be pleased to give lord Kent her orders; for Wratislaw has set his heart on the honour of her picture, and Sir Godfrey might order it so that her majesty need not have the trouble of sitting but once. But the next year I must beg the favour of the queen that she will allow Sir Godfrey to come three or four times to draw hers and the prince’s pictures for Blenheim; if I am ever to enjoy quietness, it must be there, so that I would have nothing in my sight but my friends.

“ Having writ thus far, I have received yours of the 18th, by which I find there were two dutch posts due. What 73 tells you is a melancholy prospect; but when thoughts are carried any where else, they are dangerous; so that of two evils you must chuse the least. I am more concerned at what you say of the queen, since that is what may hurt immediately the elector of Hanover. But as to 50, I hope it is at a great distance; and I will own to you, that the little gratitude or sense the english have of their peculiar happiness, makes

me less concerned; but I would venture a good deal to make the queen happy, for I am persuaded she means very honestly."

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"*Genappe, August 11.*—I had not time by the last post to answer that part of your letters of the 17th and 21st of the last month, in which you say that it is not only your own opinion, but also that of lord Halifax, lord Somers, and lord Sunderland; that there should be no time lost in taking measures; and at the same time, letting the dutch know the firm resolution of the queen and England, never to think of peace till they can bring France to those preliminaries agreed to last winter. I think this is very rightly judged, but the execution will be very difficult; for as the preliminaries were never in form brought to the States, so you may be sure they will pretend to know nothing of them.

"By what I hear from Leipsig, I believe the fate of Toulon will be decided before the negotiation of count Wratislaw will be finished. When I told you that I approved of the greatest part of count Wratislaw's letter, I did not mean his reasoning upon what was passed; for my humour is to look forward, so that I meant as to the managing of the war for the next campaign. You may be in the right to wish prince Eugene to continue where he is; but if himself and the emperor shall think fit to have him in Germany, it would be very harsh in the allies to oppose it. But I shall be better able to speak on this subject after the return of Palmes, which cannot be till the middle of September.

“ By the last post I sent you the last resolution of the States, by which you will see their great caution. I cannot forbear giving you my opinion as to what you say of the parliament settling the management of the war with the States. It is a matter I think 31 and all his friends would be extremely glad of, and, therefore, I think it should be avoided; for it is certain that there can be no good end of such an inquiry, and although I cannot prevail with them to do what is good for themselves, yet they will trust me with much more power than they will ever be brought to do by treaty.”

In many of the letters between Marlborough and Godolphin, as well as in those from the duchess to the queen, we find frequent allusions to the court of Hanover, and to the discordant views and sentiments of the electoral family.

The electress Sophia was highly anxious to accept the invitation to England, which had already formed the subject of a discussion in parliament; and notwithstanding her repeated disavowals, both public and private, she always contemplated the prospect of visiting a country, where she was regarded as the presumptive heiress to the crown, with a degree of eagerness which increased with age. She even frequently declared that she should die content, if she could only live to have inscribed on her tomb, “ Sophia, queen of Great Britain.” At all events, she considered herself as intitled to a pension sufficiently ample to give consequence to her rank and pretensions. She, therefore, readily listened to all who flattered her ruling passion,



and, at this moment, was secretly caballing with the tories, who, to embarrass the government, proposed to bring the subject of the invitation again into discussion. She was, at the same time, displeased with the whigs, and in her resentment for their opposition to her wishes, forgot the services which they had rendered at the Revolution, and the zeal which they had manifested in promoting the protestant succession.

The elector was too prudent and high-minded to countenance these petty cabals ; but from aversion to parade, and a love of economy, he contributed to the coldness which reigned between the two courts, by declining the formalities which custom had introduced in the intercourse of princes. Thus, when it was thought proper to invest the electoral prince with the order of the garter, to raise him to the english peerage, under the title of duke of Cambridge, and to compliment him by the mission of a regular ambassador on the birth of his son ; the elector received these marks of distinction with a degree of coldness which bore the appearance of aversion, and did not hesitate to express his contempt, for what he called baubles and trifles. The dissatisfaction arising from this source, was increased by the reports and complaints of Mrs. Howe, the lady of the british minister, who, in her correspondence with the duchess of Marlborough, expatiated on the froward and mysterious conduct of the electoral court, and represented every trifling omission of ceremony as a deliberate insult, and a proof of indifference to the succession.

The electoral prince partook neither of the eagerness of his grandmother to anticipate her expected honours, nor of the stern contempt with which his father regarded the established forms of princely intercourse. On the contrary, he seized every occasion to manifest his respect to the queen, and his regard to the nation over whom he was destined to reign; but he was too confined both in means and influence to be an object of attention to any of the parties, who were striving to ingratiate themselves with the future sovereign.

The tories did not fail to profit by the situation of the electoral family, and the dissatisfaction which reigned between the two courts. At first they employed the agency of Sir Rowland Gwynn, an english gentleman who resided at Hanover; and when he was dismissed for his intrigues, by order of the elector, they recurred to Mr. Scott, a dependant of the electoral family, who visited England under the plea of domestic business. By this channel they conveyed assurances of their attachment, accused the whigs of treachery to the protestant cause, and wrought on the passion which the electress felt to visit the british dominions.

By the agency of Robethon, the duke of Marlborough was speedily acquainted with these machinations, as well as with the sentiment of displeasure which they exerted in the mind of the elector.

*Robethon to Cardonel.\**

“*Hanover, Aug. 2. \* \* \* \* \** My lord Peterborough has been here three days; he was indulged

\* Translated from the french original.

with a court carriage and six horses to convey him to Herenhausen, where he dined and supped every day. He has warmly declaimed against lord Galway. He appears to be extravagantly swedish, and an enemy of the emperor.

“ Our Mr. Scott, who has demanded permission of his electoral highness to go to London for his domestic affairs, has been intriguing there with the high tories; and he has written to the elector a letter of ten pages, which I have read, tending to advise him to give his assent to the invitation of the electress, and assuring him that if he will permit him to forward it, he will take care that the business shall pass in the next session. He pretends that the great body of the nation desire it; that the tories, who have proposed it, are the true friends of this house; that the whigs are devoted to the court, and for this reason, oppose the invitation of the successor; and that these same people, among whom he reckons lord Halifax, would engage his electoral highness to take the command on the Rhine, in order to expose his reputation, and to receive an affront. But he has been told that his highness would not go, unless my lord duke would give him a good detachment, which he could do without risk. He has written four letters to the elector, full of invectives against my lord duke. His highness was so irritated at this proceeding, that he wrote to him, with his own hand, forbidding him to meddle in any business, on pain of being dismissed from his service.\* His highness

\* A translation of the elector's letter is printed in Macpherson, v. ii. p. 95.



ordered M. de Schutz to communicate the copy of this letter to lords Godolphin, Sunderland, and Halifax, in order to make this fellow known to them. I am directed to acquaint you with all this, and to beg you to apprise my lord duke of it. Hitherto I have been the dupe of this man, and therefore it is just that I should labour to prevent others from being so too."

On this occasion Marlborough acted with his usual candour and frankness, by acquainting the elector with the reports circulated by Mrs. Howe, and experienced a similar return. From the correspondence we find that this explanation prevented an open breach between the two courts, and restrained the intrigues of those who laboured to set them at variance.

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"*Meldert, Aug. 8.*—I find by yours of the 21st that you want four packets from Holland; and as the wind is, I fear they are still on this side. The news we have this morning from Paris is much better than what we received by the last post. The duke of Vendome has detached 12 battalions and 9 squadrons, but continues still in his camp. I hope this detachment will encourage the deputies, so as that I may make the march I have been proposing to them for these last six weeks. If they allow of it, my next will be from another camp. You will, by Mr. Walpole's\* letter, have an account of all our affairs in Catalonia; however, I trouble you with a copy of the letter from lieut.-

\* Horace, afterwards lord Walpole, brother of Sir Robert, who was secretary to general Stanhope in Spain.

general Erle. The other two papers, I have not had time to have them copied ; they should not be shewn to many ; by that from Hanover the queen may see the obligations she has to some of her subjects. Tho' the elector has behaved himself in this business as I always thought he would, you may depend on it that Mr. Scott does nothing but by the direction of the electress, and I dare say you will see this matter attempted in the winter. The other is from Besenval, the french minister, to Torcy. By a letter Mr. Cardonel has received from lord Peterborough, he should be here this evening or to-morrow.

“ I here inclose the resolution of the States, given me this day by the deputies of the army. It is an answer to my having pressed them to get fuller powers. It would do them hurt with the States, if they should know they have shewn me the whole resolution, so that I beg it may be communicated only to lord Halifax, lord Somers, and lord Sunderland. You will see by the reasoning of this resolution, the humour they are in. I should be glad to know what your opinions are of the use I ought to make of this.”

*From Lord Godolphin.*

“ *Windsor, Aug. 4.-15.* — I received yesterday the favour of yours of the 4th and 8th of August, with the several papers inclosed. The copy of my lord Peterborough's letter is a perfect picture of himself, and some paragraphs of it are very well explained by the letter intercepted from Besenval. But you having by this time had enough of the original, I shall say no more of it now, but that I

hope you have advised him not to be so troublesome as his own temper and inclination would naturally lead him to.

“ I think it very probable that he may have entered into all the views of the elector of Hanover, and join with these people in that and in other things when he comes hither, unless your lessons have power enough to hinder him from it.

“ I thank you for the letter you sent me from Hanover, because I hope it will do some good with the queen; I am sure it ought to do so. Mr. secretary Harley will have orders from the queen to let the elector of Hanover's minister know that the person \* mentioned in that letter ought to be recalled immediately.

“ I have communicated to lord Halifax and to lord Sunderland the resolution of the States, inclosed in yours of the 8th from Meldert. Their construction of it is, that you are more at liberty than you have been; and your letters received to-day, of the 11th from Genappe, seem to confirm that construction. We agree that this month of August must pass, and the fate of Toulon be over, before any just measures can properly be taken, as to what ought to be said to the States.”

“ *August 5.-16.* \* \* \* \* I am much afraid our affairs grow every day worse and worse with the king of Sweden, not that I really think he is in any engagement with France; but his own natural unreasonableness, and his uncertainty is like to have the same effect. And I doubt lord



Peterborough has done all he could to make mischief there, as well as in other places where he has passed; and unless he be gone from you before this comes to your hands, a little good advice from you will have more weight than from any body to hinder him from hurting himself, and being very troublesome to others."

The disavowal of Scott, and the communications made to the queen, contributed to soften her prejudices against the elector; and before the close of the year, Mr. Howe was commissioned to convey assurances, which announced the restoration of harmony between the two courts.

*From Mr. Howe.*

"*Hanover, Dec. 26. N. S.* — The morning after my arrival I had an audience of the elector, and when I had made the queen's compliments to him, I came upon the business of England, which he entered into with me, in the openest and fairest manner that could be expected. He bid me assure the queen, that he should never think of any other interest in England but hers, and that whatever interest he had there, he thought very secure in her majesty's; nor would he hearken to, or give any encouragement to the projects of those who have only their own private views. His electoral highness told me, that as to Scott, he was wholly ignorant of his behaviour in England, and that as soon as he was acquainted with it, which was indeed by Scott's own letters, he sent for him away, and ordered M. Schutz to let him know how much he was displeased at his proceedings. M. de Bernsdorf has assured me since, that the elector

had once resolved to turn him out of his service, but that he thought the fellow would then go into England, and still carry on his intrigues, which might have occasioned a jealousy that his electoral highness had done it with that design.

“ I have seen Scott at court, who has been to see me at my house, and I think I have not seen a greater alteration in any body’s countenance ; for from that height of insolence he used to carry himself, he looks quite dashed, like a guilty knave that is discovered in all his vice. I hope this has set the elector himself very right in every thing, and that it will make him put a stop to the proceedings of the electress.”

## CHAPTER 60.

1707.

*Marlbrough moves to Genappe and compels the enemy to quit their position at Gemblours. — Advance of the confederates to Nivelles, and preparations for a battle. — Continued retreat of the french, and march of Marlborough to Soignies. — Correspondence from the camp of Soignies. — Visit of lord Peterborough. — Continuation of the correspondence.*

IN the camp of Meldert Marlborough had been detained six weeks, by the caution of the dutch deputies, who opposed his design of marching on Genappe, which must have forced the enemy to risk a battle, or retire from their strong position at Gemblours.

At length, on the intelligence that Vendome had detached thirteen battalions and twelve squadrons to Provence, he obtained their consent to the projected movement. The heavy baggage was sent to the rear; the troops at Brussels were ordered to Waterloo, to cover the march; and those at Louvain, to the abbey of Florival, where four bridges had been thrown across the Dyle. On the 10th, in the afternoon, the passage of the river was effected, the duke of Wirtemberg being detached with fourteen squadrons towards Pieterbois, to observe the enemy, and afterwards to form the rear guard. The troops reached the heights



of Wavre on the dawn of the 11th. Having made a short halt, they again proceeded, and after a forced march of seven leagues, encamped with their right at Promelle, and their left on the Dyle, the head-quarters being established at Genappe.

During this movement two letters occur.

*To Secretary Harley.*

“ *Genappe, Aug. 11.* — Yesterday I decamped from Meldert. At nine I gave orders for some heavy baggage to march towards Brussels, and the artillery to pass the Dyle at St. Joris-Wert. At three the army struck their tents, and began their march at four towards Florival, where we likewise passed the Dyle, and continued our march all night to this camp, from whence we might with less disadvantage have attacked the enemy in their camp at Gemblours, had they continued there. But having notice about eight at night of our march, they immediately gave orders for decamping, and marched about midnight towards Gosseliers, and are supposed to have taken the camp at Pieton.

“ You will receive a large volume from Mr. Robinson of my negotiation with the swedish ministers, who consent that her majesty and the States should procure the consent of the several princes pretending to the territory of Hadelen, that the emperor transfer the sequestration to the king of Sweden, which may bring these princes to demand an equivalent, as in the affair of Eutin; but the article about the protestant religion in Silesia, will admit greater difficulties. There is little appearance of bringing the swedes to any reasonable terms.”

*To Lord Godolphin.\**

“ *Genappe, Aug. 4.—15.* \* \* \* \* I had writ thus far in our old camp. The march I made last night and this day has had the effect I always assured the deputies it would have. As soon as the duke of Vendome had the assurance of my being marched, he immediately gave orders for decamping, and accordingly began to march at twelve o’clock last night, knowing very well, that if he had staid till I had been in this camp, he could not have marched without an action. I hope this will convince our friends in Holland, as it has done our deputies, that if they had consented to my making this march six weeks ago, as I pressed to do, the french would have then made, as they now have, a shameful march, by which both armies see very plainly, that they will not venture to fight. We have nothing since my last from Provence; and I am so very sleepy, not having shut my eyes last night, that I shall give you no farther trouble.”

On the retreat of the enemy, Marlborough moved directly to Nivelles, where he arrived on the same evening; and learning that Vendome was advancing to Senef, he prepared with alacrity for an engagement the ensuing day. Count Tilly was detached at the head of forty squadrons and 5000 grenadiers, with orders to post himself between the two camps, and harass their rear guard, in case they should attempt to march, before the main army could arrive. But the french commanders were not anxious to risk the event of a

\* The former part of this letter is printed in the preceding chapter.

battle. The approach of the confederates to Nivelles became again the signal for retreat, and they effected their purpose with such rapidity, that they gained the inclosures which skirt the plain of Mariemont, without any effectual obstruction from the allied detachment. They then continued their progress to the position of St. Denis, behind the rivulet which falls into the Haine, in the vicinity of Mons.

Uncertain of their design, Marlborough detached parties to watch their movements, and an aid-de-camp of Overkirk ascending the height of Great Roeux, descried them in full march towards the Haine. Calculating that they intended to occupy the strong camp of Cambron, Marlborough reluctantly allowed his troops to halt a day, for the sake of recovering from their fatigue. On the 14th, at six in the morning, he directed his march to Soignies; but his progress being retarded by a heavy rain, the heads of his columns did not reach the intended camp till late in the evening, and the rear was unable to join before the ensuing morning. The french, meanwhile, evinced the same caution as on the former occasion. After passing the night under arms, they broke up from St. Denis, and continued their retreat by Cambron to Chievres, from whence a single march would place them within the protection of their lines.

As the hasty retreat of the enemy precluded all hope of an action, so a succession of heavy rains detained the two armies above a fortnight in their respective camps, greatly to the mortification of the british general, who confidently expected to



retrieve the time which he had been compelled to waste, since the commencement of the campaign.

But although the caution of the enemy, and the opposition of the deputies, had frustrated his views, his skill and activity called forth the admiration of all competent judges, and of none more than Eugene, who sincerely sympathised in his disappointment.

“*Turin, August 19.*—What your highness has done since you had the power of marching against the enemy, evidently proves that this campaign would have been as glorious as the last, if you had not been restrained by the great circumspection of the dutch deputies, who, ignorant of our profession, follow the opinion of their generals, who know nothing but defensive warfare.”

In a letter to Godolphin, Marlborough recapitulates the incidents of his march.

“*Soignies, August 15.*—I was in hopes this might have given you an account of some action; for on Friday we marched to Nivelles, and camped about half a league from Seneff, where the french army was encamped. We came too late for attacking them that evening. As soon as it was dark, they began to make their retreat, without making the least noise, not touching either drum or trumpet; so that the count de Tilly, whom I had detached with 40 squadrons and 5000 grenadiers to attack their rear guard, in case they should march, knew nothing of their marching till daylight; so that their rear guard was got into the inclosures before he could join them, so that there

was very little done. Our loss was three officers and some few soldiers. I believe theirs was also very inconsiderable ; but by these four days' march they have lost very considerably by desertion ; for we gave them no rest, so that they were two days without bread. They were in one continued march from Friday night from Seneff, till Sunday 12 o'clock, to Cambron ; so that they may now have their bread from Mons. This army is also very much fatigued, so that I shall be obliged to take three or four days' rest in this camp, and then I shall march towards Ath.

“ M. Vendome's avoiding twice to fight within these four days, I hope will convince our friends, as well as enemies, that his orders are not to venture. The consternation that has been amongst their common soldiers ought to assure us of victory, if we can ever engage them ; but as they will not venture, they are now in a country where they may march from one strong camp to another, and so end the campaign, which I fear they will do.

“ I have this morning had the favour of yours of the 27th, by which I see you think this may be a proper time to attempt on the coast of France. The season is very much advanced ; but if you have any fixed project settled with the officer that is to command, if you would let me know it, you may depend upon having three or four battalions as you desire ; for though the dutch should not be willing, I would take upon myself for so inconsiderable a number. But should you not be almost sure of success, I should not think it advisable for you to run into such an expence as unavoidably this

must be. But if you are sure that the people will join with you; and that they can be supported this winter; it ought not to be neglected. If I could have persuaded, the elector of Hanover had been at the army before now.

“ Count Dohna \* has been some days with me, and his account differs very much from that of the english officers concerning lord Galway.

“ My lord Peterborough has been here ever since Friday, and I believe thinks of staying some days longer. He assures me that he shall be able to convince yourself and lord Sunderland that many stories have been made of him, in which there is no truth, and that he hopes to justify himself in every particular to the queen’s satisfaction; that his intentions are to be employed by the queen, as she shall judge best; and that if she does not make use of him, that he may have her leave to serve elsewhere.

“ He has very obliging letters from the king of Spain; and the duke of Savoy has a kindness for him.”

During the visit of lord Peterborough, which Marlborough here announces, the justifications and complaints with which he had filled his letters while absent, were repeated even to satiety. After a stay of ten days he took his departure, apparently gratified with the polite and hospitable reception which he had experienced, and soothed by the judicious advice of his former patron. At his request, Marlborough gave him a letter of recom-

\* Count Dohna was the principal officer taken prisoner at the battle of Almanza.



mendation to Godolphin, but cautiously abstained from a general approbation of his conduct, and referred him to the queen and ministry, to whom he transmitted his written justification. The correspondence will spare the necessity of entering farther into the particulars of this visit.

*To the Duchess.*

“*Soignies, August 15.* — Since my last we have had one continued rain, so that neither the enemy nor we can stir out of our camps. I have at this time my winter clothes, and a fire in my chamber, but, what is worse, the ill weather hinders me from going abroad, so that lord Peterborough has the opportunity of very long conversations; what is said one day, the next destroys, so that I have desired him to put his thoughts in writing. My lord Peterborough has shewn me several obliging letters of the king of Spain to himself, which I can’t but wonder at, after what he has writ against him. He does also assure me that he is some thousand pounds the worse for the service, having lost two equipages, upon the whole, he swears, And I believe his estate is very much in debt.”

*To Lord Godolphin.*

“*Soignies, August 18.* — I have this morning had the favour of yours of the 31st and 1st of last month. I think your thought of the venetians is very good, but I very much question your bringing it to bear in any reasonable time; for that of landing in France, I gave you the trouble of my thoughts by the last post. I should have sent you the inclosed copies of the king of Spain’s letters some time since, but by a mistake they were forgot. I

also send you a copy of what I have received this morning from count Wratislaw, it giving more hopes of an accommodation than his last. But I am afraid at last he will find that the swedes presume so much on the favourable conjuncture, that they will be very unreasonable. It is not to be expressed the rains we have had, and that continue still, so that if the safety of the common cause depended upon our marching, neither the enemy nor we could stir out of our camps; for it is with the greatest difficulty that the generals get to my quarters for orders. All the comfort we have is, that the enemy do at least suffer as much as we.

“Sinzerling has acquainted me this day with the assurances he has had from her majesty, of her assisting the king his master; and pressed me at the same time that troops might be immediately sent. I have endeavoured to let him see that till we have more certainty of the expedition of Provence, nothing could be done; but, in the mean time, he ought to press the court of Vienna to have those troops in Naples ready to be transported, if that should be for the service.

“Lord Peterborough has said all that is possible to me, but says nothing of leaving the army. By what he tells me, he thinks he has demonstration to convince you, that he has been injured in every thing that has been reported to his disadvantage.”

“*Soignies, August 20.\** — My lord; as I have had the favour of lord Peterborough’s company ten days, he has not only shewn me, but left with

\* This is the ostensible letter of recommendation, of which Peterborough was the bearer.

me the copies of several letters, and resolutions of councils of war, to demonstrate the falsity of several facts maliciously reported of him. He has given me the enclosed paper of what he hears is reported against him. My having been so constantly abroad makes me ignorant, not only as to this paper, but also what other facts may be laid to his charge; but as he is resolved to acquaint you and lord Sunderland with every thing, in order the queen may have a true information, I shall say no more, but that as far as I am capable of judging, I verily think he has acted with great zeal.

“ I am, ever,

“ My lord,

“ Your most obedient, humble servant,

“ MARLBOROUGH.”

“ *Soignies, August 22.* — If we had had any tolerable weather we had staid but one night in this camp, but as the rains continue, God only knows when we shall be able to get out of it.

“ Lord Peterborough left us on Saturday. I have endeavoured to let him see, that for his own sake, he ought to clear the objections against him, in order to which, I have given him a letter for yourself; and he has promised me, that he will acquaint you and lord Sunderland with all he has to say. At the same time I must acquaint you, that by what I am told of his discourses, he will not be governed; but I have said so much to him, that I hope you will have it in your power to make him easy, which may prevent much mischief, as he will most certainly run into the notion of Hanover, and



all other things that may be cross. The opinion of the elector of Hanover should be made as public as possible; for I very much fear, that this very next winter the queen may receive mortification on that subject.

“ I see by yours of the 5th, which I received last night, that you are of the opinion that the chief command should be left to the king of Spain and his generals. I think the best argument that can be given in Portugal is, that her majesty being resolved to leave only a lieutenant-general in Spain, they ought to do the same, by which that matter would be settled. But as for the number of troops that should go from Italy, I can know no certainty till the return of brigadier Palmes.

“ I believe it is very true that the king of Sweden has no engagement with France; but his unaccountable obstinacy, and the little knowledge he has of the affairs of Christendom, may make him take engagements this winter; especially, if it be true what is writ from Paris, of the duke of Savoy's having attacked the retrenchment, and being repulsed with considerable loss. The inclosed from count Wratislaw is what I have received since my last, and is the only one which gives me some hopes of an accommodation. My trumpet is this minute returned from the french army, and says they have no news from Toulon, since the 9th, so that the duke of Savoy's being repulsed is false.”

*To the Duchess.*

“ *Soignies, August 22.* — I do assure you I did not mean the whigs when I spoke of ingratitude, but I meant it in general to England; and if you

will do me justice, you must believe that I have done all the good offices that are possible, at this distance. I do not say this to make my court to the whigs, but that I am persuaded it was good for my country, and for the service of the queen; for I do really believe that the tories will do all they can to mortify the queen and England; for I am now both at an age and humour, that I would not be bound to make my court to either party, for all that this world could give me. Besides, I am so disheartened, that when I shall have done my duty, I shall submit to Providence; but, as a friend, I will foretell you the unavoidable consequence, if the whigs mortify the lord treasurer, that he will be disheartened, and Mr. Harley have the power and credit of doing what he pleases. This I know will hurt both the queen and England, but I see no remedy."

"*Soignies, August 25.* — Since yours, in which you desire I should look on the seals, I have done it for two or three posts, and I am very confident they have not been touched. As long as you are careful to send them to Mr. secretary Harley, you may be sure they will come safe. The continued ill weather we have had, which keeps us in this camp, gives me the spleen, for it is not in this place I would stay.

"If lord Peterborough should, when he comes to England, at any time write to you, pray be careful what answer you make, for sooner or later it will be in print.

"Most of your letters being full of fears for this winter, I can't forbear assuring you, that I would

not only wish prosperity and quietness to the queen, but I would take pains and venture any hazard to make her business go well ; so that for God's sake, if you think I can contribute, let me know it. For I can assure you, that if we have not success at Toulon, there will be this winter a great deal of uneasiness in most of the foreign courts ; so that should we, at the same time, have divisions in England, how could the war be carried on with vigour this next campaign, which must be done to bring France to reason ?”

*To Lord Godolphin.*

“ *Soignies, August 25.* — I send you inclosed a copy of the pensioner's letter with my answer, that on the descent, and the oaths to be given this country, as well as the barrier. I should be glad to be directed what I might say farther on those points. It is near six weeks since I have had any thing directly from Provence, and what we have by the way of Paris can't be relied on. If we should not succeed at Toulon, I find by all my letters from Holland, that they shall be very much disheartened ; so that our friends fear they will not be able to make them act with vigour. But I hope the contrary, if the king of Sweden gives no disturbance ; so that I could wish your thoughts might be employed to see if you can't find some proposition that might be made to him, to bring him more into the interest of the allies.

“ Having writ thus far, I this minute received yours of the 8th. What you say of prince Eugene, we can have no just thoughts of, till the return of Mr. Palmes. I have this morning received letters



of the 20th, 24th, and 29th of the last month, from Mr. Chetwynd, and others from the army in Provence ; and I am sorry to tell you, that I observe by all of them, that there is not that friendship and reliance between the duke of Savoy and prince Eugene as should be wished, for making so great a design succeed. I beg this may be known to nobody but yourself and the queen, hoping God may reconcile them, and make them act for the best.

“ By my letter I received this morning of the 17th from Mr. Robinson, he thinks the king of Sweden is resolved not to be reconciled to the emperor. I do not send his letter, not doubting but he writes the same thing to Mr. secretary Harley. The desire you have that the States should enter into stricter measures with the czar, may be right, if the emperor and king of Sweden should not agree ; but the inclosed I send of count Wratislaw of the 17th from Leipsig, gives great hopes. I have also a letter from count Rechteren of the 10th from Vienna, that assures me the emperor has agreed as to the point of religion, desired in favour of the silesians by the king of Sweden.

“ I have received another letter from general Erle ; he presses very much to come home. He should either be made easy in that service, or have leave to return. If you shall see it practicable, and for the service, to make a descent this year, I would recommend Withers rather than Ingolsby ; for the first is very brave and diligent, and will make no other demands than what are absolutely necessary ; the other will be desiring a train of

artillery, and such expences as you will not be able to comply with ; but upon the whole, if we do not succeed in Provence, it will not be reasonable to attempt the landing of men this year. A very little time will clear this matter ; for I reckon brigadier Palmes was with the duke of Savoy about ten days ago, so that I may hear from him in a week."

*To the Duchess.*

" *Soignies, August 29.* — I have had yours of the 10th, and your note of the 12th, with Vanbrugh's letter, by which I see the hall and saloon must be left for next year. As our business of this year goes, I am afraid it will be time enough, especially if the news we have from France be true, which says that the french made a sally on the duke of Savoy on the 15th, by which we suffered very much.

" If you have good reason for what you write of the kindness and esteem the queen has for Mrs. Masham and Mr. Harley, my opinion should be, that the lord treasurer and I should tell her majesty what is good for herself ; and if that will not prevail, to be quiet, and let Mr. Harley and Mrs. Masham do what they please ; for I own I am quite tired, and if the queen can be safe, I shall be glad. I hope lord treasurer will be of my mind, and then we shall be much happier than by being in a perpetual struggle ; for if lord treasurer and I have lost the confidence of the queen, it would be the greatest folly in the world in us, to act so as the world may think as they now do, that it is in our power to do every thing, by which we shall not

only be made uneasy, but lose our reputation both at home and abroad. I shall always be ready to sacrifice my life for the quiet and safety of the queen, but I will not be imposed upon by any body that has power with her; for as I have served her with all my heart, and all the sincerity imaginable, I think I deserve the indulgence of being quiet in my old age."

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"*Soignies, August 24.* \* \* \* \* The weather beginning to be good†, I intend to make the cannon and baggage march to-morrow, and the army the next day. I believe the french will march from Cambron before I pass the Dender; for it is very plain they will avoid the coming to action. I shall take care as soon as I can for the exchange of Macartney; but I beg that none of the prisoners in England may have any encouragement, for the french do not use us well, pretending to govern absolutely in the exchange of prisoners, by making their choice; for at this minute they act as if they were our masters."

The treasurer, who had looked with anxiety to the military operations of his friend, in the hope that a successful engagement would allay the domestic feuds, participated in his mortification. To make amends for the disappointment, he recurred to his favourite scheme of a descent on the french coast; and suggested a subsidiary alliance with the venetians, for the purpose of increasing the disposable force in Italy. The close of the

† The former part of the letter being political is inserted in chapter 62.



letter, in which he imparts these plans, merits particular attention; because it conveys his opinion on a proposal made by Harley, to arrest lord Peterborough, and bring him to a public trial for his conduct.

“ *Windsor, August 15.-26.*—I am to acknowledge the favour of your letters from Soignies, of the 15th and of the 18th, with the several letters and papers inclosed, which I shall be sure to keep very carefully, according to your directions.

“ By yours of the 15th, the french seem to have very narrowly escaped your hand, and I doubt the very ill weather, and the country in which they now are, will secure them from falling any more this year into the same dangers. This I reckon will put you in a condition of more easily sparing three or four regiments for our descent, in case the season of the year and other circumstances will admit of our putting it in execution.

“ It is impossible to be sure that any attempt of this kind shall succeed, but all the assurances from those parts are very encouraging to it; besides that, we know all the force of France is at this time moving towards Provence, and their people, on this side, left both unguarded, and also in many places organized, for fear of revolts. With your assistance, I see we might be able to have about 6000 foot and about 1000 horse and dragoons, which, if they were well on the other side, I should think might be sufficient, with a good man at their head, to make themselves masters of Rochfort and Xaintes, which opens to them the provinces of Xaintonges and Angoumois, where the protestants

are the most numerous, and the people said to be the best disposed of any. But all this will turn upon having a proper person at the head, and in a great measure also, upon success at Toulon, which I hope is in a good way; tho' all the french accounts endeavour to fright us very much with their good posture there, and the great preparations they are making to disappoint the duke of Savoy's design upon that place.

“ I am glad you have no other objection to the venetian troops, but your doubt of their not coming in time; for they are certainly nearer at hand than any others whatever, except those which the emperor has in Italy already. I am very glad to find by Sir Philip Meadows's last letters, that he is in hopes the imperial court will be early in letting us have some of the troops from Naples, for strengthening the duke of Savoy's army, which I take to be equally useful to us, as if they let us have them for Catalonia.

“ I doubt the elector of Hanover will not be willing to let the saxon troops, now upon the Rhine, advance towards Italy, because he is so pressing to have others from you; but I think it is very plain there will be no farther occasion for them this year where they now are, unless the elector would shew more diligence and vigour than his motions hitherto seem to promise, or indeed, than the season of the year seems now to admit of.

“ I inclose to you a letter I had lately from Mr. secretary Harley, which I desire you not to lose, that you may see his thoughts concerning lord Peterborough. I must own to you, at the same

time, that if one could imagine there were the least truth in what lord Peterborough has taken so much pains to profess to you, my own opinion would be, not to make him desperate, till he had first given clear demonstration. It was impossible for him not to be troublesome; but in this, as in all other things, I can submit to better judgments, and I incline to think that the opinion of lords Halifax, Somers, and Sunderland, would, *in this particular*, be the same that Mr. secretary Harley seems to have.

“ I have written to my lord Manchester by this post in my lord Sunderland’s absence; that he would lose no time in proposing to the venetians to come into the great alliance, upon promising subsidies for ten or twelve thousand men, to join the duke of Savoy, and giving them assurances of taking care of their interests at the general peace; and that no peace shall be made without their participation.”

The letter from secretary Harley to lord Godolphin, to which allusion is here made, is too singular to be omitted, particularly when we consider the situation of the secretary, and his subsequent approbation of Peterborough’s conduct.

“ *Wednesday, August 13.* — Your lordship will see what Mr. Robinson writes to me apart, in answer to my queries about lord Peterborough. I confess it is none of my business, and therefore I beg your lordship’s pardon, if my zeal run before my discretion, when I offer to your lordship’s consideration what should be done with lord Peterborough as soon as he arrives. Should he not give



an account in writing of his proceedings, and that being represented to the committee, if not to the council, and if it appears he has acted contrary to his instructions, ought he not to be committed? It is true he will be admitted to bail, but he may be tried by a common jury for a misdemeanor. I need not specify the reasons for it, they seem to be obvious. It is better to find him work to clear himself, than leave him leisure to do mischief. I must again beg pardon for offering my thoughts, to which I have no motive but the honour of the queen, and the service of her ministers."

In the next letter we find Godolphin reverting to the feuds in the cabinet, and the embarrassments arising from the influence of Mrs. Masham and Harley.

" *Windsor, August 16.-27.* — Mr. Hare came hither yesterday, and finding he resolved to return to you by the very next packet boat, I have a mind to mention some particular things to you, by a safe hand, which I should not care to venture by the post.

" I reckon one great occasion of Mrs. Morley's obstinacy, and of the uneasiness she gives herself and others, especially about the clergy, proceeds from an inclination of talking more freely than usual to Mrs. Masham; and this is laid hold of and improved by Mr. secretary Harley, upon all such matters, if not upon others, to insinuate his notions, which, in these affairs, you know by your own experience, from the conversation we had together before you left England, are as wrong as possible. I am apt also to think he makes use of the same

person, to improve all the ill offices to the whigs, which both he and that person are as naturally inclined to, as the queen is to receive the impressions of them.

“ Now this must needs do a great deal of mischief, and I am afraid we shall find the effects of it in the winter, if a timely remedy be not put to it, which I think cannot be done but by you and me speaking very plainly at the same time to Mrs. Morley, both of Mr. Harley and a great many things, and settling a rule for preventing, before it is too late, all the uneasiness for the future. But how this will be done in time I cannot see, unless your affairs on that side will allow of your being here some time before the meeting of the parliament; and to satisfy you of how great importance it is, that you should be here before that time, is the chief reason of my giving you this trouble.”

“ *Windsor, Aug. 22.—Sept. 2.* — I have the favour of yours of the 22d and 25th, and am very sorry you have had so much bad weather: we have had our share of that, and therefore I hope you have yours of the fine weather we have here at this time.

“ I have not yet heard of lord Peterborough, though our letters from the Hague tell us he was to come over in the last packet boat; but whatever he shall say, it cannot be relied on. He will be governed by his animosities or his interest. I cannot answer which of them will prevail.”

## CHAPTER 61.

1707.

*Movement of Marlborough from Soignies to Ath and Helchin, and retreat of the french to the vicinity of Lille.—Failure of the enterprise against Toulon.—Retreat of the combined forces into Piemont, and capture of Susa.—Disputes between the courts of Vienna and Turin.—Correspondence on that subject, on the domestic affairs of England, on the plan for the succeeding campaign, and on the proposal for Eugene to command in Spain.*

THE rains having at length ceased, Marlborough quitted Soignies on the first of September, and directing his march upon Ath, passed the Dender, with the view of turning the hostile position at Chievres. But the enemy, instead of awaiting his approach, fell back to the Scheld, in order to avail themselves of the protection afforded by their great fortresses. The fatigues of this arduous march did not prevent the duke from transmitting the detail of his movements, nor from giving his opinion on the suggestions contained in the letter from Godolphin, dated August 15.—27.

“*Ath, Sept. 1.*—You will know by the letters of this day, upon our marching hither, the enemy decamped in great haste, and I believe our march to-morrow will oblige them to pass the Scheld. The deputies are convinced, that if we had made



the march to Genappe two months ago, when I pressed for it, the duke of Vendome would have been obliged to retire as he now does.

“ I know nothing of the duke of Savoy’s quitting the siege of Toulon, but what I am told by the duke of Vendome’s trumpet, who says it was on the 22d. I believe this will naturally put a stop to the descent you intended ; and if you have good reason for a descent, as yours of the 15th seems to think, it is most certain that early in the year, when they have the whole summer before them, is a much properer time.

“ What Mr. secretary Harley says in his letter concerning lord Peterborough may be right ; but I think as you do, that you must take no step in that matter but in conjunction with lord Somers, lord Halifax, and lord Sunderland, and, if possible, with lord Wharton also, or he will play you tricks. By what I have heard lord Peterborough say, I believe he thinks he can justify himself in every particular ; but I should think it is impossible to justify the application of the money ; for whenever you have those accounts, I believe you will find the greatest confusion imaginable, so that I think Mr. Bridges should make himself master of that account as soon as possible.

“ Upon this ill news from Provence, I am already pressed by M. de Quiros that immediate orders might be given for sending troops to king Charles. Till I know what the duke of Savoy’s and prince Eugene’s projects may be, by Mr. Palmes, who, I believe, might leave them as soon as they marched from Toulon, I shall not be able

to give any answer. In the mean time I should be glad to know what your thoughts in England are, as to that point. The enclosed from count Wratislaw \* I received this morning; you will see it gives more reason for hopes than Mr. Robinson's letters."

Resuming his march on the 5th, Marlborough crossed the Scheld above Oudenard, and encamped at Petteghem, from which place he thus announces his movements.

"*Sept. 5.*—Since my last we have made three marches in order to pass the Scheld, which we have done this morning. We shall stay in this camp to-morrow, and the next day march to Helchin, by which we shall oblige the enemy to eat up their own country, which I am afraid is all the hurt we are likely to do them; for I am very confident they will be careful not to give occasion for action."

Advancing on the 7th along the tongue of land bounded by the Scheld and the Lys, Marlborough established his left at Helchin, where he took up his head quarters, and extended his right to Belleghem. This bold and decisive movement alarmed the enemy, and, as he had foreseen, they immediately crossed the Scheld and withdrew to the strong post of Pont à Tressin, which was covered by a series of new lines, formed behind the Marque, and protected by the cannon of Lille.

During his continuance in the stationary camp at Helchin, Marlborough received the first intelli-

\* Alluding to the successful progress of the negotiation with the king of Sweden.

gence of the unfortunate failure before Toulon, and the retreat of the combined forces into Piemont.

To the success of this momentous enterprise, which had held all Europe in anxious suspense, the british ministry had confidently looked, as a compensation for the misfortune in Spain, and as the means of extorting from France a peace no less honourable than secure. Their exertions were commensurate with the magnitude of the object. The cares of Marlborough were long called forth in providing ample means of aggression; and no resource was omitted to stimulate the zeal of the two powers employed in the execution. But it was beyond human foresight to calculate on the effects of jarring interests and passions, or to devise expedients for combining contradictory elements in one uniform and consistent plan. By importunities, threats, and largesses, the concurrence of the courts of Vienna and Turin had indeed been extorted; but no efforts could soothe their jealousies or obviate their contentions. The first and most prominent obstacle arose from the suspicion fostered by the imperial court against that of England, and the fears they entertained, lest the destruction of the french marine in the Mediterranean would be the prelude to a separate peace between France and the Maritime Powers. Similar jealousies existed between the courts of Turin and Vienna, and the interest which the duke of Savoy appeared to manifest in the enterprise, was a sufficient reason for the aversion with which it was regarded by the emperor. The rivalry which reigned in the cabinet extended its influence



to the field, and created the same disunion between the duke of Savoy and Eugene, in their capacity of generals, as between the duke and the emperor in their capacity of sovereigns. As early as June we find the duke of Savoy expressing his indignation at the obstacles and mortifications which he endured, and declaring, that were it not from respect for the queen of England, he would instantly quit the alliance. On the other hand, the imperial court were not sparing of their censures and insinuations. They expatiated on his selfish and encroaching policy, and ascribed his opposition to the enterprise against Naples, to a secret wish of preserving that crown for his son-in-law, the duke of Anjou. Eugene also not only re-echoed the accusations of his court, and incessantly dwelt on the danger and difficulties of the design in which he was unwillingly engaged; but treated the complaints of the duke of Savoy with regard to his want of authority, as proofs of an intention to avert from himself the blame of a failure, which he considered as inevitable.

The effects of these disputes were felt at every step of this ill-fated enterprise. In addition to the diminution of force, occasioned by the detachment for the invasion of Naples, no recruits appeared to fill up the vacancies in the austrian ranks, and day after day was spent in combating objections and obviating delays. An enterprise commenced under such auspices, afforded but a faint prospect of success.

The 25,000 auxiliaries in the pay of the maritime powers were united with the troops of Savoy and Austria, and a fleet of forty sail, under the

command of admiral Shovel, hovered on the coast to maintain the communications by sea, and to co-operate in the intended attack. It was not till towards the latter end of June that the army was in a condition to move, and after the necessary garrisons were drafted for the protection of Italy, the whole collective force did not exceed 35,000 men. They scaled the Col di Tende, forced the passage of the Var, and traversing the rugged country bordering the Mediterranean, reached the camp of La Vallette, in the vicinity of Toulon, on the 26th of July, the fleet at the same time appearing before the mouth of the harbour.

The garrison of Toulon scarcely exceeded 8000 men, the works were in ill condition, and the new defences, which had been projected to resist the peril of the moment, were yet incomplete. The troops, elated at the sight of the goal which appeared to bound their enterprise, anxiously expected the orders for an immediate assault, and such an effort would doubtless have been crowned with success. The expectation of all was raised to the highest pitch, when the two commanders ascended the heights, to survey the town and works, and the presence of the admiral indicated the ready co-operation of the fleet. But a sudden damp seized the spirits of the soldiery when orders were given, which announced the abandonment of an assault, and the preparations for regular approaches. As the infantry did not exceed 23,000, it was obviously impossible to invest the town, and cut off the communication with the interior; but the confederate commanders were too far engaged to retreat with honour. Orders were issued to bring

the heavy cannon from the fleet, and on the 30th of July general Reh binder, with 3000 men, occupied the commanding heights of St. Catharine. But the time which had been wasted in deliberations and disputes, enabled the french court to mature their measures of resistance. Marshal Tessé, to whom the command in Provence was entrusted, was hourly joined by reinforcements from the most distant quarters, whose advance was facilitated by all the means which the country afforded; and the efforts of the government were seconded by the sacrifices and exertions of the nobility and people. Before the allies were prepared to commence a siege, he approached with 20 fresh battalions, and occupied an intrenched camp on the opposite side of the town, while a second force was collecting of troops drawn from Catalonia and Roussillon; and detachments from the Netherlands and the Rhine successively arrived to swell the numbers engaged in the defence. On the 18th of August, the force of the enemy amounted to no less than 70 battalions.

In these circumstances the enterprise became hopeless. After some successful attacks of posts, the allies were embarrassed by the want of supplies, and menaced by the force gathering around them. Having no alternative but to abandon their design, they relinquished their posts, re-embarked the cannon and stores, and on the 22d commenced their retreat. After a toilsome march of ten days they arrived at the Var, unmolested by the enemy; and on the 14th of September, again traversing the Col di Tende, reached the point, from which they



had commenced their expedition, with a force diminished to half the number. Eugene himself announced this disgraceful retreat to Marlborough, in a style and tone, which shewed how little interest the imperial court had taken in the success of the enterprise.

“ *La Vallette, August 20.* — The siege of Toulon is every day more and more impossible, on account of the enemy's force and situation, and the strength of their artillery. By the enclosed plan, your highness will see their camp flanked on the right by the town, with more than 130 pieces of artillery, exclusive of the fire from the two ships moved into the harbour; and on the left covered by inaccessible rocks, while the cannon-shot of the place reaches even to the mountains.

“ They had originally 40 \* battalions, and a regiment of dragoons. They have been since reinforced by 72 or 73 battalions, and about 40 squadrons, which threaten our flanks under Medavi. I know not from whence troops from all quarters daily join them. The contrary winds prevent our receiving any intelligence from the fleet, and hinder the galliots and boats from advancing, altho' they have only a hundred paces to traverse; and altho' since the capture of Fort Louis, they might have bombarded the harbour and town without risk. For three days we have bombarded the town by land, with a few mortars. Marshal Tessé de-

\* This estimate is exaggerated by prince Eugene, to extenuate the failure; for we learn from the prince of Hesse, that on their arrival before Toulon, this french force consisted of only twenty battalions; and that Tessé did not join with twenty more till three days after.

clares that the dukes of Burgundy and Berry are speedily expected, that the duke of Berwick will be here to-morrow, and that by the 24th, their force will be increased to 164 battalions, and a considerable corps of cavalry. It is certain that a reinforcement of foot is marching from Roussillon, under M. d'Arene. We are embarking the sick, wounded, and artillery, that we may march without incumbrance. Medavi threatens to occupy the posts in our rear; but I believe he will think twice before he risks an action. I have to-day concerted measures with the admiral, and we have agreed to finish our arrangements at the Var, with the hope that brigadier Palmes will be there, and that I shall know your highness's intention, and what has been projected in England and Holland. This country needs a speedy remedy, and it is necessary that the allies should take just measures, without throwing the burthen from one to the other. I hope also to receive news from Vienna; for, to form a project, one must be acquainted with every thing. If I could speak with your highness, it would perhaps be more advantageous for the public good, and I should have the pleasure of assuring you, &c."\*

It is needless to make any farther comments on this unfortunate expedition; because the facts speak for themselves. The misunderstanding which had manifested itself between the two courts, and two commanders, in the course of the enterprise, broke forth with redoubled violence on its failure. Complaints and recriminations re-echoed

\* Translated from the original in french.

on every side; and the result not only frustrated the sanguine hopes of Marlborough, but convinced him that the two courts could never be again brought to unite, for the attainment of a common object, nor the two generals be associated in any future command.

The only fruit of a campaign which occasioned such sacrifices, and created such expectations, was the capture of Susa, which was reduced at the instigation of the duke of Savoy, who was anxious to close the avenues into Piemont, and open a way into Dauphiné. After this exploit, in the beginning of October, the imperialists retired into Lombardy, the palatines marched to embark for Catalonia, and the hessians took the route towards Germany. These movements sufficiently indicated the abandonment of offensive operations on the side of Italy.\*

The failure of this enterprise created equal alarm and embarrassment both in England and abroad. The whole attention of the british cabinet was employed to counteract the dangerous consequences which it was expected to produce; and under the first impulse of disappointment, we find several interesting letters from Godolphin, conveying suggestions for the plan of the ensuing campaign. From the experience of the preceding year, he argued that no effort could be expected from the dutch and germans; and pressed the necessity of maintaining the defensive in Italy, Germany, and

\* Letters from Mr. Chetwynd, the british envoy, to the duke of Marlborough and lord Sunderland — From the duke of Savoy, prince Eugene, the prince of Hesse, general Rehbender, and count Wratisslaw to the duke; and from the Journal of the baron de St. Hippolite.



even in the Netherlands, while the principal efforts were made in Spain, and on the coast of France. For this purpose, he proposed to collect troops from all quarters, particularly from the Venetians, and princes of the empire; and even urged that an attempt should be made to obtain subsidiary forces from the king of Sweden, whose army he conceived would become burthensome to his finances, in consequence of his accommodation with the emperor. Above all, he exhorted Marlborough to obtain from the court of Vienna considerable detachments from the army in Naples, and to send them with such succours as could be drawn from Italy, under the command of Eugene, to give a new impulse to the affairs of the allies in Spain. This measure he contended would be extremely popular in England, and consequently receive the cordial support of parliament; and he suggested every argument of gratitude or policy, which he conceived likely to weigh with the court of Vienna.

Collaterally with these suggestions, he recommended the speedy return of Marlborough to England, and desired him to solicit the mission of Zinzendorf or Wratislaw from Vienna, that he might arrange the projects for the ensuing campaign at the Hague, without prolonging his stay on the continent.\* His views were, however, turned to more practicable schemes; and his opinion on these and other subjects is sufficiently manifested in his letters, intermingled with reflections on the domestic policy of England.

\* Letters from lord Godolphin, July 28.—August 8. July 31. August 7.—18, and August 12.—23.

*To the Duchess.*

“ *Helchin, Sept. 8.* — By the last post I was so tired, and received yours so late, that I had neither time nor force to answer it. I am sorry for what you write concerning my brother George. It is certain he is a very indiscreet tory, and has so little judgment, that he is capable of any indiscretion ; but I am very sure he would not say or do any thing, that he thought might prejudice the queen or her government.

“ I am very glad to find by yours, that the queen has it in her thoughts to give the white staff to the duke of Devonshire\* ; for I think him a very honest man, and that he will prove a very useful one.”

*To Lord Godolphin.*

“ *Helchin, Sept. 8.* — Your two last letters of the 16th and 19th, by the post and Mr. Hare, I have received. By both I see you had not received the ill news from Toulon. What you write concerning the queen, Mr. Harley, and Mrs. Masham, is of that consequence, that I think no time should be lost, in putting a stop to that management, or else to let them have it entirely in their own hands. I did mention this to you in a former letter, but have had no answer. I do not see any thing to the contrary, but that the campaign in this country might be finished by the end of October ; and I believe the elector of Hanover will be desirous to have a meeting, for settling the operations of the

\* William Cavendish, first duke of Devonshire, who took so active a part in the Revolution, died on the 18th of August 1707, and his place of lord high steward was given to his son, who inherited both his estates and patriotic principles.

next campaign. As yet I have heard nothing from himself, but his general here has told me that he believed it would be desired.

“ The danger Mr. Stepney is in, gives me a good deal of trouble, for I am afraid it will be very difficult to find a proper person to fill his place; for it must be one that is capable of the business of Flanders as well as that of Holland; but whilst there are any hopes of his life, I beg nobody may be spoke to. If I knew any body proper for this station, I would take the liberty of naming him; but as I know none, I hope you will think of somebody that has dexterity, and no pride. For if the queen be not very well served in this country, she will quickly feel the ill effects; for not only the people in this country, but the dutch also, must be pleased, which is a pretty hard task.

“ The weather is so very fine that I have begged of lady Marlborough to make a visit to Woodstock, and if your business will permit of it, I should be glad you would see it, tho’ but for one day. If I could fly, I would be there; but my fate is to row in this galley. If I can ever be so happy as to be free, I shall then endeavour to end my days in quiet, which is much more longed for, than I can express.

“ I open my letter to send you the inclosed, which I have received this minute. Prince Eugene’s letter should not be seen by any body but the queen.”

The first of these inclosures was from count Wratislaw, announcing the conclusion of the treaty with the king of Sweden, and attributing the suc-



cess principally to the support of England and Holland. He launched also into bitter invectives against the duke of Savoy. "Your highness," he concludes, "sees how the duke acts, and if our allies will let him go on, and will continue their confidence in him, to our exclusion, they will repent of it another day. You see also the sentiments of prince Eugene, with regard to next year. By the first post I will send you a paper in cypher, and beg that some person of fidelity may be intrusted with decyphering it, for the secret is of much importance."

The letter from prince Eugene was written to count Wratislaw, during the siege of Toulon, and is interesting, because it displays the interminable misunderstanding with the duke of Savoy, and announces the failure which soon afterwards took place.

"*La Vallette, August 4.* \* \* \* \* I believe this will find you returned from your journey; I wish it happy. It is very cruel that conjunctures should oblige one to commit such meannesses, but there is no remedy. What you write to the duke of Marlborough is just. With regard to myself, I will go wherever they wish me, if I have an army; and I declare that I will no longer be a subaltern, except to my masters, unless conjunctures should oblige me to pass the winter in this country, of which I am very doubtful.

"The duke of Savoy, with his usual policy, seeing the great difficulties, not to say impossibilities, of this operation, throws it entirely on me, in order not to disgust England and Holland,

who press him extremely, without listening to any reason. He does it with the more cunning, because he praises me on my capacity, and says I can do what I will. He answers them, on every thing, that they must address themselves to me, that he is much inclined to this operation, that he knows the consequence of it, but that he can do nothing, which I do not deem proper.

“ They are all enraged with me, and think that I wish not to risk the troops. I answer clearly, that I am accustomed to act according to the rules and reasons of war, every one knowing that I readily hazard, when I have the least appearance of succeeding; and that, from complaisance for England, and for a little envoy\* who is here, I shall not advise a thing, if I see it impossible; but, that if in spite of all, the allies and the duke will have it so, the troops of the emperor will not abandon them, and that I will omit nothing to succeed.

“ This is the state in which we are. By the journal and my relation, you will see the detail. It is the most difficult operation I have seen in my life. We are working at batteries; we will see the effect of them before we decide on a bombardment or a siege, at least this is my sentiment.

“ I do not doubt that strong detachments will arrive on all sides, the enemy having repassed the Rhine in Germany, being retired into quarters of refreshment in Spain, and the armies of Flanders inactive.”

\* Mr. Chetwynd.

*The Duke of Marlborough to Lord Godolphin.*

“ *Helchin, Sept. 12.*—I find by yours of the 22d, which I received last Friday, that you had not then received the ill news from Toulon.

“ By the letter I have received from Mr. secretary Harley, as well as by what you say of lord Peterborough, I find that he had not been with the queen, nor any body in her service, which I wonder at; for he told me he would, in the first place, wait upon you and lord Sunderland. He is very capable of pushing his animosities so far as to hurt himself, and give a good deal of trouble to others, which were to be wished might have been avoided, especially this winter.

“ What you say of the oaths of fidelity \* is very reasonable; but by the pensioner’s letters they are of another opinion, so that I believe they will not allow the oaths to be given. God knows what is best to be done in that matter; but I am afraid the business of the barrier, which is next to impossible to be settled, will occasion very great uneasiness between England and Holland. I can very easily keep it off till my return to the Hague, but then I must be instructed.

“ Don Quiros and M. Sinzerling have been with me. I have wrote by Sinzerling to the elector palatine, to know what number of his troops, paid by England and Holland, he will consent should go for Spain. As soon as I have an answer, you shall have it. I believe Holland will consent that those troops should be sent to Catalonia, and the

\* Alluding to the oaths of fidelity, which were proposed to be administered to the inhabitants of the conquered provinces.



truth is, we have no others that can go. By what we hear from France, they are sending back the duke of Berwick with the troops that came from Spain, and 4000 men more; and as they say, orders for attacking Gerona.

“ Now that the agreement is signed between the emperor and king of Sweden, I beg you will be careful of making any step with the muscovite ambassador that may give offence to the swedes; for should they return into the empire during the war, it would oblige us to make an ill peace with France.

“ You will see by the copy of the letter I sent you by the last, of prince Eugene, that he and the duke of Savoy cannot serve any more in the same army; and the elector of Hanover being in possession of the command in the empire, I see no place where he can serve but in Spain, in which place I am afraid we cannot succeed. I long for the coming of Palmes, that I might know what the duke of Savoy and prince Eugene intend for the remainder of this campaign, and their thoughts for the next. It is now very plain that the french having no troops in Italy, enables them to be strong in all other places; so that we must think of strengthening the army on the Rhine and in this country, or the next year we shall be beaten in one, if not in both places. God knows how we shall be able to do this; but if we cannot, we shall run great hazard, notwithstanding the catalan regiments which lord Galway has raised, and which I hope your orders will put an end to.

“ I could wish for the queen's service and the

good of the common cause, that you would do all that is in your power for the raising those regiments of foot, which were taken at Almanza, by which you may have in the spring a body of foot to employ in a descent, if practicable. I should think the raising of these regiments very difficult, but that I am persuaded that the greatest part of the officers are at liberty, or vacant. When you shall resolve to take this method, I shall then press the States to do the same thing.

“ *Helchin, Sept. 15.*—Since my last I have had the favour of your two letters of the 25th and 29th. I think your thoughts for the affairs of Spain, and retrieving our misfortune at Toulon by strengthening the army in Italy by the venetians, if possible, are very right; but I am afraid you will find those people more backward. You will see by the inclosed, that the king of France promises the elector, that he shall have, the next campaign, an army strong enough for regaining Brabant.

“ I am not concerned for what may happen here the next campaign, in comparison of the apprehensions I have for the queen’s business this winter in England. If that goes well, I hope we may be able to struggle with the french in this country.

“ I am sorry to see you are of opinion that lord Galway will not care to go to Portugal; for there he might do service, and where he is, I think it is impossible.

“ I think it might be for the queen’s service and the public good, to endeavour to persuade the States to make an augmentation for carrying on the war with more vigour, or we shall never come

to a good peace. Whatever you say to Vriberg, must at the same time be said at the Hague.

“ The french intending this day to forage at Templeuve, I marched thither with 20,000 foot, and 5000 horse. Upon their having notice, they did not suffer their foragers nor escort to leave their camp; but suffered me to forage the whole country, though I was three leagues from my own camp, and not a league from theirs; but they will venture nothing this year.

“ You will see a letter I sent lady Marlborough, which I received by the last post from lord Peterborough. By that you will see that he intends to be in good temper; but I confess I cannot understand the meaning of his not waiting upon the queen, and that there is no notice taken of it. In my poor opinion, you should resolve to be pleased, or to be very angry.”

“ *Helchin, Sept. 19.* — The inclosed is a copy of a letter I have received from count Wratislaw, and all in cypher. I am afraid his characters are very just. However, his project, in my opinion, is very dangerous at this time; but I have not, nor shall give any answer to it, till I hear from you.

“ As to your desire of prince Eugene’s going to Spain, I think he can serve no where else; for I dare say he will not serve under the elector of Hanover, nor can he serve with the duke of Savoy. I shall incline to think, as Sir Edward Seymour said in the house of commons, that he never knew admiral or general that had ships or troops enough.

“ I am of opinion that the war will be decided.



in this country by a battle early in the next campaign, for they see that no success in any other part of the world can get them peace; so that I am persuaded they will have a very great struggle here at the opening of the field. However, I shall endeavour to govern myself agreeably to what you think will please in England. If you have any particular place, in which you think great service might be done, by a descent, that ought to be known to none but England and Holland, and I think might very easily be accommodated with the service of this country, for a descent can't be put in practice till the beginning of July, and before that time I dare say we shall have decided the business here; for if we have not a battle before that time, we may ship the troops to Ostend, which will not give so much notice to France as if they were shipped from England."

The letter from count Wratislaw, which accompanied the preceding, conveyed an additional proof of the perverseness of the imperial court, in continuing their endeavours to alienate the Maritime Powers from the duke of Savoy.

"The last post I gave your highness notice of my arrival at Vienna, and that the ratification of the treaty was in the hands of the king of Sweden; so that I flatter myself his army will pass thro' Silesia without stopping, altho' his march, in consequence of the excesses which the officers encourage the soldiers to commit, will cost us immense sums, and will diminish our finances to such a degree, as to shackle the efforts of the ensuing campaign.

“ Your highness may be persuaded that this court will faithfully execute the treaty recently concluded. Nevertheless, we cannot flatter ourselves that Sweden will leave us in repose; and I beg leave to recall to your recollection, what I had the honour of representing to you in my last letter from Leipsic, of the 3d of August, being always of opinion, that we ought to arm Denmark during the winter, that we may be able to dispose of her troops in the spring as we think best. The Maritime Powers ought not to spare some hundred thousand crowns, which will be well expended, if we should be delivered from the embarrassing apprehensions, which have so much disquieted us during this campaign.

“ I conjure you then to finish the treaty before you return to England, for which the States seem well inclined; and the english ministers will be responsible to the public, should they continue to persuade themselves of the good dispositions of the king of Sweden towards the common cause.

\* \* \* \* \*

“ The retreat of our army from Toulon justifies the court of Vienna, and proves it to have been more correct in its predictions than that of England, which was so urgent for the invasion of Provence, an enterprise shewn by experience to have been impracticable. I have long intreated your highness that such approbation and facility should not have been given in England to the projects of the duke of Savoy. What is past, sufficiently shews his intentions. You see, at present, that all his views are directed to create misunderstandings

between the court of Vienna and the Maritime Powers, in order to render himself master of your opinions, and ruin the credit of the emperor. He insinuates, through the means of lord Peterborough and others, that it is the interest of the Maritime Powers to procure for him the Milanese, for the purpose of establishing a third power in Italy, which being more attentive to economy than to the house of Austria, would prove a balance to France in that quarter. This poison, however subtle and insinuating, is too apparent to deceive persons so enlightened as you, and who reflect on the conduct of the duke of Savoy in all times. For doubtless he will make the same insinuations to France, under the pretext of limiting the power of the house of Austria, and thus render the interests of both parties subservient to his own views, which are only for his own aggrandisement. Whatsoever may be said to the contrary, you will never have an ally more sure and more necessary than the house of Austria; while the duke of Savoy, whatever accession of power he may obtain, will always be a mercenary, and will never act against France, except under new and advantageous conditions. Whereas, if he is retained in a situation less considerable than that to which he aspires, he will always be necessitated to join the allies, or see his territory become the theatre of war. I do not affirm that we ought not to conciliate the duke of Savoy, and must grant what we have promised; but, at the same time, distrust his personal conduct and advice, and not be the dupes of his suggestions, as we have been this year. Far from placing the



same confidence in him as we have lately done, we ought to place our confidence in each other, and mutually communicate what insinuations may be made on his part."

After expatiating on the necessity of forming a plan for the next campaign, he hints at the conquest of Sicily, and adds, that it should be promptly undertaken, lest France should have time to repair its shattered marine, and render the enterprise more difficult. The english fleet, he observes, might winter either at Palermo or Messina, and thus at once cover Naples, and deliver Barcelona from the danger of a siege, as well as open the Mediterranean for the passage of succours to Spain. He complained that this design had not been sufficiently promoted in England; that no attention had been paid to form a regular plan for conducting the military operations in Spain, or for sending immediate succours; and that even no answer had been given to their proposals, except that nothing could be settled, till the result of the expedition against Toulon was known. And as the news of its ill success had not then reached England, and the fleet had returned to Lisbon, there could, he urged, be no time for subsidiary treaties with the german princes, and no troops could be dispatched to Spain.

"I have long," he adds, "declared that the emperor is incapable of sending his troops into Spain, and defraying the expences of the war; for how can it be supposed possible that his imperial majesty can do so, when the rebels ravage on one side his hereditary countries, and the swedes ruin

Silesia? It is quite chimerical to dictate to us terms of peace with the rebels, which can never be carried into effect; for experience evidently proves that Ragotski has rejected all conditions, even the most advantageous, which were proposed to him last year; and I entreat you, prince, to consider this as a certain truth, and not suffer yourself to be amused on that subject, by any person whatever.

“ In the present state of our affairs we cannot cede Transilvania to him, without placing ourselves in a much worse situation, since the loss of Transilvania will inevitably draw us into a war with the turks, and without that cession Ragotski will never enter into an accommodation.

“ To prove, however, the anxiety of the emperor to assist his brother, he is willing to exceed his powers, and has ordered prince Eugene to send to Barcelona 2000 foot and 1000 horse, provided admiral Shovel will engage for the expence of the transport, and the Maritime Powers will provide for their future subsistence. In a word, this is all which the allies have a right to expect from the court of Vienna, for the assistance of Spain. For we are not in a situation to charge ourselves with more expences; and the business of Sweden, besides a thousand reasons, will not permit us to spare more of our own troops.”

After touching on the difficulties in regard to the appointment of a commander for the imperial troops in Spain, the inactivity of the Low Countries, and the progress which the french had made on the Rhine, he continues, “ these considerations induce me to apprehend that the parliament will

be more agitated than ever, and that our enemies in England will use their best efforts to gain the superiority to our detriment. It is, therefore, more than ever necessary, in so alarming a crisis, that the conduct of both sides should be extremely prudent. On our part, we must not impute the ill success of this campaign to the counsels of the english ministry, in order not to discredit them with the nation ; while on your part you ought not to render us odious to a people, from whom we must draw the means of continuing the war.

He concluded with proposing that prince Eugene, or some other minister from the court of Vienna, should have a personal interview with Marlborough, to arrange the plan of future operations.

*From Lord Godolphin.*

“ *Windsor, Sept. 9.*—I am very much afraid the miscarriage of Toulon is owing to the little good understanding betwixt those two princes, or rather, in truth, betwixt the imperial court and the duke of Savoy ; for which reason I think little or nothing can be hoped from them in this year, nor I doubt in the next neither, unless measures are taken this winter, to remove and cure the jealousies between the emperor and the duke of Savoy. This makes me repeat once more to you the necessity of count Wratislaw’s meeting you at the Hague, at the end of the campaign, that both this thing, which is extremely essential, and also prince Eugene’s going into Spain, may be there concerted and settled. The latter of these will be a very popular thing in England, and very much contri-



bute to obtain the necessary subsidies in parliament.

“I am the more particular upon what relates to Spain and Italy, because those places being most remote, the necessary measures for carrying on the war there ought to be adjusted, in the first place; because else there will want time to put them in execution. Spain cannot be supported this winter without prince Eugene and some troops from Italy; and Italy cannot be made useful next year to the common cause, but by putting the duke of Savoy at the head of an army to act offensively against France, and by giving him the view and assurance of it immediately.”

After proposing to procure from the king of Sweden a body of troops to serve under the elector of Hanover, he adds, “as to Flanders, I am sorry to find you think there will be a necessity of augmenting that army. I doubt it will prove no small difficulty here to keep it upon the foot it now stands, considering how little fruit the dutch have suffered it to yield us this summer. Nor how they are like to be persuaded to any augmentation on their part, can I see much ground to hope. What you say of their aversion to let king Charles’s own subjects take the oath of fidelity to their sovereign, and of their renewing at this time their instances about settling their barrier, seem to me as if they sought rather for a handle to be cross, than really to join heartily with us in prosecuting the war. If they had, as they have not, any just pretension to the sovereignty of any part of Flanders hereafter, upon a peace, the taking the oath of fidelity to king

Charles in the mean time, till such stipulation be made, does not interfere with that pretension ; and as to their barrier, I continue of opinion that England never will, nor can admit, that Ostend should be in their possession, but in the possession of king Charles. That being granted, I think we might agree with them in the other desires they make as to their barrier, provided they will agree with us in an augmentation of their forces, and a vigorous prosecution of the war the next year. But for all these things poor Mr. Stepney will be extremely much wanted, for his condition is thought desperate by most people here ; and if it were possible for him to recover, it would be impossible for him to assist in these things, which come to bear immediately, and will continue all this winter to require a man in that station of the best sense and integrity. If you can spare Cadogan till spring, I believe he is the most sufficient for this service. But you are the best judge of the whole, as well as of this particular.

“ I doubt the season is too far spent for you to think of any siege, otherwise Ypres or Nieuport would open a way to Dunkirk next year, and consequently give a pleasing prospect to our people.

“ By our letters from Lisbon of the 3d, I find they will expect more regiments from us for the defence of their frontier, or take a handle from the want of them to make up with France and Spain. I think, therefore, we must send them two or three regiments more by this convoy.

“ By the next post the queen tells me she will give me an answer to your letter.”

*To Lord Godolphin.*

“*Helchin, Sept. 22.*—The winds have been so contrary that I believe this may come at the same time with what I wrote by Mr. Hill. Since that, I have received the enclosed letters concerning the march of the palatines for Catalonia. I have sent copies of them also to the pensioner, desiring him to lose no time in returning an answer, and that I should take upon me, in the queen’s name, so that the troops might be immediately sent; but I fear the States will not willingly promise what is desired by the elector.

“I have not yet seen brigadier Palmes, but expect him daily. I hope he will bring prince Eugene’s consent to serve in Spain, since you say it is what is desired in England. If there be need of it, I shall be sure to press him. Besides, as the commands are now settled, he can serve no where but in Spain or Hungary.

“The king of Sweden will certainly not come into the grand alliance, since that would put him out of all hopes of his mediatorship, with which we must continue to flatter him. For the troops of king Augustus, it is just that they should be entertained by the emperor and empire, but I fear they are not able to comply with the expence; however, they ought to be pressed by England and Holland.

“It were to be wished that we could please the portuguese, without sending any more troops, since they must be useless.”



## CHAPTER 62.

1707.

*Domestic affairs.—Pertinacity of the queen in the nomination of the two tory bishops.—Resentment of the whigs.—Their jealousy of Marlborough and Godolphin.—Continuation of the correspondence.*

WHILE the perplexing state of affairs abroad, and the embarrassments arising from the failure of the enterprise against Toulon called forth all the exertions of Marlborough, he experienced additional disquietude from the continued feuds in the cabinet, and the increasing jealousy of the whigs. He was now fully sensible of the secret cabals of Harley and Mrs. Masham, and their rapid advances in the favour of the queen; but he was convinced that the influence of Harley was too powerful to be eradicated, and either from the remains of former confidence, or from a reliance on his asseverations, he still flattered himself that he might venture to employ, as heretofore, his interest and services.

This apparent indecision, and the inflexible determination of the queen to persevere in the appointment of the two bishops, inflamed the resentment of the whigs; and they recurred, as before, to threats of a separation of interests, and parliamentary hostility. Their determination was an-

nounced by lord Sunderland, in a letter, which is now lost, but of which the substance may be collected from the correspondence of the duke.

*To Lord Sunderland.*

“ *Meldert, July 27.—August 7.* — I had not by the last post time to acknowledge the favour of yours of the 8th. As to the affairs of the church, I have done what in me is, so God’s will be done. I am very much obliged to you for your friendly and sincere manner of letting me know what must happen next winter, if the queen is not governed by her friends in the matter of the bishops. I do with all my heart wish every thing may be as you desire, for the sake of the queen and England; but I am very sensible there is no content except in a quiet life.

“ The inclosed is from Sir Cloudesley Shovel, which will give you an account of the duke of Savoy’s passing the Var. I have sent lord treasurer a copy of my letter to prince Eugene, by which you will see they intend the siege of Toulon as the first place, which is certainly right; for the other sieges would have lost time. If this expedition succeeds, we may live to see happy days, or, as the dutch are so weary of war, we must have an ill peace. The business of Hungary is as wrong as possible; but I cannot but hope the king of Sweden will at last do well, for he is certainly no friend to France. May you and yours be happy, is the hearty wish and prayer of, &c.”

“ The perplexity which these threats created, and the disappointment which Marlborough himself felt, in the failure of his efforts to vanquish the op-

position of the queen, may be traced in the subsequent letters.

*To the Duchess.*

“*July 27.*—I have a letter from lord Sunderland, in which he lets me see the ill consequences that must happen, if the queen cannot be prevailed with in the affairs of the church. It is pretty hard to me to give him an honest answer, since it would lay too great a weight upon the queen. If other things go well, that will be done as they wish; but I am rather despairing than otherwise. I have done what I can, and let what will happen, I hope to have nothing to reproach myself with, and then God’s will be done.”

*From Lord Sunderland.*

“*Whitehall, August 5.-16.*—I give you many thanks for your kind letter of the 27th of July, and assure you what I wrote to you last, concerning the affair of the church, was sincerely meant for the service of the queen, your grace, and lord treasurer. I will only say one thing more on this occasion; that there are so many uneasy things preparing by the common enemy against next sessions, and by the management of the court, so little confidence between them and the only people that either will or can support them, that I own I have terrible apprehensions of the consequences.

“I can’t help taking notice, upon this occasion, of the letter from Hanover\*, which you sent inclosed to the lord treasurer. That letter does really set that matter in so true a light, that one

\* Alluding to the invitation.



would be astonished at the blindness of the queen, or any about her, considering how much they apprehend that foolish thing. But really if the queen does go on a little longer in the way she is at present, mankind will be quite uneasy, and will think of Sir Miles Wharton's old saying, "not to anger two courts at once." I only mention these things, as what are sincerely my apprehensions, but hope you and lord treasurer will be able to prevent the mischief which seems hanging over us all.

"I am very well pleased with the resolution of the States, which you sent to the lord treasurer, for I think it leaves it entirely in the power of the deputies; and the march your grace has lately made shews it is so.

"I send inclosed a letter writ by lord treasurer's direction to lord Galway. I think it essentially agrees with your thoughts of that matter; and, indeed, as lord Rivers has ordered it, it is impossible the poor man should venture there with any satisfaction to himself, or so as to be of any use.

"I am very much afraid of the king of Sweden, by the accounts the last letters give us, though one can hardly bring oneself to think he is in measures with France."

*To Lord Sunderland, in Reply.*

"*Soignies, August 22.*—I have had the favour of yours of the 5th, and am sorry for the apprehensions you have for the next winter. As for myself, I have done what I can at this distance. I do not say this to make my court, for really I am weary of struggling, but to do myself justice to

you; for I writ \* the very next post after I received yours, and sent the copy of my letter to my lord treasurer; but I am as yet ignorant of the effect it has had. I think what you say as to lord Galway is so very right, that I hope he will approve of it, for his own sake and that of the public. I intended to have staid but one night in this camp, but the continual rains are such, that God knows when I shall be able to march."

*From Lord Sunderland.*

"*Althorpe, August 30.—September 10.*—I have the honour of yours of the 22d, since which, we have the melancholy news of our disappointment at Toulon. The greatest apprehension I have from it is, the effect it may have upon Holland; that makes it the more necessary for England to shew a spirit upon this occasion, if there should be that humour amongst them in Holland. For I am confident that people will be of the side of England in this, whenever they are spoken plainly to, notwithstanding Buys and his friends, who I take to be the Harley of Holland.

"I should be very sorry your grace should be weary of struggling, as you say you are; but if so, what must the whigs be, at least of struggling upon the foot they have hitherto done?"

*Reply of the Duke.*

"*Helchin, Sept. 19.*—I received yesterday the favour of yours of the 30th of the last month, from Althorpe. I agree entirely with you, that the success the french have had, is very discouraging;

\* To the queen.

and if care be not taken, in the manner you mention, the consequences may be dangerous with Holland; for I have received very desponding letters from those parts. Either we were in the wrong in the beginning of the war, or we have reason to continue it with vigour, or content ourselves with losing our liberties; for the french are very insolent in success, notwithstanding their great desire of peace. If the allies continue firm this winter, I am of opinion the enemy will, at the entrance of the next campaign, venture a battle in this country, since they see that success in any other part of the world cannot give them peace.

“You may be sure that I long extremely for quietness; but, at the same time, I am very sensible, that during this war I must continue in the galley. My greatest uneasiness is, what I hear from England; and my concern for the lord treasurer is such, that, as a friend, I could wish he would take the resolution of retiring; for, by the letters I receive, he will unavoidably be mortified, and, consequently, not be able to serve England with the success he has done hitherto. I do, with all my heart, wish England prosperity; but if that cannot be, it would be some ease that it was not in the hands of lord treasurer. If you are of my opinion, I shall ever acknowledge it as a mark of your kindness to me, if you advise him to make this step; for I am much more concerned for him than for myself.”

*To Lord Godolphin.*

“*Soignies, August 29.*—I am a good deal concerned at a letter I received by the last post from



lady Marlborough, in which she tells me that Mr. Harley has the entire confidence of the queen. If she has good reason for this opinion, I can't but think there should be no time lost in speaking plainly to her majesty, in letting her know what you and I think is her interest. If she be of another opinion, I think you and I should honestly let her know, that we shall not be able to carry her business on with success; so that she might have time to take her measures with such as will be able to serve her. I shall always be ready to sacrifice myself for the prosperity of the queen; but I will not be thought to have credit, when her business is managed in a way which in my opinion must be her ruin. I beg you will let me know your thoughts on this matter, and what you think may be proper to be done; for though I am weary of all sorts of business, I know her meaning is so sincerely honest, that I would undergo any trouble or hazard, that you think may do good. On the other side, if I can't do good, nothing can make me so happy as a quiet life."

By the reply of Godolphin, we find that this letter was shewn to the queen, and instead of producing the expected effect, drew from her a justification of her conduct, and a vehement exculpation of Harley, in the same manner as she had exculpated Mrs. Masham to the duchess.

"*Windsor, August 25.—September 5.*—I have the favour of yours of the 29th, with the papers enclosed. I keep them all by me, and if at any time you want any of the papers you send me, I can readily find them.

“ Though I have written fully to you by Mr. Hare about the queen, and though I am not very willing at any time to say much upon that subject by the post; yet desiring in yours of the 29th, to know my thoughts upon what lady Marlborough had written to you, I am under a necessity of endeavouring to make you comprehend as well as I can, that both Mr. Montgomery and Mrs. Freeman have thought it best to read to Mrs. Morley your last letter to me, all except one word, which was the name of a person not fit to be mentioned. They did very well foresee this would certainly have the consequence of making yet more uneasiness in Mrs. Morley towards Mrs. Freeman, but did hope it might be of so much use another way as to overbalance that. Whether their thoughts will prove right in the latter of these, I cannot tell; but in the former, I am very sure they have not been mistaken, and I believe you will soon be of the same mind in that matter, by a letter I am told you will have from the queen as soon as this. And I cannot but think it is of so much consequence, that the queen should not be countenanced and encouraged in complaints of lady Marlborough, that you will take great care, in your answer, of that particular. I will only add, that when you write yourself any thing to me, which you would not have the queen know, it ought to be in a letter apart. I am so much distracted with doubt and apprehensions concerning Toulon, that I cannot say any thing to the purpose, about that matter, or the consequences of it. But as the wind is, I believe we shall have another post to-morrow.

“ I have not seen lord Peterborough, nor has he yet waited upon the queen. In my lord Sunderland’s absence, he made his application to Mr. secretary Harley, who is rather worse disposed towards him, if possible, than his colleague. Several letters and answers have passed between them, which all tend, I think, rather to increase the misunderstandings, than to lessen them. He has sent me your letter, with his answer to some objections he states in it. I must own I think his answers to those objections, stated by himself, are frivolous enough. I believe I shall see him to-morrow or next day at Quanton-place, where I am told he is to be.”

*From the Queen.*

“ I had the satisfaction of receiving yours of the 25th last Wednesday, for which I give you many thanks, and for your kindness in telling me your mind so freely ; and I beg you would continue to do so upon all occasions. But as to what you say, that I must put my business into Mr. Harley’s hands, or follow the lord treasurer’s measures, I should be glad you would explain yourself a little more on that. For I know no measures the lord treasurer has, but what were laid down when you were here, and I do not know I have broken any of them ; for I cannot think my having nominated Sir William Dawes and Dr. Blackhall to be bishops is any breach, they being worthy men ; and all the clamour that is raised against them proceeds only from the malice of the whigs, which you would see very plainly, if you were here. I know this is otherwise represented to you, and I believe you



have been told, as I have, that these two persons were recommended to me by Mr. Harley, which is so far from being true, that he knew nothing of it, till it was the talk of the town: I do assure you these men were my own choice. They are certainly very fit for the station I design them; and, indeed, I think myself obliged to fill the bishop's bench with those that will be a credit to it, and to the church, and not always to take the recommendations of 29\*, who, all the world knows, is governed by 26†; and now that I have said all this, in answer to yours of the 25th, I must give some answer to a long letter the lord treasurer read to me, which he received by the last post from you. In that I find lady Marlborough has said, that I had an entire confidence in Mr. Harley. I know so much of my own inclination, that I am sure I have a very good opinion of Mr. Harley, and will never change it without I see cause; but I wonder how lady Marlborough could say such a thing, when she has been so often assured from me, that I relied entirely on none but Mr. Freeman and Mr. Montgomery. You seem much concerned at this thing that lady Marlborough said, and upon that, tell the lord treasurer that Mr. Freeman and Mr. Montgomery should tell their minds freely to me. It is what I desire of all things, for I can't see any other measures to be taken, than what have been already laid down; and I am sure I have no thoughts of altering them. I can think but of one

\* Probably the archbishop of Canterbury.

† The junta, or one of the whig chiefs.

thing to be added, which is, a resolution to encourage all those, who have not been in opposition, that will concur in my service, whether they be whigs or tories, which is a thing I wish might be put in practice, believing it might do a great deal of good, and I am sure it is not for my service to disoblige any body.

“ I cannot end this without begging you will once more be so kind as to tell me your mind freely in every thing. I will desire the same favour of Mr. Montgomery, and when I know both your thoughts, I will give you my poor opinion. In the mean time continue your justice to me, and be assured I will be to my last moment, most sincerely your humble servant.”

The appeal of the queen produced a reply from Marlborough, in a tone of more than usual earnestness, corroborating his former sentiments.

“ Madam ; *September 15.*

“ I have had the honour of your majesty’s of the 25th of the last month, by which I find mine of the 29th to lord treasurer was read to you. I beg the justice of you to believe, that I am no ways concerned for the power that the whigs may have with you, but the great concern that I must always have for your quiet and safety ; for if you are served to your satisfaction and security, I am very indifferent who the persons are. And as you desire that I would speak freely, I do protest in the presence of God Almighty, that I am persuaded that if you continue in the mind that I think you now are, and will not suffer those that have the honour to serve you, to manage your ‘affairs agreeably to

the circumstances of the times, your business must inevitably run into confusion ; and, consequently, make it impossible for my lord treasurer to serve ; for if he is thought to have the power, when he has not, both parties will be angry with him ; though both would admire him and be his friends, if he were out of the service. If I were with your majesty, I believe I could let you see the trouble and distraction you are like to be in this winter, which you must prevent, before the meeting of parliament, or it will be too late.

“ I find the duke of Savoy, prince Eugene, the elector of Hanover, and the emperor, are all desirous that you would be pleased to allow me to continue so long on this side the water, as might be necessary for concerting the operations of the next campaign. This will make it impossible for me to be in England before the meeting of the parliament ; and should I come at this time, it might create jealousies on this side the water. But as I prefer your quiet and service above all other considerations, if your majesty thinks my being with you, for one day or two, may be of any use, I am ready to obey. If I come in a yacht, one man of war should be ordered to Ostend, and not be told what it is for ; for I would endeavour to be back with the army, before the french should know I am gone for England. What I now propose will make so much noise, that I beg you will be pleased to advise with my lord treasurer, before you send me your commands.

“ It is impossible for me to finish this letter without assuring your majesty of what I know of



lady Marlborough, that nobody could serve you with more zeal and true affection than she has done for many years; and I must do her judgment that right, as to say, that she has foreseen some things which I thought would never have happened; I mean concerning the behaviour of \*some in your service. I pray God to direct you in all things for your own good, and that of all Europe, that your own affairs may prosper and be glorious, as they have been for some years, and I shall then enjoy all the happiness and quiet that this world can give me."

The subsequent letters refer to the same subject, and are filled with complaints on the unpleasant situation of the two ministers; being without influence with the sovereign, and yet exposed to the jealousy of those whom they were labouring to serve.

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"Sept. 15. — I inclose a copy of my letter to the queen, and I leave it to your discretion to deliver it or burn it; and I think I am obliged, let the consequence be never so fatal to the friendship and love I have for you, to tell you my opinion freely, that if the whigs continue in that unreasonable humour of being angry with you, whenever the queen does not do what they like†; for the truth is, they are jealous that you and I have inclination to try once more the tories. You and I know how false this is. However, if the queen

\* Alluding to Mrs. Masham.

† Something omitted in the original, though the sense may be supplied from the context:

will be governed by Mr. Harley, they will have just reason given them to be angry ; and if you and I continue in business, all England will believe what is done is by our advice, which will give power to the whigs to mortify whom they please ; so that I think you must speak very freely to the whigs and the queen, and if they will not approve your measures, have nothing to do with either ; and if we were well out of this war, we should then be happy."

*To the Duchess.*

" *Helchin, Sept. 15.* — I have received yours of the 25th and 26th of the last month, and by the inclosed letter you sent of the queen's, I am afraid that nothing can go well this winter. I am confirmed in this thought, by what lady Sunderland writes, as from her lord. I will make no reflections, but I own to you, that I think the expressions are very hard, when I consider what pains lord treasurer and I take.

" I have sent a letter to lord treasurer for the queen, and a copy of my letter, and have left it to his discretion of burning or delivering it. For my own part, I am out of heart, and wonder at the courage of lord treasurer ; for were I used, as I do not doubt but I shall, as he is by the whigs, who threaten to abandon him, whenever the queen displeases, I would not continue in business for all this world could give me ; and I believe they would be the first that would have reason to repent. I do not send you a copy of my letter, being sure lord treasurer will shew it you. I did desire your opinion as to his quitting, but you have never made

me any answer ; for, as I would serve the queen with the hazard of my life, so my friendship to him obliges me to wish, that he would venture nothing, since every body pretends to be angry.

“ I send you back lady Sunderland’s letter, that you may read it once more ; for I think it is plain, they believe that lord treasurer and I have a mind to bring in the tories, which is *very obliging*.”

“ *Helchin, Sept. 19.* — I have received yours of the 30th and 2d. I have received no letter from 267\* since that you sent me ; and you may be sure I shall never mention Mrs. Masham either in letter or discourse. I am so weary of all this sort of management, that I think it is the greatest folly in the world to think any struggling can do good, when both sides have a mind to be angry. When I say this, I know I must go on in the command I have here, as long as the war lasts, but I would have nothing to do any where else ; for really what I hear from England, gives me great disturbance, and sometimes vexes me so, that I am not the same man. If you, the lord treasurer, and I, were out of business, I should be more capable of doing my duty here.

“ I find by some of your letters, that you think I may have credit with the queen ; but I do assure you I have not, and I will give you one instance,—that Smalridge has been able to hinder the disposing of the professorship. I see this, but that must not alter my doing the best service I can ; I would be esteemed, but I am not ambitious of having power.”

\* Probably the queen.



*From Lord Godolphin.*

“ Windsor, Sept. 12.—21.—My last acknowledged the favour of yours [of the 12th and 15th from Helchin, and there is now but one post due this day, and we shall not have that before these letters go.

“ I believe you will have an answer by this post from the queen : whether it will be inclosed in this I cannot tell. By a long conversation between Mrs. Morley and Mr. Montgomery, of which I have had some account, I find they both agree that for you and England to see one \* another before the natural time, might be liable to many great inconveniences ; and those, in the nature of them so uncertain, that no human precaution is sufficient to prevent the ill consequences that may happen from those uncertainties. Besides that, to say the plain truth, in case one should run that venture, one cannot at this time depend upon the fruit of it with any certainty, I having lately spoken very fully upon all those subjects, of which Mrs. Freeman’s head and heart seem to be so full. And though there has yet appeared but very little encouragement to think the arguments used upon that occasion are like to prevail ; yet one may conclude in this case, as the Scripture does, in the very words of our Saviour. “ *If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead.*” Mr. Hare can explain this sentence to you, if there be need of it.

“ I have troubled you so much in my three or four last letters upon the subject of our affairs

\* These expressions are used to conceal the cypher.

abroad, that I shall not repeat any thing, but that it seems indispensable to have a congress of the ministers of all the allies, at your return to the Hague, for a thorough concert of all that is to be done next year. The time will not allow you to give yourself the trouble of going to the elector of Hanover, or any body else. The sooner this concert can be made, the better ; for we shall never be able to get our parliament to enter upon the particulars of the war, next year, till we are able to communicate some scheme for it, from abroad, which will be encouraging and agreeable to them. I am very sensible that in other years the encouragement to our allies has often proceeded from their votes, in the first week of the parliament ; but our misfortunes and disappointments in this year will make that very difficult at present, even though we could obtain those things to be done, which are necessary to put them in good humour."

*To the Duchess.*

" *Helchin, Sept. 29.* — Tho' I have wrote a long letter this day by the post, I would not lose this safe opportunity by Mr. Lumley. I am so extremely concerned for the quiet and safety of lord treasurer, that I can't be at ease till I know what resolution he has taken. If he stays in his place, and does not entirely govern the queen, he will be duped by Mr. Harley ; and if he does, what is certainly best for himself, quit, he will do great hurt both to the business at home and abroad. However, there is nothing else left to make the queen sensible of the danger she is running into ; and if that will not do, we must leave it to Provi-

dence. I do with all my heart pity the queen, being very sure she does not know the fatal step she is going to make."

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"*Helchin, Sept. 29.* — I have had the favour of yours of the 12th; I have also received the letter you mentioned from the queen. I am sure lady Marlborough must have acquainted you with it. You being on the place must judge infinitely better than I can; but by what I hear from England, I think every thing must go ill, and therefore I continue of the opinion, that unless the queen will be pleased to be guided by you, or that lords Somers, Halifax, and Sunderland, will make it their business to persuade you to have patience some time longer: if neither of these two things happen, I hope you will take such measures, that it may appear very plainly to England, that you do not approve of the measures now taken. The words in your letter I think I understand, so that I shall not speak to Dr. Hare; but since one from the dead can't gain belief, pray be careful of the living, for I am convinced that the queen will not be guided, till she see that the advice she now follows has brought her affairs into confusion. Nothing shall dishearten me from endeavouring to do all the good I can here abroad. Our prospect is by no means good; but I think in the beginning of the next week to go for two days to the Hague, in order to hearten and take measures with them, so that I might not be obliged to stay long at the Hague when the campaign is done, tho' I am persuaded my being in England this winter will be of very little use to



the public. But I shall have the satisfaction of being with you and lady Marlborough notwithstanding."

"*Helchin, Sept. 29.* — The uneasiness of the whigs, and the obstinacy of the queen, must unavoidably give an opportunity to the Tories of shewing their malice. I am a good deal concerned for the mischief this must do, both at home and abroad; but I am satisfied it will be impossible for you and me to influence the queen to any thing that is right, till she has tried this scheme of Mr. secretary Harley and his friends. What it is, God knows, but that there is one I am sure. If there is any thing in the world can hinder her from running this hazard, it must be her knowing you will quit. For myself, I would not, for any thing this world could give me, act otherwise than to shew that I have no concern left, but the wishing you may do right. If you stay in your place, though you are no ways consenting, yet all that shall be amiss you must be answerable for; and on the other side, I am very sensible that if you do quit, the business both at home and abroad must very much suffer. For whatever the queen and these new schemers may think; the allies will expect nothing good from England, when they shall see that you and I have lost our credit, after having served with so great success. I hope your answer to this will let me know your positive resolution, so that I might govern myself; for whilst you are in, I shall send my opinion."

## CHAPTER 63.

1707.

*Journey of Marlborough to the Hague, to arrange the plans of the ensuing campaign. — Distributes his troops into quarters. — Meets the elector of Hanover and count Wratislaw at Frankfort. — Increasing difficulties with the queen. — Cabals and letters of Harley. — Return of Marlborough to the Hague. — Correspondence with Godolphin on the feuds in the cabinet, and their future conduct.*

As the campaign was now drawing to a close, and as both the queen and treasurer disapproved Marlborough's temporary journey to England, it became necessary to accelerate the arrangements for the ensuing year, that his departure from the continent might not be retarded.

For this purpose, he first visited the Hague, to confer with the ministers of the States; and after a short stay at the camp, on his return, repaired to Frankfort, to settle the necessary plans with the elector of Hanover, and with count Wratislaw, who was deputed thither on the part of the emperor.

During this interval his correspondence displays the same character, and the domestic broils occupied more of his attention than the foreign transactions.

*To Lord Godolphin.*

“ *Helchin, Oct. 3.*—I shall go to-morrow towards the Hague, where I intend to stay but two days at most, being resolved to return to this camp. I have thought, as well as I can, how to leave the business of this country, at my return to England, and I think it must be to Cadogan; so that if the queen pleases, I shall acquaint the States General, and the council of state of this country, that in the absence of Mr. Stepney, he is charged with the care of her majesty’s business. My journey this time to the Hague, will not only enable me to take measures for the operations on the Rhine, for the next campaign, but also make my stay much shorter at the end of the campaign.

“ You will have known by the last letters from France, that the king has given orders, as they write, for an augmentation of 30 regiments of foot and 20 of horse. This added to the superiority they had the last campaign in Germany, Flanders, and Spain, as also the advantage they probably will have of having some of their troops from Spain, must give a very melancholy prospect for the next year’s service, if we are not willing and able to make a considerable augmentation. I shall endeavour to make them sensible of this at the Hague, tho’ I am aware their expence is already so great, that tho’ they should have the will, I fear they have not the power. You shall be sure to know by the next post from the Hague, in what humour I find them; and if there should be a necessity of my going to Frankfort, I shall do it, so as not to delay my coming for England; for if I



do go, I will return to this army before they separate, so that I desire the yachts may be in Holland by the end of October, old style."

Marlborough leaving Helchin on the 4th of October, reached the Hague at nine in the morning, on the 6th, and without a moment's delay visited the pensionary and secretary to the council of state, with whom he deliberated on the objects of his journey. In the afternoon he held a conference with the deputies of the States, and communicated the orders which he had received from the queen, to repair to Frankfort, for the purpose of settling with the elector of Hanover and count Wratislaw, the operations of the next campaign. The same afternoon he held another conference with the deputies, and obtained the concurrence of the dutch government in all the plans, which he thought proper to submit to their consideration. During his short stay at the Hague, we find some interesting communications both on foreign and domestic affairs.

*To Lord Godolphin.*

"*Hague, October 7.* — Since coming here I have had two conferences with the deputies of the States; they are very desirous I should meet the elector of Hanover, for taking measures with him for the next year's campaign, and at the same time to press that the emperor, and empire, might take the 6000 saxon horse into their service. I shall so order it, that my going to Mentz shall not delay my return to England; for I intend to return to the army before they separate. I leave this place this evening, and hope to be with the army on

Sunday night, and stay with them till the Saturday following, when I shall leave them encamped, where they shall continue till my return, which I intend shall be by the 28th or 29th of this month. In two days after my return, I intend to send them to their garrisons, after which, I am afraid it will be necessary for me to be at Brussels for some few days. By what I have now done, I hope my stay at the Hague need not be above six days. I am the more particular, that you may know when to expect me in England, which I think may be about the 7th of November.

“ Having this safe opportunity by col. Pendergrass, I must acquaint you, that I see very plainly, that the dutch will not only not augment their troops, but will act the next year as they have done this last, which is so disheartening, that I do wish with all my heart, it were possible for me to be excused from being at the head of their troops. I am very impatient to hear the certainty of what you will do; for that shall govern me. I shall say no more, since you will see my mind by the inclosed copy of what I wrote to the queen.

“ Brigadier Palnes came to me yesterday. He hopes to be in a condition to pass with the next packet boat. He will give you an account of all that the duke of Savoy and prince Eugene have said to him.”

*To the Duchess.*

“ *Hague, October 7.*—I thank you for yours of the 16th, as also the copy\* you sent me. God’s

\* Probably a copy of one of her letters to the queen, or of one of the queen’s replies.

will must be done. I have thought as well as I can, and have prepared myself for the worst.

“ I return to-morrow for the army, and as it is thought necessary for me to go to Mentz or Frankfurt, I shall begin that journey about ten days hence, and return again to the army, before they go to their winter-quarters; so that this journey will not delay my coming for England, as I intended, in the first week in November. I have had so little time to myself here, that I shall not trouble you with a longer letter, but refer you to what I wrote to lord treasurer. He will let you see what I wrote to the queen, in answer to two letters I have received.”

*To Lord Sunderland.*

“ *Hague, October 7.*—My lord; I had the favour of yours of the 19th last night, and am very glad of this safe opportunity, by colonel Pendergrass, to return you my thanks and thoughts. I believe the last year no argument could have prevailed with the queen to have had a thought of parting with me and the lord treasurer; but I have good reason to think that is much altered. However, I believe when it is very plain, that I and the lord treasurer are in earnest, I am a good deal of your opinion, that the queen will not part with us; so that I think there should be no time lost in trying this experiment. If it does not do, at least the lord treasurer and I shall have nothing to reproach ourselves with, and shall be blessed with a quiet life, which in my opinion is preferable to all this world can give. I do from my soul wish so well to the queen, that I hope those that shall



succeed may be more lucky in giving content than we have been ; but I am sure they can never be more sincere, though we could not cure jealousies."

*Reply of Lord Sunderland.*

" *Newmarket, October 8.—19.*—I must now return you my thanks for the favour of your kind letter by Mr. Pendergrass. I am fully convinced that things are not so well as they were last year between the queen, and your grace, and the lord treasurer. But I must beg on this occasion to say, that if you and the lord treasurer would have believed what some of your friends and servants have told you, in relation to Mr. secretary Harley, this had never happened. But be that as it will, without looking back to what is past, I am sure it is high time to try to retrieve them, before they are past recovery; and I can't but believe, as you say, that when it is very plain that you and the lord treasurer are in earnest, the queen will not part with you; since what is insisted on is so reasonable in itself, as well as what has been promised over and over. I am ashamed to trouble you in so many letters with this over and over; and, indeed, I should not do it, but for the apprehension I have of the inevitable confusion that must attend the queen, and all that have to do with her, if this obstinacy continues. For as to myself, I am very easy, having resolved, as an honest man, whatever happens, to act upon the same principles and with the same people I have always acted."

In the afternoon of the 7th, Marlborough de-

parted from the Hague and proceeded to Antwerp, from which place we find a letter to Godolphin.

“ *Antwerp, Oct. 8.*—I received this afternoon yours of the 23d, by which I see you are desirous I should come for England. Your two letters of the 12th and 16th, as well as that of the queen, telling me that your opinions were, that it would make too much noise, made me take the measures I now have done at the Hague, to meet the elector of Hanover, and one \* from the emperor, at Mentz, the 20th of this month. Accordingly I have wrote letters to all the courts of Germany; so that it will be impossible for me to put the journey off; but since the queen is desirous I should come, I will order it so as to be with you by the first of November, if the wind gives leave. I am afraid my presence will be but of very little use, but if the queen and you be of another opinion, the parliament ought then to be put off for a fortnight. And if the intelligence I have from England be true, their meeting is no ways to be wished, till the queen is pleased to take a firm resolution of what she will do; for if the whigs will not support, and the tories will be malicious, what must be the consequence but ruin. But if any body has a good scheme, which is like to succeed, the sooner they meet the better.

“ I find my thoughts are very different from those of the queen. My comfort is, that a little time will convince her I am much more concerned

\* Count Wratislaw.

for her quiet and good, than I am for my own life. Whilst I am thought to have a share in the ministry, I must tell my mind freely, when I see destruction at hand. When I have nothing to do, I shall not displease, and shall always be ready to help, whenever I shall think my service can be of use."

On the 10th he reached the camp, and inspected the movements of the troops, preparatory to the arrangements of winter-quarters. The same evening the intended garrisons for Menin, Courtray, and Oudenard, commenced their march, and on the ensuing day the army moved to Pettighem, with an intention to traverse the Scheld. The passage being however delayed by heavy rains, till the 13th, they proceeded through Ghent to Westrem, and finally pitched their camp at Asch. Here they remained stationary a few days, and followed the example of the enemy, in breaking up for their winter-quarters, which were nearly the same as in the preceding year.

Before the separation took place, Marlborough had commenced his journey, and his correspondence with his friends in England shews the progress of his negotiations, as well as the state of domestic affairs in England.

*To the Duchess.*

" *Helchin, October 10.*—I having had opportunities of writing four letters to you this week; and my head aching, and none of yours to answer, will be an excuse for this short letter. I leave this camp to-morrow, and shall certainly have the spleen to see the poor soldiers march in dirt up to the



knees, for we have had a very great deal of rain. I shall write to you once more before I leave the army, after which my letters will come irregularly, till my return from Germany. I hope to make the journey in fourteen days."

"*Westrem, October 13.*—I have had yours from Woodstock of the 25th. I wish you may find the building advanced as you are told; but by what is writ to me, I believe you will not. I have been a good deal out of order these four or five days; however, I intend to begin my journey on Saturday, so that I may be in England, since it is desired, by the first of November. I pray God I may be able to do any good, when I shall be there. I have no heart nor spirits left, and would give a good deal to avoid this troublesome journey. We have had, and have still very ill weather, which will make the roads intolerable. I am very much afraid I shall not have the pleasure of receiving many of your letters till my return; however, I will take the best care I can to have them follow me, so that I beg you will be regular in writing, and I will take all opportunities of doing the same.

"I have often had the spleen, but never with so much reason as now, finding almost every body disheartened, I mean on this side the water; and if we have at the same time uneasiness in England, how is it possible to struggle? The english I am afraid do not know their happiness, I mean in comparison with other countries; but if they oblige the queen to a peace, as the circumstances of affairs are now abroad, they will be sensible in

a very little time of their error. For my own part, it will give me ease, and the pleasure of being with you, which is what I most earnestly desire.”

*To Lord Godolphin.*

“ *Westrem, October 13.*—If you have so ill weather as we have here, Newmarket must be very disagreeable. I was not well when we began our march on Tuesday, and these three ill days have made me more uneasy; however, I am resolved to begin my journey next Saturday, that I may return to the Hague, so as I may be in England by the first of November. You know that Mr. Craggs keeps company with the tories, which makes me send you his inclosed letter \*, which I desire may be shewn to the queen; for if the whigs will not oppose these measures, I beg that parliament may be put off for some little time, but you and the queen can judge much better than I can. But my zeal is such, that I can’t forbear sending my opinion; for if the tories succeed, it will not be in any body’s power to do service. I found every body so desponding, that should parliament not begin with their usual vigour, it must give great advantage to France, especially should they shew any inclination for peace. And should they succeed in their invitation, the dutch would think themselves undone, for they put their trust entirely on the sincerity of the queen; for the news of the invitation was got to the Hague, so that I know the pensioner thinks it will disturb all business, which will encourage in their country the

\* This relates to the proposed invitation of the princess Sophia to England.

partisans of France. I intend to-morrow to make use of the queen's leave, in making the inclosed promotions."

"*Frankfort, October 27.*—I was resolved to have left this place on Monday last, but the two electors were so very pressing that I would stay for the arrival of count Wratislaw, that I could not refuse. He is not yet come, but they say he will be here this night. I have taken my measures to begin my journey on Saturday, and hope to be at the Hague by the 3d of the next month; so that with a fair wind, I may yet have the happiness of being with you by the 1st of November, old style. The two electors are very zealous that the emperor and the empire may entertain the 6000 saxon horse, which would be a very necessary augmentation for this army. I have promised to press count Wratislaw that the court of Vienna may do their part, which it is said ought to be one-half of the expence. I believe I shall have good words, but I am afraid it may end there; however, I shall be very plain with him. The elector of Hanover tells me very positively, that if the empire do not put their army in a better condition than it is at this time, he will not return to it the next campaign. I can be very sensible of the uneasiness he is like to meet with, by what I suffer in Flanders.

"What I am going to say does not proceed from the spleen, but really from the vexation I have in my mind, which makes me less capable of serving with success, as I have done hitherto; so that if I can't prevail to have prince Eugene sent



to Catalonia, I should think the next best thing for the service will be, that he commands in chief in the empire, and that the elector of Hanover takes upon him the command I have in Flanders; for if things go as I think they will, both in England and Holland, nothing shall prevail with me to lose that reputation I have hazarded for this war. Till I have had an opportunity of acquainting the queen, and having her leave, I shall let nobody know of this intention of mine but the pensioner, who is an honest man, and so much my friend, that he will say nothing of it, till he has my leave.

“ I send you the duke of Savoy's letter and project, as also my answer; so that in what I have been wanting, the lords of the cabinet may advise her majesty. The States having, by an express, given me power to assure the landgrave of Hesse, that they will satisfy him for his arrears, if he will consent to leave his troops one year longer in Italy, I shall this afternoon send an express to Cassel, and press him, in the name of her majesty, as well as that of the States General; but I fear he has already sent his orders from the Hague. You shall know what effect my letter to the landgrave has had.”

Meanwhile, Godolphin, in conformity with the advice imparted in the preceding letters, in his own name, and in that of Marlborough, expostulated with Harley; and not only required from him a categorical answer, whether he would continue to support the system on which they had hitherto acted, but specifically charged him with

influencing the queen in the choice of the two bishops.

Harley received these accusations with an affectation of humility and surprise, and replied in the language of injured innocence. As to the first point, he professed his sole and decided attachment to Godolphin and Marlborough, and after hinting at the malice of the whigs, who delighted to wound in the dark, and to ruin by misrepresentations the characters of those whom they did not approve, he made a tender of his resignation, whenever he should be deemed a burthen to the service. His answer to the question, whether he would continue to concur in the measures of the treasurer and general, can only be given in his own singular words.

“ It has always been my temper to go along with the company, and if they should say Harrow on the Hill or Maidenhead was the nearest way to Windsor, I would go along with them and never dispute it, if that would give content; and that I might not be forced to swear it was so.” He then professes his sincerity and devotion to his two patrons, and continues, “ I am satisfied to a demonstration there can be no other centre of union but the queen, by the ministration of your lordship and the duke of Marlborough, and there the bulk of the nation will fix themselves if they be suffered. All other expedients are very wretched things, and will end but ill; and I dread the thoughts of running from the extreme of one faction to another, which is the natural consequence of party

tyranny, and renders the government like a door, which turns both ways upon the hinges, to let in each party as it grows triumphant; and in truth it is the real parent and nurse of our factions here. It is time to relieve your lordship's patience, and beg pardon for this tedious letter, and withal to desire leave to assure your lordship, that you have not a more faithful servant, nor a truer or more zealous friend than myself, to the utmost of my capacity, &c."

He wrote in the same style to Marlborough.

"*September 16.-27.*—I have desired my lord treasurer to ask leave for me to go into the country, which I hope to do this night se'nnight. I entreat your grace will permit me now, upon my taking leave, to assure you I never have writ any thing to you but what I really thought and intended. For near two years, I have seen the storm coming upon me, and now I find I am to be sacrificed to sly insinuations, and groundless jealousies. I have the satisfaction, not only of my own mind, but my enemies and friends witness for me, that I have served your grace and my lord treasurer with the nicest honour, and by the strictest rules of friendship; that I have sacrificed every thing to this, the world knows; and that what credit I have with the clergy or laity, has been all employed to no other end but the service of both your lordships.

"I have not interposed in, or contradicted directly or indirectly, by myself or any other, the putting in or putting out any person, or meddled



with any measures which are taken ; for I have avoided knowing them. And yet I am now first charged in general, and when I desired that particulars might be told me, nothing is specified but the two nominated bishops. I must therefore say the same to your grace, I did when it was mentioned to me yesterday, that I never knew those two persons, I never spoke of them, nor ever thought of them, or directly or indirectly ever recommended them to the queen, or to, or by any other person. And, my lord, I must do myself this justice, that I am above telling a solemn lie ; that I scorn the baseness of it ; and that if I had known or recommended those persons, I would not have been so mean as to deny it, but would have owned it, and given my reasons for it. And now, my lord, since I am going into the country, and perhaps Sunday next may put an end to any farther opportunity of my troubling your grace with letters ; I beg leave to assure your grace, that I shall always preserve an entire duty and service for your grace. And I will add but this, that if there be any uneasiness in the queen to comply with any proposals, I heartily wish that the true reason of it may be found out ; for as I have no hand in it, nor any friend or acquaintance of mine that I know of, so I believe that half the pains which are taken to accuse and asperse the innocent, would discover the true cause, and provide the remedy. I shall trouble your grace no more upon this subject. I humbly beseech you to forgive what is extorted by the undeserved misrepre-

sentations made of him, who has neither in thought, word, or deed, contradicted the title of being, with the utmost sincerity, \*

“ My lord,

“ Your grace’s most humble,

“ And most obedient servant,

“ R. HARLEY.”

These asseverations, however solemn and plausible, did not dissipate the suspicions of the two ministers, although from the correspondence it appears, that they continued in a state of doubt and hesitation, ignorant of his real schemes, and yet conscious that he was secretly caballing to their detriment.

Marlborough, in particular, seems to have been deeply affected by the ingratitude of a minister, whom he had cherished and promoted, and so discouraged by the decline of that influence which he had hitherto enjoyed, that he determined to carry

\* Contrary to my custom, I have inserted these extracts from the letters of Harley, which I discovered in the Hardwicke Collection, notwithstanding they are already printed in the Hardwicke State Papers, and Somerville’s Queen Anne; because they convey an indubitable proof of political duplicity which has seldom been paralleled. That I may not be accused of partiality to the great man whose life I have undertaken to write, I shall merely give the comment of the able historian of queen Anne.

“ The part which Mr. Harley was now acting exhibits a scene of dissimulation and duplicity, for which, neither his sympathy with the sovereign, nor the unjustifiable conduct of the junta to her, nor the goodness of the end which he had in view, supposing that to be admitted, can afford any apology. He not only maintained the external profession of respect for the duke of Marlborough and lord Godolphin, but continued in his private correspondence to give them the most solemn assurances of his affectionate attachment to their persons, while he was using every art to undermine their influence with the queen.” Somerville’s Queen Anne, v. 268 *note*

into effect the resolution he had already announced, of withdrawing from public life. But as the affair drew to a crisis, Godolphin relapsed into his former hesitation. He appears to have been vanquished by the earnest solicitations of the queen, and fascinated by the professions of Harley; and the last letter which he wrote to his friend, is an attempt to weaken the impression which his complaints had previously made.

“*Newmarket, Oct. 7.-18.*—I am to acknowledge from this place the favour of yours of the 8th from Antwerp, by an officer whom I don’t know, with the enclosed to the queen, which I delivered to her last night; also that of the 10th from Helchin, and of the 13th from Westrem, with the letters and papers enclosed. I am extremely sorry to find by them that you complain of want of health, at the same time you are to take a great journey, in this ill weather, which is the same with us as with you, and makes the queen very apprehensive of a fit of the gout coming upon her here. I saw her very uneasy last night, but they send me word this morning she is a little better; and if she is able, she designs to go to London on the 10th.

“I am very much troubled to find our letters of the 23d of September did not reach you before you left the Hague, and had settled with them your journey to the Rhine; for it is most certain that must have had a better effect, after you could have been able to have encouraged them from hence; and it is as certain, that your coming over in time, would have contributed to that encouragement more than any thing else can. It is very



true, both the queen and my letters were against your coming for a day or two only, while the armies were in the field; for that could not but have made a great noise, and have exposed all things to great hazard, without allowing time enough here, for your coming to have been of any effect. But when the armies were, or might have been separated, when you had opportunity of giving, at the Hague, the reasons for your coming over, that must needs have been of the greatest use here; and if it had succeeded, would have enabled you to have adjusted every thing on that side, much more to the advantage of the common cause. But there is an end of that now, and it remains only to be considered, whether the parliament can be deferred a fortnight, without doing more hurt than good. I confess I think it puts us under a great deal of difficulty; and I doubt the parliament cannot be put off, without discouraging our friends, retarding all our preparations, and encouraging the opposing party, already grown insolent, from our ill success abroad this year.

“On the other side, nothing is fixed here to make the parliament succeed, nor can I do any thing so shameful as to abandon the queen, but upon a joint measure with Mr. Freeman, who now cannot be here till after that thing comes to bear; and the resolution must be taken, one way or other, upon the whole matter. I can come to no other conclusion, but that it will still be best for you to hasten hither as soon as you can. Accidents may happen to delay the proceedings of the parliament,

so that nothing very material may be decided finally before you come.

“ In several of your letters to Mrs. Morley, I find you often repeat *that the rashness of some people's schemes may prove fatal*. But there is really no such thing as a scheme, or any thing like it from any body else; nor has the queen as yet any thought of taking a scheme, but from Mr. Freeman and Mr. Montgomery. The misfortune is, that the queen happens to be entangled in a promise \* that is extremely inconvenient, and upon which so much weight is laid, and such inferences made; that to effect this promise would be destruction; and at the same time, she is uneasy with every body that endeavours to shew the consequences which attend it.

“ 10. at night. This afternoon the queen told me she hoped to write to you herself by this post, but just now she sent me the inclosed †, which I send you, because it is less trouble to me, than to write the substance of it by candle-light.”

These cabals in the cabinet, and the declining favour of Godolphin and Marlborough, did not escape the penetration of the dutch government, and increased that desire which the States had already manifested for peace. But no mortifications could damp the zeal of the two friends for the true interest of their country; for we find Godolphin engaged in a correspondence with the leading men in Holland, the object of which was to stimu-

\* About the two bishops.

† Unfortunately this and many other letters, between the queen and the duke, are lost.

late them to new exertions, and to evince the necessity of prosecuting the war with unabated vigour, and on the same principles on which it was begun.

*From Lord Godolphin.*

“ *Newmarket, October 9.-20.*—I have but just time to acknowledge yours of the 11th. I did not want the letter you inclosed from Slingelandt, to know their humour in Holland for peace. I have letters almost every post from Buys. I send you the last, because I have not time to copy it. Pray keep it, and when you see him, if you ask him, I believe he will shew you my answer, which is, in short, to repeat, that if they will proceed to settle their state of war, they may have such terms as will satisfy and secure their allies; whereas, any other method will create jealousies and distinctions among the allies, and oblige all sides to continue their expences. I need not, therefore, trouble you with any thing more, to guide you in your behaviour, when you come to the Hague, especially since Mr. Secretary Harley’s letter to you upon that point is so plain and so full; I think it was dated 4-15. In a word, after the advantages with which God has blessed the arms of the allies, England will not be satisfied, nor think themselves safe, with less terms than those mentioned in the letter to Buys.

“ I cannot say enough to you, nor have I time for your expressions of kindness to myself. I am apt to think that matter \* may remain as it is, till

\* Their resignation.



your coming over, which I wish may be with the soonest, but not much longer."

" *October 24. — Nov. 4.* — The wind being westerly, I must still continue to write, though I long extremely to see you here; for till you come, I doubt nothing will go right, whatever it does then. I labour as much as I can, and try every way that can be thought of, to prevent the queen's spoiling every thing. But I am much afraid it will be too late, unless Mr. Freeman helps to make a solemn treaty, from which there is to be no departure upon any terms whatsoever, without which, it will be next to impossible for Mr. Montgomery to continue where he is; and the consequences of that I need not enlarge upon to you.

" Mr. Secretary Harley came to town the night before the parliament met. They chose the same speaker yesterday, without any obstruction, and he is to be presented to the queen the 30th, at which time I am afraid there will be a necessity for her to speak, though if it could be without too much murmuring, I would rather her speech were deferred till you come."

*To Lord Godolphin.*

" *Hague, Nov. 4.* — A little after my arrival here last night, I received five packets from England. The convoy is also come, and I am using all the diligence I can, to dispatch what of necessity must be done before I leave this place. Count Wratislaw and Quiros being here, with powers from the emperor and the king of Spain, will create so much business, that should I stay a month, I should not have one day to myself. I

have declared to them, as well as to the States, that I shall be obliged to make use of the first fair wind after this next Tuesday. The wind being now very contrary, I may probably be with you as soon as this letter, which I beg with my duty you will let the queen know is the reason of my not doing myself the honour of answering hers of the 14th.

“I send you inclosed my letter to the landgrave of Hesse, his answer, and the States’ letter to me on that subject. I also send you the letters I have received by two expresses from Turin. You will be pleased to acquaint her majesty with the contents, and such as may be proper, with her leave, may be communicated to the cabinet council. I shall do my utmost to persuade the landgrave’s minister, that his master’s troops may continue one year longer in Italy. I do not see by prince Eugene’s letter, that he has any thoughts of going to Italy; and by what I find by count Wratislaw, I am afraid the court of Vienna are desirous of keeping him in Germany.

“The pensioner has promised me to second my endeavours with count Wratislaw, that the prince may be sent. He tells me that the king of France has given the necessary orders for an augmentation of threescore thousand men, which I believe is not in his power; however, it has a very ill effect here. I have many things to say, but shall give you no further trouble at this time, being resolved of being with you as soon as possible.”

“*Hague, Nov. 8.*—I had ordered my business so that I might have sailed this day, having sent

my servants on board yesterday, and ordered the yacht to Helvoet Sluys, where they are now, with the men of war, so that we might go to sea with the first opportunity. But the wind is not only contrary, but also blows very hard, so that God knows when I shall be able to be with you; but you may be assured that I will not lose one hour, when the wind will allow my going to sea.

“ I have this morning had the favour of yours of the 24th, and am much troubled to see that the queen continues making you uneasy. I am afraid you do me too much honour in thinking that my presence is necessary; but you may depend that I shall be governed by you, in doing what you think may do good; but I must confess that by what I see abroad, as well as at home, it looks as if it were resolved by destiny, that nothing should go well this winter. My last letter I hear is blown back; and as the wind is, it is impossible for this to go, so that I may be as soon with you as this.”

*To the Duchess.*

“ *Hague, Nov. 8.*—I was in hopes not to have writ, but to have been at sea this night, having sent my servants on board the yacht yesterday. But the wind being as contrary as possible, and blowing a storm, I have continued in this place, but shall not send for my servants back, being resolved to make use of the first wind that will allow of my going to sea, having finished what I was to do here, and very desirous of being with you. I am afraid my friends will then see that I am not of much use, but I shall be governed. I am sorry to tell you that the inclinations the dutch




have for peace will occasion their hurting themselves and their friends, as much as our unhappy differences in England. I am to thank you for yours of the 24th, which I received this morning. What you say of Mrs. Masham is very odd; and if you think she is a good weathercock, it is high time to leave off struggling; for believe me, nothing is worth rowing for against wind and tide, at least you will think so when you come to my age. I have been to wait upon Mrs. Burnett, and have ordered her a yacht."

" *Hague, Nov. 11.*—I find my lord treasurer very desirous of my being with him. I have no opinion of my being able to do any good; but uncertainty is the worst of all conditions, for death itself is easier than the fear of it. If you were truly sensible of the great desire I have of ending my days quietly with you, I flatter myself your good-nature would be contented to bear many inconveniences, and to let the rest of the world govern itself after its own method. This is the third I have writ since my being here, and the postmaster tells me, that not only those, but some of mine from Frankfort, are still on this side; so that I shall not make this longer, than by assuring you of my being, with my heart and soul,

" Yours."

END OF THE THIRD VOLUME.







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